How Trump Can Improve the Iran Deal: Mark Dubowitz & David Albright, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 2017 — Powerful voices at home and abroad are pressuring President Trump to give his blessing to his predecessor’s nuclear agreement with Iran.
Donald Trump Takes a Hostage: Bret Stephens, New York Times, Oct. 13, 2017— Negotiators warn never to take a hostage you can’t shoot.
Trump's Tough Talk on Iran Fails to Mask His Inaction: Eli Lake, Bloomberg, Oct. 13, 2017— For anyone baffled by President Barack Obama's humiliating outreach to Iran in his second term, President Donald Trump's speech Friday was cathartic.
Stopping Iran Is up to Israel Now: Efraim Inbar, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 1, 2017— Western hopes that Iran will moderate and "engage" with the international community following the faulty 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) have been gradually replaced with apprehension.
Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy: White House, Oct. 13, 2017
With New Iran Strategy, Trump Rips Page out of Netanyahu’s Playbook: Raphael Ahren, Times of Israel, Oct. 15, 2017
After Iran Announcement, Trump Punts to Congress: Sean Savage, JNS, Oct. 15, 2017
Trump’s ‘Calm Before the Storm’ is a Message to North Korea and Iran: Alan Dershowitz, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 9, 2017
HOW TRUMP CAN IMPROVE THE IRAN DEAL
Mark Dubowitz & David Albright
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 2017
Powerful voices at home and abroad are pressuring President Trump to give his blessing to his predecessor’s nuclear agreement with Iran. Mr. Trump has repeatedly pledged to renegotiate the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or scrap it altogether. There is a way for him to highlight the agreement’s egregious deficiencies while showing his determination to improve the deal or leave it. We call this strategy “decertify, waive, slap and fix.”
The president should follow through on his commitments by refusing to certify the JCPOA under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. That law requires Mr. Trump to certify every 90 days that Iran is fully implementing the nuclear deal and hasn’t significantly advanced its nuclear-weapons program. Additionally he must certify whether the suspension of sanctions remains vital to U.S. national-security interests and proportionate to Iran’s efforts to terminate its illicit nuclear programs. The next 90-day deadline is Oct. 15…
The JCPOA is a prelude to a Middle Eastern version of the North Korean mess. It gives the clerical regime sunset-expiring restrictions, advanced centrifuges, intercontinental ballistic missiles, the ability to frustrate U.N. inspectors’ access to military sites where Tehran has conducted secret nuclear-weapons and uranium-enrichment work in the past, and tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, with hundreds of billions to follow. The Iranians will continue to run amok in the Middle East, using foreign cash to pay for their imperialism.
The president should refuse to certify for another reason: The nuclear deal’s fundamentally flawed architecture—not just how it is enforced—makes it too dangerous to continue. By patiently following the deal the Islamic Republic can gain nuclear weapons, as well as a nuclear-capable arsenal of missiles giving it regional hegemony and the ability to threaten the United States. It also will have a powerful economy immunized against sanctions pressure by the time the JCPOA restrictions expire. Allowing this is not in the “vital national security interests of the United States.”
Decertifying doesn’t mean breaking the deal. That happens only if the U.S. reimposes sanctions that have been lifted or suspended under the JCPOA. On Sept. 14, as required by the JCPOA, the president again waived nuclear-related sanctions, this time on Iran’s central bank and oil exports. He accompanied this “waive” with a “slap” imposing new sanctions on companies and individuals connected to Iran’s ballistic missile program and recent cyberattacks. An engineering company working with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was also targeted.
These sanctions, which are fully compliant with the JCPOA, are a decent start. But Mr. Trump must do more. He should designate the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization, as Congress has required he do by Oct. 31. He should also instruct the Treasury to blacklist companies with Revolutionary Guard and military ownership, which represent about 20% of the total market capitalization of the Tehran Stock Exchange. He should redesignate Iran Air (which is buying planes from Boeing and Airbus) as a terrorist entity for airlifting weapons and fighters to Syria. All these measures are consistent with the JCPOA.
We propose the president “fix” U.S. policy by making it clear he does not accept the Iran deal’s dangerous flaws. He should insist on conditions making permanent the current restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and the testing of advanced centrifuges and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, as well as the buying and transferring of conventional weaponry. He must insist on unfettered access for U.N. weapons inspectors to Iranian military sites.
Congress should do its part to help fix the deal. Reinstating the JCPOA sanctions after decertification would ruin the “decertify, waive, slap and fix” approach. To persuade Republicans, who are the most likely to vote to reinstate JCPOA sanctions that have been waived or lifted, the administration needs to demonstrate a comprehensive strategy to fix the deal and use all instruments of American power to neutralize and roll back Iranian aggression. Democrats should help fix the deal or explain to Americans why a brutally repressive and aggressive Iranian regime should have a North Korean-style glide path to dozens of nuclear weapons and ICBMs.
The Europeans are already responding to Mr. Trump’s threats to walk away from the deal. French President Emmanuel Macron has said he’s willing to consider supplementing the agreement to address the sunset provisions and missiles. European leaders who want to preserve the accord are now working on a U.S.-EU consensus on ways to fix it. They should outline conditions under which trans-Atlantic sanctions would be reinstated if Iran doesn’t play ball. Otherwise, they can watch Mr. Trump exit the deal and use the considerable financial power of the U.S. to force European banks and companies to choose between America’s $19 trillion market and Iran’s $400 billion one.
Decertification is the critical first step of a strategy to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from becoming a nuclear state. The famously blunt Mr. Trump must send an unambiguous message to Tehran’s clerics: His administration will not tolerate a nuclear Iran, nor can it abide by the agreement as it stands. But the strategy doesn’t depend on Iranian acquiescence. It gives the Europeans a chance to come on board to fix the deal in order to save it. If they don’t, the consequences could be severe.
Bret Stephens
New York Times, Oct. 13, 2017
Negotiators warn never to take a hostage you can’t shoot. By announcing Friday that the administration would not certify that the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran was in the national interest, Donald Trump has taken a hostage.
The hostage is the deal itself. Contrary to belief, decertification neither violates nor cancels the agreement. It does not betray our commitments to our allies and it does not abrogate our obligations to the Iranians. It’s an act of domestic politics between two branches of the United States government.
But it’s also a psychological step, a brash signal that Trump is prepared to see the deal fail and accept the consequences, including war, if he can’t negotiate a better one. Since Iran insists it won’t budge, it sets Washington and Tehran on a path of confrontation that can be averted only if one side or the other blinks. Decertification is Trump saying: We won’t blink.
On Thursday, a well-placed source who advises the administration on Iran policy and supports decertification listed for me all the ways things could go wrong. There’s personnel risk, starting with the volatility of the man at the top. There’s escalatory risk, as the United States, its forces thinly stretched in the Middle East, become vulnerable to attack by Iran’s terrorist proxies. Think of the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983 and the humiliating American withdrawal in its wake.
There’s diplomatic risk, as Iran traps Western diplomats in a process of never-ending negotiations designed to go nowhere — all the while turning the Islamic Republic into a reputable member of the international community and the United States into the global pariah. Above all, there’s the risk that Iran will call Trump’s bluff, much as Bashar al-Assad called President Obama’s when he failed to enforce his chemical red line in 2013. A superpower repeatedly exposed as a paper tiger by lesser, if more willful, adversaries will not maintain its pre-eminence for long.
So what’s the case for supporting decertification? The architects of the nuclear deal make three dubious claims on its behalf. They say it concerns Iran’s nuclear dossier alone, and does not prevent us from thwarting Tehran’s regional bids in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Gaza or the Gulf. They claim the deal is working because Iran is abiding by its terms, as certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. And they add that since the agreement permanently enjoins the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States maintains the military option to stop them from doing so.
Yet Iran’s regional behavior has become worse since the nuclear deal came into effect, not least because it provided the regime with a huge new income stream — $10 billion in cash and gold in 2016 alone, plus more than $100 billion in additional sanctions relief — to fund its work. Tehran also operates on the assumption, well justified during the Obama years, that the United States would not risk the nuclear deal for the sake of rolling back Iranian gains in Syria and elsewhere.
As for the point that the Iranians are generally (if not quite entirely) honoring their end of the bargain — why shouldn’t they? “Iran doesn’t want a bomb today,” one senior Israeli official told me. “It wants a bomb tomorrow.” That is, it wants a robust nuclear base that puts it within a screw’s twist of a sizable nuclear arsenal without the economic and security risks of actual possession. And if it does choose to go for a bomb once the agreement has run its course, our military options will be slight. If we couldn’t prevent Pakistan or North Korea from going nuclear in the 1990s, why should we think we’ll be able to stop Iran in the nick of time?
My critics will claim that a distant prospect of a nuclear Iran is still vastly preferable to an exit from the deal that allows Iran to bring its centrifuges out of storage and start spinning its way to a bomb once again, this time without the monitoring of United Nations inspectors. Maybe. But Iran still wants the economic benefits of the deal — benefits Washington alone can bestow through waivers, permits, relief from secondary sanctions and control over dollar transactions. The American Goliath needn’t be helpless against a Middle Eastern state with a gross domestic product only slightly larger than that of metropolitan Atlanta.
We are living through a nuclear nightmare on the Korean Peninsula after more than two decades of optimistic diplomacy. That’s a fate we ought to do everything possible to avoid with Iran. As Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies points out, “decertification isn’t a sufficient condition to break the paralysis of our Iran policy, but it is a necessary one.” Even if the rest of the difficult enterprise rests in the hands of — God help us — President Trump.
TRUMP'S TOUGH TALK ON IRAN FAILS TO MASK HIS INACTION
Eli Lake
Bloomberg, Oct. 13, 2017
For anyone baffled by President Barack Obama's humiliating outreach to Iran in his second term, President Donald Trump's speech Friday was cathartic. He spoke plainly about Iran's "rogue regime," which seized power by revolution and "forced its people to submit to fanatical rule." The nation’s Revolutionary Guard will be designated as supporting terrorism and sanctioned. Trump seeks to assure us that he will never allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon.
As I reported last week that he would, Trump stopped short of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. He is not pushing Congress to re-impose the crippling sanctions Obama lifted, which would void the nuclear bargain. Instead he is urging Congress to rewrite the 2015 law that requires his certification of the deal every 90 days to spell out the terms of a better nuclear accord with Iran and the consequences for Iran if they violate those terms. While Trump said he reserves the right to withdraw from the deal at a later date if his efforts to improve it fail, his decertification amounts to a rebuke, but not a rejection of Obama's signature foreign policy achievement.
But like Obama, Trump fails to address the greatest threat the rogue regime poses: its expansion in Syria and Iraq. Senior administration officials who briefed reporters Friday acknowledged that there is no policy for now to begin trying to drive Iran and its proxies out of Syrian territory it has taken over. These officials said a Syria-specific policy was coming where these issues would be addressed.
U.S. officials have also told me that at the moment there is no plan for countering Iranian influence among Shiite allies in Baghdad. This policy is also under review for Iraq, but for now U.S. forces will continue to train and equip the Iraqi military as Iran continues to train and equip the Shiite militias that have done much of the fighting against the Islamic State in Iraq. In some ways Trump's decisions to date have exacerbated Iranian expansion, particularly in Syria. As the Washington Post reported in July, Trump cut off a CIA program to support rebels in Syria who were fighting the regime. U.S. intelligence officials tell me Trump's decision was sudden, and it is still unclear whether another ally will take over the agency's support for the anti-regime rebels.
A deal the U.S. helped to broker this summer also contributes to Iranian interference. Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me Friday, "Far more detrimental than the covert program issue is the de-escalation agreement because it has allowed Iran's proxies to focus on the center of the country in the Euphrates River valley without having to contest the southwest part of Syria where the de-escalation agreement applies."
It's possible that a new Syrian policy for the Trump administration will commit more U.S. forces and allies to begin to push back Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq as the war against the Islamic State dies down. But to date, Trump has resisted such policies. Senior administration officials on Friday told reporters that the strategy for now is to prepare to push back against Iranian expansion in Iraq and Syria over time. But time is not on the side of America and its allies. Iran's Revolutionary Guard is close to establishing a land bridge from Tehran to Beirut, giving groups like Hezbollah and other militias access to advanced weapons they can aim at Israel and Jordan. Sanctions are a good first step. But Trump needs to do more, and quickly.
STOPPING IRAN IS UP TO ISRAEL NOW
Efraim Inbar
Jerusalem Post, Oct. 1, 2017
Western hopes that Iran will moderate and "engage" with the international community following the faulty 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) have been gradually replaced with apprehension. More voices in the international community are joining Israel in expressing growing concern about Iran's policies. While Iran seems to be abide by the JCPOA, it resists expanding the scope of inspections, continues its nuclear research and development (for example upgrading centrifuges) and continues to make progress on its long-range missile program. Recently it conducted a test of a missile designed to carry nuclear warheads.
Moreover, Iran's involvement in the region attests to its hegemonic plans, defying the notion, propagated by its propagandists, that it is a status quo power acting defensively. Rather, Iran is following its Persian imperial instincts that are reinforced by Muslim jihadist impulses. It already controls four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa; its Shi'ite militias and proxies are fighting in Iraq, Syria and Yemen and engaging in ethnic cleansing; and it is on the verge of solidifying the Shi'ite corridor from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Israel tries to capitalize on the new widespread global apprehension about Iran and a new American president who is not committed to the JCPOA to bring about the cancellation of the 2015 nuclear accord or its renegotiation, and the reinstating of the sanctions regime. Yet, these goals are difficult to attain and not useful in preventing a nuclear Iran.
The international community, including the US, has little appetite to confront Iran. The belligerent tone of President Donald Trump might be pleasant to Israeli ears, but we should not forget that he has not yet dismantled the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Understanding very well the Western reluctance to take military action, Iran is emulating the North Korean scenario. Many states, Germany for example, were eager to renew business relations with Iran after the removal of the sanctions regime and to turn a blind eye to Iranian purchases of dual-use equipment.
The world seems to prefer to wait until the agreement expires in 10 years or so without worrying about what will happen after. Iran signed the deal to gain legitimacy for its nuclear program without giving up the plan to go nuclear in the near future. Iran, with its thousands of years of history, is patient, seeing the agreement as only a short delay on the road to achieving its ambitions.
Israel cannot rely on the international community to stop Iran's nuclearization. Unilateral cancellation of the nuclear agreement will only energize the Iranian nuclear program. Even if attempts to convince Iran to renegotiate the deal are successful, the Iranian talent for bargaining will prolong the negotiations for years, gaining it additional time to enhance its nuclear program. Similarly, putting in place a tough economic sanctions regime requires years of diplomatic struggle. Neither Russia nor China have a great interest in helping the US neutralize the trouble potential of an anti-American Iran. Moreover, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is limited. Past sanctions were useful in bringing Iran back to the negotiating table, but not in changing its policy.
The claim that a tougher deal could have been achieved in 2015 and therefore renegotiations could elicit a better one for the West is not credible. The JCPOA, with its loopholes, was the only agreement the Iranians were ready to sign when it became clear that the US under president Barack Obama would anyway be unwilling to use the military option. Despite the anti-Iranian rhetoric, the US under President Donald Trump seems to lack the strategic acumen needed to stop Iran from attaining regional hegemony. As a matter of fact, its Middle Eastern policies suit Iran. Trump continued the obsession with Islamic State (an anti-Iranian force) and is going along with the Russian and Iranian plans in Syria. The US prefers the integrity of Iraq, an Iranian satellite, rather than supporting a Kurdish state that Iran opposes. The US did not side clearly with Saudi Arabia in isolating a Qatar that courts Iran. A nuclear Iran will be even more difficult to restrain.
Nothing in the world can convince Iran to give up the nuclear dream. Only the use of force can stop Iran from fulfilling its ambitions. Israel is on its own in this. Nobody will deal with an Iran that is going nuclear. Therefore, Israel must prepare its military for a strike against the main components of Iran's nuclear infrastructure. This will not be easily achieved, but with determination and creativity it is feasible. A successful attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure would change the regional power equation and reverse Iranian advances. Most states would be happy for Israel to do the dirty work, and judging from past Israeli strikes on the Iraqi and Syrian reactors, would hardly create any difficulties for Israel on this account. It is true that Iran has ways to retaliate and exact costs from Israel. However, these would be easier to bear than the cost of allowing Iran to have nuclear weapons.
Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy: White House, Oct. 13, 2017—History has shown that the longer we ignore a threat, the more dangerous that threat becomes. For this reason, upon taking office, I've ordered a complete strategic review of our policy toward the rogue regime in Iran. That review is now complete.
With New Iran Strategy, Trump Rips Page out of Netanyahu’s Playbook: Raphael Ahren, Times of Israel, Oct. 15, 2017—When US President Donald Trump outlined his new strategy to counter Iran in a major policy speech Friday, he said that his views were formed “after extensive consultations with our allies,” but he could really only have been talking about Israel and some Gulf states.
After Iran Announcement, Trump Punts to Congress: Sean Savage, JNS, Oct. 15, 2017—President Donald Trump announced on Friday that he will decertify the Iranian nuclear deal as part of a new and tougher approach towards the Islamic Republic. The move brings a new level of challenges and uncertainty in handling one of the most complex international agreements in recent years.
Trump’s ‘Calm Before the Storm’ is a Message to North Korea and Iran: Alan Dershowitz, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 9, 2017—Reporters continue scratching their heads about what President Trump meant when he spoke of the “calm before the storm” recently as he was hosting a dinner for military commanders and their spouses.
