Modi Is Coming to Jerusalem: Prof. Efraim Inbar, BESA, July 1, 2017— At the beginning of July, Narendra Modi will arrive for a first-ever visit by an Indian PM to Israel.
A Memoir – Background to Indian Prime Minister’s Visit: Isi Leibler, Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2017— This week’s historic visit to Israel by India’s prime minister revived memories of my previous associations with Indian leaders and the Indian Jewish community in the 1980s.
Vietnam, an Emerging Partner in Israel’s ‘Asia Pivot’ Policy: Alvite Ningthoujam, BESA, May 17, 2017— Vietnam’s relationship with Israel has been getting steadily stronger over the past few years.
Azerbaijani US Ambassador: Israel Is a Pragmatic Partner and Good Friend, We Want it to Be Normal for Muslims and Jews to Be Allies: Barney Breen-Portnoy, Algemeiner, Mar. 29, 2017 — Over the past two and a half decades, the Caucasus nation of Azerbaijan — a Shiite Muslim-majority state — has become a close ally of Israel, manifested by deep economic and military bonds.
Modi and Israel’s Coming of Age: Caroline B. Glick, Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2017
The India-Israel Breakthrough: Walter Russell Mead, American Interest, July 3, 2017
Israeli-Indian Singer, Set to Perform National Anthem for PM Modi, Gave Up Blossoming Bollywood Career to Return to Jewish State: Shiryn Ghermezian, Algemeiner, July 3, 2017
How Israel Used Weapons and Technology to Become an Ally of China: Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot, Newsweek, May 11, 2017
Prof. Efraim Inbar
BESA, July 1, 2017
At the beginning of July, Narendra Modi will arrive for a first-ever visit by an Indian PM to Israel. This trip reflects the significant expansion in relations between the two countries that has taken place since the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1992.
Since Modi and the BJP came to power in May 2014, his administration has shed its predecessors’ reservations about regular public discourse regarding India’s ties with Israel. It is worthy of note that Modi’s trip to Israel is not planned to be “balanced” with a visit to the Palestinian Authority, indicating that India has freed its relations with Israel from its historical commitment to the Palestinian issue. Indeed, India has modified its voting pattern at international organizations by refraining to join the automatic majority against Israel.
India and Israel display high levels of threat perception and share a common strategic agenda. Both have waged major conventional wars against their neighbors and have experienced low‐intensity conflict and terror, as they are both involved in protracted conflicts characterized by complex ethnic and religious components not always well understood by outsiders. Both face weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of their rivals.
The two nations share a common threat: radical offshoots of Islam in the greater Middle East. Israel regards parts of the Arab world — Saudi Arabia in particular — as hubs for Islamic extremism, while India views Saudi‐Pakistani relations with suspicion. Moreover, India fears the Pakistani nuclear arsenal might ultimately fall into the hands of Islamic radicals. For Israel, Islamic radicals in the Arab world and in the Islamic Republic of Iran constitute a constant security challenge. This challenge has become more acute as Iran’s nuclear potential has grown. The more recent ISIS phenomenon has ramifications beyond the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, as its offshoots threaten the stability of Egypt and Jordan — Israel’s neighbors — and are increasingly sources of concern in south and southeast Asia.
India has gradually overcome its inhibitions and engaged in security cooperation with Israel. In the wake of diplomatic normalization in 1992, then Indian Defense Minister Sharad Pawar admitted to having already cooperated with Israel on counterterrorism. This cooperation, which involves exchange of information on the finances, recruitment patterns, and training of terrorist groups, is conducted away from the public eye. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks underscored the need for better counterterrorism preparations in India and elicited greater cooperation with Israeli agencies. Arms supply and technology transfer have become important components in the bilateral relationship. Initially, Russian failure to deliver promised weapons at expected prices and/or schedules led India to turn to Israeli companies to upgrade some of its aging Soviet platforms, such as its Mig‐21s and T‐72 tank fleet.
Difficulties in the development of weapons systems at home have led to the purchase of Israeli products and to partnership in developing advanced military technology. New Delhi purchased advanced radar and communications equipment from Israel, as well as portable battlefield radars, hand‐held thermals, night warfare vision equipment, and electronic fences to improve border monitoring. A long list of Israeli military items, such as ammunition, UAV parts, and even missiles (Spike anti‐armor, the Python‐4 air‐to‐air, naval Barak‐8 surface‐to‐air) are being produced in India.
Examples of high-end items include the airborne Phalcon radar Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) , which is mounted on the Russian IL‐76 transport aircraft, and the long-range Green Pine radar. The sale of the Phalcon by Israel to India required American approval, which was finally secured in May 2003. India signed a contract for the purchase of two additional Phalcon/IL‐76 AWACS valued at $1 billion during the November 2016 visit of Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin to India. Israel was the third‐largest arms supplier to India in the three years ending March 2016.
In April 2017, India signed a contract worth about $2 billion to procure anti‐tank missiles and air defense systems from the Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI). This was the largest order in Israel’s history. One month later, the IAI secured another contract for $630 million to supply Barak‐8 missiles for the Indian Navy. Both deals involve technology transfer and production in India. These deals are part of PM Modi’s $250 billion plan to modernize the armed forces by 2025 amid tensions with neighbors China and Pakistan.
The Indian‐Israeli nexus has various Indian Ocean implications, particularly in response to China’s growing presence. The Indian Ocean, where India is an important actor, has become an area of growing interest for Israel because of its apprehensions about Iran and Pakistan. While India, a major player in the international system, has improved relations with Washington, New Delhi’s links with Jerusalem have the potential to smooth over some of the remaining difficulties in dealing with the US. Working with Israel fits into Modi’s plan to deepen relations with the US given the US‐Israel friendship.
New Delhi believes its normalization of relations with Israel in 1992 had a positive effect on the American disposition toward India. The often‐exaggerated power of the Jewish lobby in America was appreciated in New Delhi. In the 1990s, the American Jewish organizations valued the importance of India for the US and for Israel, as well as the potential advantages of nurturing good relations with the Indian community in America, whose congressional power is on the rise. Many members of the Indian lobby, the US‐India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), which was formed in September 2002, expressed the desire to emulate American Jewish groups and showed interest in cooperation…
Two strategic developments of the 21st century are likely to strengthen the strategic glue between India and Israel: the decline of the US and the rise of China. In the Middle East, the Obama administration projected weakness and encouraged Iran’s quest for hegemony. US weakness is inevitably having ripple effects in other parts of the globe. Indeed, Asian states view the declining American role with concern. It is not clear whether new American president Donald Trump will adopt a more assertive foreign policy than that of his predecessor. Nor is it known how he will go about confronting China, as he displayed isolationist impulses during his election campaign.
India and Israel represent two ancient civilizations. They share a British colonial past and were the first to become independent (in 1947 and 1948, respectively) in the post‐WWII decolonization wave. Both were born as the result of messy partitions and have maintained democratic regimes under adverse conditions ever since. Nevertheless, it took over four decades to establish a fruitful bilateral relationship. For Israel, good relations with India reflect awareness of structural changes in the international system as the center of gravity moves to Asia and the Pacific Rim. India is an extremely important protagonist that requires Israel’s utmost attention.
A MEMOIR – BACKGROUND TO INDIAN PRIME MINISTER’S VISIT
Isi Leibler
Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2017
This week’s historic visit to Israel by India’s prime minister revived memories of my previous associations with Indian leaders and the Indian Jewish community in the 1980s. India at that time was still a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, dependent on Arab oil and expatriate income from the Gulf states, in addition to accommodating a population of over 140 million Muslims.
I will never forget my unpleasant meeting with the late prime minister Indira Gandhi at her home in New Delhi on December 21, 1981. She bitterly claimed that American Jews had turned the US government and media against her, maligning her because they opposed her policies toward Israel. The discussion became hostile and despite her claim to like Jews, she came close to becoming antisemitic. I reminded her – to no avail – that during her childhood in the United Kingdom, Anglo Jews such the late Harold Laski – a leading professor of political science at the London School of Economics – were among the most fervent supporters of Indian independence. That meeting left me deeply distressed and pessimistic about prospects for the future.
India’s policy during the Six Day War and Yom Kippur War basically echoed the Soviet line on Israel. Gandhi sought to strengthen Indian support for the Arab world and intensified her hostility against Israel. When her son Rajiv became prime minister following her assassination in 1984, he maintained the anti-Israel policies, and if anything, they were even intensified. But at the same time, India is one country that never had a record of antisemitism and, unlike Muslims and Christians, Hindus never saw themselves as triumphant over Judaism or as a proselytizing faith. Although the bulk of the Indian Jewish community made aliya, they did so freely, and the remnant of the ancient Bene Israel, who claim ancestry back to the Lost Tribes of Israel, maintain their synagogues and community centers.
For many years, I continued to advocate for a change in Indian policy toward Israel. Indian External Affairs Ministry officials listened to me courteously and then politely dismissed whatever was discussed. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s had global implications. In November 1991, at the request of Dr. Moshe Yegar of the Foreign Ministry, I sought a meeting with the newly elected Indian prime minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. Yegar had met him in July 1991 following the kidnapping of Israeli tourists in Kashmir but the meeting deteriorated into a diatribe against Israel on Palestinian rights.
The timing for my meeting was problematic as Rao had only been elected a few months earlier, in June 1991. However, thanks to the combined intervention of Congressman Stephen Solarz, then head of the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, and then-Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans, my request for an audience was reluctantly granted. This meeting was the first in many years between an Indian prime minister and a global Jewish representative. It became clear very quickly that Rao was far more receptive than his predecessors.
At the time, I reported – on behalf of the World Jewish Congress – that the situation in India was “much more promising… no personal, irrational impediment to improved ties with Israel. …The fact that Rao agreed to the meeting at a highly inconvenient time for himself… indicates the seriousness he attaches to improved ties with world Jewry as an important element in India’s orientation in the post-Cold War era. This in itself is highly encouraging and augurs well for the future.”
But it transpired that there were only minor changes and no substantive improvement to India’s policies. While agreeing to expand the Israeli consulates in Kerala and Mumbai, the deputy foreign minister stressed that India would not even contemplate full diplomatic relations with Israel until substantial progress was achieved in the peace process with the Palestinians…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
VIETNAM, AN EMERGING PARTNER IN ISRAEL’S ‘ASIA PIVOT’ POLICY
Alvite Ningthoujam
BESA, May 17, 2017
Vietnam’s relationship with Israel has been getting steadily stronger over the past few years. In what could be considered an extended, modern-day “peripheral doctrine”, Israel is doing all it can to enhance cooperation with the Asian countries. This can be seen with regard to China, India, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, South Korea, and Japan. Thriving economic and military-security cooperation has become the hallmark of its relations with these countries (though in some cases, political relations have yet to be strengthened).
Israel and Vietnam are carefully crafting a potential partnership based on their respective national interests – economic, military, and political. Contemporary Israel’s Vietnam policy resembles the overtures it made during the 1950s and early 1960s towards the Sub-Saharan countries, with which it shared technical expertise in agriculture and healthcare. With the aim of forging friendly, supportive relations, Israel focused on multifaceted initiatives in Africa, including technical assistance, training programs, joint-economic enterprises, trade, and so on. Military cooperation and arms trading were also important elements of Israel’s relations with African countries, including Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zaire, and Ghana.
A similar trend is now being followed with Vietnam. Israeli-Vietnamese relations are expanding in the fields of agriculture, commerce, science, and technology, and – most importantly – in the defense sphere. Israel and Vietnam established diplomatic relations in July 1993, and their economic relationship is relatively healthy. Bilateral trade volume touched US$1.3 billion last year, and the countries aspire to take it to an annual US$2 billion. In 2004, the countries signed the Agreement of Economic and Trade Cooperation for further development of trade. Israel imports cellular phones, electronic components, seafood, coffee, textiles, and footwear from Vietnam, and exports machinery and equipment, hi-tech goods, and fertilizer.
In the first quarter of 2017, Israel had 25 foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in Vietnam worth over US$46 million. In December 2015, during a visit by Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai to Israel, formal discussions were launched on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This raised the prospects for further growth in the investment, finance, services, science and technology, and labor sectors. Cooperation in the health sector is also expanding: the two countries have signed an agreement in which Israel has agreed to assist Vietnam in the construction of a 300-bed hospital with some of its latest technology and equipment.
Israel’s agricultural involvement with Vietnam – an area in which Israel has deep expertise over many decades – is significantly on the rise. To augment cooperation, Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MASHAV), and embassy in Hanoi have implemented a training program in the country for Vietnamese citizens. In December 2013, Israel’s Agriculture Minister Yair Shamir and Vietnamese officials agreed to establish a joint Research and Development (R&D) program in agriculture to expand businesses in this area. Some of the areas in which Israeli companies can offer assistance to Vietnam are breeding, preservation technology, water use, and models for scientific research. Remarkable progress can already be seen, and Israel has become an important partner for Vietnam’s dairy industries – so much so that it has become an essential component of Vietnam’s “dairy diplomacy”. Israel-developed agricultural technology is now widely used in almost every province in Vietnam.
Simultaneously, there is steady growth in openly acknowledged military-security relations between the countries. In addition to trading arms, Israel and Vietnam are engaged in joint ventures in the production of weapons systems suitable to the needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Israel’s entry into this defense market is timely, as Hanoi is undergoing modernization programs for all three military services. It is increasing defense expenditures, which touched nearly US$4.6 billion in 2015 and are expected to reach US$6.2 billion by 2020. These steps have likely been taken by the Vietnamese government in response to the Chinese military build-up in the South China Sea.
Israel has carved a niche in the global arms market by developing and manufacturing some of the most technologically advanced systems for maritime security, air defense, electronic warfare systems, reconnaissance drones, arms and ammunitions, short/long-range missiles, and avionics and other subparts. These systems are reasonably priced, and the securing of deals to acquire them is relatively easy as they tend to come with fewer strings attached.
Vietnam’s large army is equipped with aging weapons systems, and Israel has the potential to upgrade some of them. Elbit Systems is reported to have secured an upgrading contract for Vietnam’s Mil Mi-17 helicopters. In 2011-12, Israel Weapon Industries established a production facility (at a cost of $100 million) in Vietnam to help supply Galil ACE 31 and 32 assault rifles to the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA). In 2014, the countries worked towards signing agreements to establish a “formal framework” to upgrade their bilateral defense relations, including promotion of future technology transfer and industrial cooperation. In 2015, Israel set up a defense attaché in Vietnam…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
ISRAEL IS A PRAGMATIC PARTNER AND GOOD FRIEND,
WE WANT IT TO BE NORMAL FOR MUSLIMS AND JEWS TO BE ALLIES
Barney Breen-Portnoy
Algemeiner, Mar. 29, 2017
Over the past two and a half decades, the Caucasus nation of Azerbaijan — a Shiite Muslim-majority state — has become a close ally of Israel, manifested by deep economic and military bonds. In December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Baku, where he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. “The world sees so much intolerance, so much darkness, and here is an example of what relations can be and should be between Muslims and Jews everywhere,” Netanyahu said at the time.
On Wednesday, Azerbaijani Ambassador to the US Elin Suleymanov sat down for an interview with The Algemeiner at his country’s embassy in Washington, DC and talked about a wide range of topics, including Azerbaijan-Israel ties, the Azerbaijani Jewish community, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran and the Trump administration, among other things.
How did the relationship between Azerbaijan — a Muslim-majority state — and Israel — the world’s only Jewish-majority state — develop? “It’s kind of sad that the relationship is surprising to some. We don’t want it to be surprising, we want it to be normal. Muslims and Jews are very similar in many ways. I think the relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel actually preceded formal statehood for either one. We have a 2,500-year-old Jewish community in Azerbaijan, with both Sephardim and Ashkenazim. Jewish people have always been part of Azerbaijan’s society. There is also a very strong Azerbaijani Jewish community in Israel. Haifa is now a sister city of Baku, our capital, and there are direct flights between Tel Aviv and Baku. When Azerbaijan became independent again (with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991), Israel was among the very first countries to recognize it. There are very strong economic, technological, medical, educational, agricultural, tourism and security ties. It’s a mutually beneficial relationship.”
“The ties are very multi-faceted. It’s easy, even cliché, to say it’s ‘oil for guns.’ Azerbaijan does provide over 40% of Israel’s oil, its single largest supplier. And Azerbaijan also purchases some equipment from Israel, by the way not limited to security equipment. But that’s not the whole story…I think we gain valuable expertise from Israel. We see Israel as a pragmatic partner and a good friend. They’re very competitive with technology and the relationship is very good for us because we can diversify our supplies…For Israel, I think Azerbaijan is a good customer and a good provider of oil and gas. And as Israel develops its energy expertise, I think they can actually build on what we have, because Israel doesn’t have a longstanding energy tradition.”
“Also, Israel is not just a Jewish state, it’s a quite diverse country. So regarding how to manage diversity issues, we both can learn from each other…I respect the Israeli view that it needs to have more friends among Muslim nations. And Azerbaijan is a very good friend of Israel among the Muslim nations.”
There has been a lot of talk recently about burgeoning behind-the-scenes ties between Israel and Arab nations across the Middle East. What are your thoughts on this? “It’s good. I’m very happy to see better relations between other nations and Israel. I’m hoping this will contribute to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.” …
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
Modi and Israel’s Coming of Age: Caroline B. Glick, Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2017—Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel this week marks more than the 25th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two nations. It marks as well Israel’s coming of age as a nation.
The India-Israel Breakthrough: Walter Russell Mead, American Interest, July 3, 2017—This week, Narendra Modi will make history as India’s first Prime Minister to make an official visit to Israel.
Israeli-Indian Singer, Set to Perform National Anthem for PM Modi, Gave Up Blossoming Bollywood Career to Return to Jewish State: Shiryn Ghermezian, Algemeiner, July 3, 2017—The Indian-Israeli singer expected to sing the countries’ national anthems when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits the Jewish state this week reportedly gave up a blossoming Bollywood career in order to be in Israel.
How Israel Used Weapons and Technology to Become an Ally of China: Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot, Newsweek, May 11, 2017—The secret, circuitous journey began late one night in February 1979 when an unmarked Boeing 707 took off from Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel.
