Iran-Israel Clash Marks New Phase of Syrian Conflict: Matthew R.J. Brodsky, Weekly Standard, Feb. 13, 2018 — The recent clash between Iran and Israel is the latest indication that there’s some unfinished business to attend to in Syria…
It’s Time for Trump to Attack Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: Richard Goldberg, New York Post, Feb. 12, 2018— When Iran flew an unmanned aerial vehicle into Israel this weekend, the mullahs were testing President Trump, not just Israel.
39 Years Since the Establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Dr. Doron Itzchakov, BESA, Feb. 1, 2018— On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini landed at Mehrabad Airport to the cheering of the crowds, and 10 days later he declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under his leadership.
He Fought for Iran’s Environment and Was Arrested. Now, He’s Dead: Thomas Erdbrink, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2018— A well-known Iranian-Canadian professor has died in prison in Tehran, a statement posted on his son’s Instagram page revealed on Saturday, and his family is seeking an independent autopsy.
Israel Signaling a Heavy Price for Iranian 'Entrenchment' in Syria: David Makovsky, Washington Institute, Feb. 12, 2018
Israeli Assessment: Next Bout With Iran Only a Matter of Time: Judah Ari Gross, Times of Israel, Feb. 11, 2018
Comparing the Nuclear Challenges Posed by North Korea and Iran: Emily B. Landau, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 25, 2018
How 'Peoplekind' Has Done a Disservice to the Brave Women of Iran: Terry Glavin, National Post, Feb. 7, 2018
IRAN-ISRAEL CLASH MARKS NEW PHASE OF SYRIAN CONFLICT
Matthew R.J. Brodsky
Weekly Standard, Feb. 13, 2018
The recent clash between Iran and Israel is the latest indication that there’s some unfinished business to attend to in Syria even with the decline of the civil war and the territorial defeat of ISIS. In the skirmish over the weekend Iranian troops launched an Iranian-made attack drone against Israel from inside Syria, which resulted in what Brig. Gen. Tomer Bar, the deputy head of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) called, “the biggest and most significant attack the air force has conducted against Syrian air defenses since Operation Peace for the Galilee” in 1982 during the First Lebanon War. Unfortunately, it also resulted in the first loss of an Israeli fixed-wing combat aircraft since the same 1982 war in Lebanon. It means the war in Syria is shifting gears and entering a new phase, where the rules of the game are also being put to the test.
This event marks the first time Iranian soldiers used their own weapons to fire at Israel; usually they employ any number of proxies or Hezbollah. Nevertheless, it was not the first time they or those who serve the regime in Tehran have used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In fact, Iran’s drone program, which includes suicide drones, is rather advanced. They have developed and distributed them to Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. In 2012, Hezbollah threatened to use them to take out Israel’s nuclear infrastructure and by 2015, Hezbollah boasted of an advanced drone operating base in Lebanon.
Nor has Iran and its loyal forces focused solely on Israel with their developing drone technology. In 2017, they used them against U.S.-backed forces in Syria after releasing footage from a day earlier where they shadowed allied forces.
This specific drone from the attack in Israel was a copy of the advanced American UAV that Iran seized in 2011 and it emulated Western technology including its “low signature” profile which helps evade detection. Just last week, Iran opened a line to mass-produce offensive drones that are meant to carry precision munitions. There is no indication yet as to whether the drone involved in the weekend’s attack was carrying ammunition.
In this new phase of the Syrian conflict, the regional and international powers involved are seeking to establish new rules of the game for engagement. It includes testing the shade of each other’s red lines to see if they are actually pink. Recent examples include the U.S. coalition’s coordinated response to the shelling that fell near an allied base outside of Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria. That strike came after U.S. warned Russia and observed the hostile force build up over the course of several days. Another example is Turkey’s foray into Afrin in northwest Syria that not only aroused the ire of Assad and Iran but has also rankled the U.S.-backed coalition. The Turkish president has promised a blink-first contest over the town of Manbij where U.S.-supported forces are located, after delivering an invective-laced speech against the United States before his ruling party.
For Israel, this brings about yet another shift in the rules. Since the start of the Syrian war in 2011, it has had a relatively free hand to strike what it describes as “game-changing” weapons in Syria, as long as it left Lebanon alone. That in itself was a dramatic reversal of the unwritten rules, which for decades saw the Syrian border as Israel’s quietest, with its enemies loyal to Iran preferring to strike from Lebanon and risk repercussions there.
The 2011 rules changed in 2015 with Russia’s entry into the conflict and the air defense umbrella it set up north of Homs. The T-4 air base, from which this latest drone attack was launched is located along the same parallel and is one of Syria’s largest and most important airfields also used by the Russian Air Force for regional operations. Some in Israel’s security establishment have surmised that this latest drone flight was designed to lure Israel into the Syrian hornet’s nest of air defenses.
Whether or not this latest Iranian attack was meant as a test or to deliver a message to Israel, the U.S. and their allies, one its goals was to make Israel think twice before responding to Iran’s breaching of Israel’s red lines, which aside from the transfer of “game-changing” weapons systems includes the consolidation Iran’s territorial gains and the transformation of its military posture in order to further threaten Israel. All of this is aside from Iran’s nuclear project, which is the loudest clock ticking in Israeli minds.
IT’S TIME FOR TRUMP TO ATTACK IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
Richard Goldberg
New York Post, Feb. 12, 2018
When Iran flew an unmanned aerial vehicle into Israel this weekend, the mullahs were testing President Trump, not just Israel. The Iranian drone, reportedly based on US technology, was a reminder of America’s abandonment of an active military deterrent, which began in 2011 when President Barack Obama allowed Iran to recover a highly classified UAV instead of sending a missile to destroy it.
In the years that followed, Obama applied intense pressure to prevent an Israeli airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities, abandoned coercive diplomacy to appease Tehran in nuclear negotiations and responded to the capture of 10 US sailors with the diplomatic equivalent of “Thank you, sir, may I have another.” Worse still was Obama’s refusal to act in Syria, even to enforce his own red line on the use of chemical weapons. The Obama administration said the Syrian air-defense system made a no-fly zone too dangerous to enforce. Yet hundreds of thousands of dead Syrians later, the Israeli Air Force wiped out half of Syria’s air defenses on Saturday afternoon.
Iran’s leaders observed and internalized American weakness. In response, they intensified their pursuit of a regional hegemony with the money and diplomatic cover from the flawed nuclear deal to spread terror and missiles throughout the Middle East.
And while President Trump entered office wielding aggressive rhetoric toward Iran and vowing to tear up the nuke deal, Tehran still doesn’t know what to make of him. On one hand, Trump’s decision to impose sanctions on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps along with his uncompromising indictment of the nature of the Iranian regime at the United Nations showed a willingness to engage in ideological and economic warfare. On the other, the nuclear deal remains in place, and his administration has done little to raise the cost to Iran for its regional expansion. Iran still smuggles weapons into Bahrain, the home of the US Navy’s Central Command and missiles into Yemen to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia, while building missile-production facilities in Syria and Lebanon.
Now is the time for Trump to re-establish a robust military deterrent toward Iranian expansionism in close collaboration with regional allies. His administration declared the Revolutionary Guard a terrorist entity in October, and he should target key Guards’ bases and weapons in Syria accordingly. Such an approach could help prevent a larger-scale conflict.
Iran’s leaders tend to avoid direct military confrontation against a superior military power. Saudi officials like to tell the story of the 1984 shoot-down of two Iranian fighters that crossed into Saudi airspace. When the line was next tested in 1988, the Iranians turned back before being intercepted and never tested Saudi Arabia again. Furthermore, the mullahs know that if they direct more money into extraterritorial operations, their economic and political situation at home will deteriorate. The Iranian people are already chanting, “Let go of Syria, think about us.” Raising the cost for Iran in Syria would exacerbate internal tensions.
Trump will certainly need to prepare for a range of potential responses from Iran, particularly via proxies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. But these proxy threats aren’t new — and the benefits far outweigh potential costs. First, Tehran’s strategic calculus would start to change, curtailing risk-taking in the region, enhancing security for US allies over the long run and potentially changing regime behavior in other illicit activities. Second, a US military deterrent would close the so-called “land bridge” that gives Iran an uninterrupted line of influence to the Mediterranean. And that deterrent would undergird Trump’s threats to exit the nuclear deal, which could dramatically increase the likelihood that attempts to fix the deal succeed while significantly reducing the risks of an Iranian escalation should he decide to nix it.
Finally, the United States would reclaim diplomatic leverage over Russia in Syria. If Vladimir Putin wants to maintain a long-term presence and profit off the country’s reconstruction, he’ll have to clear Iranian forces out of Syria or America and its allies will do it for him. But without that deterrent, America will keep sleepwalking into an era of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East. This weekend’s events should be a final wake-up call.
39 YEARS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Dr. Doron Itzchakov
BESA, Feb. 1, 2018
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini landed at Mehrabad Airport to the cheering of the crowds, and 10 days later he declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under his leadership. The change brought about by the Islamic Revolution led by Khomeini and its influence on modern-day Iran is indisputable. That change was nothing short of a restructuring of identity, values, norms, and patterns of thinking around the worldview of the leader of the revolution.
Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic has undergone several enormous changes. They can be divided into five distinct periods, each distinguishable by their essences and by the marks they left on the Republic’s discourse.
The first period can be dated from the Republic’s establishment to the end of its eight-year war with its Iraqi neighbor. This war, which caused great loss of life and property, led to the construction of the “self-reliance” concept, which was the product of a sense of isolation. On the other hand, the war built the top echelon of the current military-security establishment. The bloody confrontation with Iraq left a mark on the worldview of senior officers in the military and the Revolutionary Guards and contributed a great deal to the establishment of a network of personal connections, as is now reflected in the chain of appointments at the highest levels of the security forces.
Another symbol of this stormy period was the suppression of opposition elements that didn’t identify themselves with the policies and practices dictated by Khomeini. The first gap emerged not long after the establishment of the Islamic regime as a result of Khomeini’s decision to turn on the revolutionary partners who had helped him topple the shah. Opposition elements that opposed the post-revolutionary path led by the leader were subjected to mass arrest, expulsion, and even execution. The regime’s iron fist impaired the opposition’s ability to influence either Iran’s internal affairs or its foreign policy.
Shortly after the end of the war, Iran overcame the significant challenge it faced with the death of the Supreme Leader in June 1989. In many respects, the appointment of Ali Khamenei, who lacked the religious credentials of his predecessor, was a testament to the survivability of the revolutionary regime. The drastic step of dismissing Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, who was perceived as the most legitimate heir and had all the theological credentials, shed light on the post-revolutionary decision-making process. Despite challenges, the transition was crowned a success – not least because of the connection forged between the new leader and the Revolutionary Guards, who became his power base.
The second phase can be defined as Iran’s “period of rehabilitation,” as it was during these years that the country’s economy absorbed the consequences of the war with Iraq. The economic stagnation caused by the war left Iran’s economic system in such a deep crisis that it returned to the GNP levels of almost twenty-five years earlier – that is, to mid-1960s levels. The period of rehabilitation coincided with the eight years of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s rule as President of Iran (1989-97). In fact, Iran’s rehabilitation is associated with Rafsanjani, who delineated its policies and was responsible for putting them into practice.
One of the outcomes of this period was the transfer of a vast proportion of reconstruction and economics projects to the Revolutionary Guards. This enabled the security organization to become a financial conglomerate and to act as the main concession holder in Iran.
Renowned Iranian-American academic Ray Takeyh considered Rafsanjani’s tenure in office and concluded that he showed initiative by offering paths and agendas that propounded the notion that practical demands must transcend revolutionary mandates. He sought to construct a modern state while remaining loyal to the essential pillars of Khomeini’s ideology. Such a balancing act might have been possible if Rafsanjani had been able to maintain good relations with the new Supreme Leader. However, once Khamenei consolidated his power and developed ties with the conservative faction, he emerged as a serious obstacle to Rafsanjani.
The election of Muhammad Khatami to the presidency (1997-2005) opened the third period, which was a time of change in the political balance of power in Iran. The era of Khatami was dubbed “the liberal period” to reflect his openness on issues related to foreign policy and relations with the West. His election reflected the desire of the Iranian people to move away from an isolationist foreign policy and highlighted the discontent of the young generation with the overall pattern of Iranian politics. Khatami’s call for “dialogue among civilizations” reflected this perception and was considered a response to Samuel Huntington’s theory of a “Clash of Civilizations.”
However, like his predecessor, Khatami lacked the necessary power base to implement the policies he sought to promote. As a result, his status weakened. Conversely, the security establishment – which had become a dominant factor in the decision-making process – gained strength in full coordination with the Office of the Supreme Leader. Despite the fact that Khatami was considered a reformist, a mass wave of student protests erupted during his tenure. The protests, which began over the closure of the newspaper Salam (which was affiliated with the reformist wing), ended in a brutal crackdown. This heightened popular resentment of the president, who had shown himself unable to stand up to the conservative establishment.
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005 marked the beginning of a new era. Ahmadinejad’s term of office, 2005-2013, was particularly turbulent due to his policies and statements on both domestic and foreign issues. On the domestic level, his attempts to replace subsidies with allowances accelerated inflation, and his inability to deliver on his promise to bring oil revenues to the “food table” of the Iranian people led to a decline in popular support. Moreover, his messianic approach, invoking as it did the reappearance of the Hidden Imam and representing the worldview of the Hojjatieh Society (Anjoman-e Hojjatieh), was seen as defiance by senior clerics, including some who had been his supporters at the start of his term.
Ahmadinejad’s outspoken statements on foreign policy issues only deepened the gap between Iran and the West and served as a catalyst for the sanctions imposed on it, which caused near-total paralysis of its economy. Among the salient moments of Ahmadinejad’s term of office were his calls to wipe Israel off the map, his Holocaust denial, and his association with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, through whom he was able to promote Iranian influence in Latin America…[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
HE FOUGHT FOR IRAN’S ENVIRONMENT AND
Thomas Erdbrink
New York Times, Feb. 10, 2018
A well-known Iranian-Canadian professor has died in prison in Tehran, a statement posted on his son’s Instagram page revealed on Saturday, and his family is seeking an independent autopsy. The professor, Kavous Seyed Emami, was one of the founders of the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation, Iran’s most prominent nongovernmental organization focused on the environment.
On Friday, his wife received a phone call from prison authorities saying that her husband had committed suicide in Evin prison, his son said in his post. Mr. Seyed Emami had been arrested on Jan. 24, and, according to the family, was detained by intelligence agents along with several other environmental activists, including Morad Tahbaz, a visiting Iranian-American businessman. The death of Mr. Seyed Emami is among a number involving recently detained activists. Prison authorities insist that at least three prisoners who died after they were arrested during nationwide protests in December also died by suicide. Many prominent Iranians have assailed that conclusion.
On Saturday, Abbas Jafari-Dolatabadi, Tehran’s public prosecutor, said that several people who had been posing as environmentalists were arrested and charged with espionage, according to a report from the Young Journalists Club. “These individuals have been collecting classified information about the country’s strategic areas under the guise of carrying out scientific and environmental projects,” he said, adding that they were arrested by Iran’s intelligence forces.
No further information has been provided on the identity of those arrested. It was unclear if Mr. Jafari-Dolatabadi was speaking about Mr. Seyed Emami and his colleagues. Mr. Seyed Emami’s son, the popular singer Ramin Seyed Emami, was on a trip to the United States when his father was arrested. In the statement posted to his Instagram accounts, he said he was in disbelief that his father killed himself in prison. “The news of my father’s passing is impossible to fathom,” he wrote. “They say he committed suicide. I still can’t believe this.”
For decades, Mr. Seyed Emami taught sociology at Tehran’s Imam Sadegh University, a hard-line institution where the cadres of the Iranian establishment are trained. He said it was his duty to teach students his opposing views. In his spare time, he organized popular camping trips for Tehrani youths to the outskirts of Iran. Other environmentalists associated with Mr. Seyed Emami’s organization remain behind bars. Mr. Tahbaz, the Iranian-American businessman, is a board member of the Persian Heritage Wildlife Foundation, and was quietly arrested by intelligence agents while visiting the country. Several local employees and volunteers of the foundation were also arrested, though it is unclear why. Mr. Tahbaz has been accused by hard-line Iranian news outlets of plotting to sell hunting permits, something that seems highly implausible, people close to the foundation say.
The detention of Mr. Tahbaz adds to a long list of dual nationals arrested in Iran, most of them by the intelligence service of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Family members of two Iranian-Americans sentenced for spying, Baquer and Siamak Namazi, a father and son, say Iran is effectively holding them hostage in order to make a prisoner exchange.
In 2003, an Iranian-Canadian photographer, Zahra Kazemi, died in Evin prison after she was detained while taking photographs. Her death led to a downgrading in relations between Canada and Iran. There is currently no Canadian embassy in the country and there are no official diplomatic relations between the two nations.
Israel Signaling a Heavy Price for Iranian 'Entrenchment' in Syria: David Makovsky, Washington Institute, Feb. 12, 2018—By striking Syrian antiaircraft forces and installations where Iranian personnel are located this weekend, Israel seems intent on forcing key players to recognize its deep interest in limiting Tehran's military presence in Syria. If Iranian leaders ignore this interest, they risk triggering a rapid military escalation.
Israeli Assessment: Next Bout With Iran Only a Matter of Time: Judah Ari Gross, Times of Israel, Feb. 11, 2018—Israeli security assessment on Sunday following the major aerial clashes in Syria a day earlier indicated that the current round of clashes has ended, but the next altercation is only a matter of time.
Comparing the Nuclear Challenges Posed by North Korea and Iran: Emily B. Landau, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 25, 2018—Drawing A comparison between Iran and North Korea in the nuclear realm is both conceptually sound and empirically instructive.
How 'Peoplekind' Has Done a Disservice to the Brave Women of Iran: Terry Glavin, National Post, Feb. 7, 2018—The White Wednesdays protests began last May, in the streets of Tehran, and every Wednesday ever since, women across Iran have been posting pictures or videos of themselves wearing white hijabs, or walking unveiled while holding white hijabs aloft, or just wearing something white.
