AS WE GO TO PRESS: 11 INJURED IN ARAB CITIZEN/TERRORIST RAMMING ATTACK (Jerusalem) — An Arab terrorist with Israeli citizenship was shot and killed near the Jerusalem Chords Bridge at the entrance to the capital after he rammed his vehicle into people at a bus stop around 3 p.m. (8 a.m. EDT). Eleven civilians were wounded, including a seriously injured 18-month-old baby girl and a 65-year-old woman who suffered moderate injuries. Nine others were lightly injured. Following the attack, Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat urged city residents to stand firm: “Go on with your daily routine, be vigilant, but do not let the terrorists win.” (Jewish Press, Dec. 14, 2015)
Western Officials: Iran Retreating From Syria Fight: Eli Lake, Bloomberg, Dec. 10, 2015 — Iran is beginning to withdraw its elite fighters from the Russian-led military campaign in Syria, according to U.S. and other Western military officials, suggesting a fissure in what President Barack Obama derided last month as a "coalition of two."
The Confrontation Between Turkey and Russia: Lessons for Israel: Amos Yadlin, Jerusalem Post, Dec. 3, 2015— The confrontation between Turkey and Russia heightens the instability in the Middle East by reducing the possibility of concluding the ongoing crisis in Syria and successfully contending with the Islamic State.
Canada’s Withdrawal From Syria Goes Against the Flow: Kelly McParland, National Post, Dec. 4, 2015— One of the criticisms of the U.S. coalition against ISIL was that it wasn’t much of a coalition.
Does ISIS Pose a WMD Threat?: Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, BESA, Dec. 13, 2015 — Since its emergence, ISIS has sought chemical weapons and has used them against its opponents, namely the Syrian opposition groups, Kurds, Iraqi and Syrian government forces.
The Isis Papers: Leaked Documents Show How Isis is Building its State: Shiv Malik, The Guardian, Dec. 7, 2015
Syrian War as Testing Ground for Russia’s Latest Sea and Air Weapons: Debka, Dec. 13, 2015
The Evil That Cannot Be Left Unanswered: Roger Cohen, New York Times, Dec. 10, 2015
Obama’s Cynical Game on Syria: Jonah Goldberg, National Review, Nov. 18, 2015
WESTERN OFFICIALS: IRAN RETREATING FROM SYRIA FIGHT
Eli Lake
Bloomberg, Dec. 10, 2015
Iran is beginning to withdraw its elite fighters from the Russian-led military campaign in Syria, according to U.S. and other Western military officials, suggesting a fissure in what President Barack Obama derided last month as a "coalition of two." U.S. officials tell me they are seeing significant numbers of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps troops retreat from the Syrian combat zone in recent weeks, following the deaths and wounding of some of top officers in a campaign to retake Idlib Province and other areas lost this year to opposition forces supported by the West and Gulf Arab States. As a result, the Russian-initiated offensive that was launched in September seems to be losing an important ally.
On Friday at the Saban Forum at the Brookings Institution, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said that Russia's initial plan was to take back Idlib and other cities that had fallen under rebel control within three months. "It’s not going to happen because of the military difficulties," he said, adding that the campaign to date looked to be a "failure." He cited the "incompetence" of Syria's army as well as "the lack of determination of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps."
This is a surprising turn of events. A number of Western media outlets reported this fall that Qassem Suleimani, the leader of Iran's elite Quds Force, and Russia's defense ministry had negotiated an infusion of Iranian forces into Syria over the summer, shortly after the conclusion of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and six other world powers. That surge was supposed to change the tide of the Syrian war that the dictator Bashar al-Assad was losing, as more of his territory fell to a coalition of rebels supported by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others.
In October, the Wall Street Journal reported on experts' assessments there more than 7,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps members and other militia volunteers were aiding the Syrian regime. In late October, General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified there were 2,000 Iranian troops in Syria leading the fight to save Assad.
Today that number has dwindled, according to U.S. and other Western officials. One estimate shared with me by a senior Western defense official said there were only 700 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps members now fighting in the Russian-led offensive. (That estimate does not include Iranian military advisers who have embedded with the Syrian armed forces since 2012.)
One reason Iran is now withdrawing from Syria, according to U.S. officials, is that many officers have been killed or wounded in the heavy fighting this fall. The U.S. intelligence community is still trying to verify reports that Suleimani himself was injured in late November in Aleppo, Syria's largest city. Robert Ford, who served as U.S. ambassador to Syria between 2011 and 2014, told me reports from the region suggest that guard corps members are in the very thick of the warfare. "They are losing lieutenants," he said. "When you lose lieutenants it means you are losing people fighting on the front lines." Iran has started acknowledging some of those losses in its official press. Ford said the fierce combat the Iranians and Russians have encountered is an indication that the Western and Gulf Arab support for the Syrian opposition may be having a significant effect.
The question for U.S. policy makers is what an Iranian withdrawal will mean for Russia's campaign. Both countries remain steadfast that Assad should remain in power for the foreseeable future. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, even mused this week about using nuclear weapons against the Islamic State, which has declared a caliphate in territory it has conquered in eastern Syria and western Iraq.
Meanwhile, some press reports say Russia is planning to open a second air base near Homs in central Syria, in addition to the facility at Latakia on the Mediterranean coast, suggesting that Moscow has decided to escalate the air war. (The media site Russia Today contradicted those reports.) In the last week, U.S. officials say they have seen an increase in the Russian air campaign in Aleppo.
Nonetheless, some U.S. policy makers stress that the Kremlin cannot continue its air campaign indefinitely. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken made this point last week at a forum hosted by Foreign Policy Magazine, saying that while Russia's military intervention in Syria increased its leverage over Assad, it also "increased the conflict's leverage over Russia. Russia cannot afford to do what it's doing in Syria for a long period of time."
The conflict has also increased its leverage over Iran. "If the Iranians feel over the long term they need a deal, if the cost of maintaining the Assad government is too great for them, then these developments are a positive," Ford, who is now a scholar at the Middle East Institute, told me. "If they feel the costs of the battle can be sustained for months, if not years, they may be able to pay that price. They put a high value on maintaining the Assad government as it is now."
Since 2011, when the Syrian people began the uprising against Assad, Iran and Russia have been willing to pay that increasing price to keep their client in power. And yet even with a new Russian air campaign and an infusion of Iranian fighters, Assad has been unable to take back his country. The Obama administration now hopes the withdrawal of Iranian forces is an indication that at least one of Assad's benefactors may decide to cut its losses.
THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA:
Amos Yadlin
Jerusalem Post, Dec. 3, 2015
The confrontation between Turkey and Russia heightens the instability in the Middle East by reducing the possibility of concluding the ongoing crisis in Syria and successfully contending with the Islamic State. Israel can derive a number of tactical and strategic lessons from the confrontation, and in this context, should also underscore that Syria cannot be reunited and the area must be stabilized through a re-demarcation of borders, perhaps within a federative framework.
Yet regardless of the solution found, the lesson from the Turkish-Russian confrontation for all parties involved in Syria is that in the complex Middle East, rivalry between two parties should not be allowed to render a third party acceptable. In other words, the desire to weaken the Islamic State cannot make the Iranian-backed Assad regime any more acceptable, and at the same time, opposition to Russian involvement in Syria cannot make the Islamic State or the al-Nusra Front a legitimate replacement for Assad. The challenge, then, is to find the right overall strategy, backed by the decisiveness, resources, and ground forces necessary to simultaneously fight Assad and the Salafi jihadist forces in Syria, and in so doing, to create a sustainable reality in this arena.
Israel is not part of the Middle East upheaval and plays almost no active role in it. Whether out of choice or dictated by circumstances, Israeli policy has thus far favored sitting on the fence and observing from the side while developments unfold. Regardless of questions regarding the fundamental wisdom of this policy, current events oblige Israel to internalize and understand the emerging dangers and opportunities in its surroundings. Indeed, in a region that must commonly adapt to new patterns – reflecting frequent changes in the delicate balance among the many actors involved – a new chapter in the complex plot is underway, with the first military confrontation between Turkey and Russia. Turkey’s downing of the Russian plane has both highlighted and sharpened contradictions and truths on the bilateral and international levels.
Above all, this is a clash between two countries whose relations are based on an historic rivalry that is unrelated to the current context. The Russians and the Turks have in the past engaged in full scale military conflicts with one another regarding struggles over control and influence in key regions, particularly the Balkans and the Black Sea, and Ankara regards Moscow as standing threat to its interests. The policies of the current leaders of both countries only fan such tensions. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin represent aggressive and ambitious leaders driven by the desire to transform their respective countries into the powers they once were. Indeed, the two heads of state have been referred to as “sultan” and “czar,” implying the figure that each seeks to become.
Second, the already charged relationship between Turkey and Russia has been affected by strategic considerations and political interests relating to the current reality in the Middle East and Europe. The two countries do not see eye to eye regarding the crisis in Syria or the preferable solution. Whereas Turkey has adopted the ultimate goal of Assad’s removal from power, Russia regards Assad’s ongoing rule as a necessary condition for the promotion of stability in the collapsed state and the preservation of its own strategic interests in the Middle East.
Although both countries formally oppose the Islamic State and seek to weaken it, they are actually making use of it to garner legitimacy for their activities in Syria, which are part of efforts of much greater importance to them: Turkey’s efforts against the Kurds and Russia’s efforts against the opposition groups that are not aligned with the Islamic State (the majority of which are supported by Turkey). Against the backdrop of the crisis in Ukraine and the West’s united opposition against Putin (by Turkey’s fellow members in NATO), the conflicting interests of Russia and Turkey in Syria, along with Turkey’s staunch opposition to Russian military intervention in Syria, has placed the two countries on a collision course.
Without a doubt the confrontation between Turkey and Russia heightens the instability in the region by reducing the possibility of concluding the ongoing crisis in Syria and successfully contending with the Islamic State. That being the case, a variety of future scenarios in the Turkish-Russian confrontation are now possible, ranging from containment of the confrontation and a return to normal relations, to mutual diplomatic and economic hostility (as in the case of Turkish-Israeli relations), to military escalation (such as the launching of S-400 missiles or the downing of a Turkish aircraft, a cyber attack, or more extensive military action). It is difficult to assess which is the most likely scenario, but understanding is growing within Turkey that downing the Russian plane was a far-reaching step. Erdogan has expressed a willingness to issue a veiled apology, and both parties may now begin to conduct themselves with caution. Still, even at this stage, and regardless of the different scenarios, Israel can derive a number of lessons and insights from the confrontation.
First and foremost, the interception of the Russian plane highlights the minimal room for error; at the same time, the Turks could have exercised restraint and refrained from downing the Russian plane. The radar images released indicate that the Russian aircraft did indeed enter Turkish airspace, but that its penetration was negligible (lasting only 10-15 seconds) and clearly reflected no hostile intent toward Turkey. The plane was not intercepted accidentally, but it is unclear who gave the final authorization for the interception. In Israel, efforts must be made to ensure that such authority remains at the highest possible political and military level.
The unfolding of events, from the moment the decision was made to intercept the plane, highlights the need to ensure maximum control over decision making in the future regarding events with the potential for escalation that might entangle Israel. Although in Israel existing escalation control mechanisms are sufficiently effective, and not all warlike events lead to full scale war, Israel must nonetheless develop strategic thinking regarding mechanisms for preventing escalation and concluding campaigns, even after a proactive or reactive initiated action that is regarded as of essential importance.
On the level of coordination with Russia in light of its military involvement in Syria, Israel must maintain the understandings reached with Russia in October 2015 and consider whether they should now be sharpened, as a lesson based on the incident on the Turkish border. Moreover, the stationing of S-400 missile systems changes the rules of airspace for Israel as well, and requires the establishment of a stringent mechanism to prevent an Israeli-Russian collision. Israel currently has no significant points of friction with Turkey, but must nonetheless derive the right lessons. Turkey has proven that it is not trigger-shy and that it makes good on its threats: approximately two years ago, Turkey warned that it would intercept any plane that violated its sovereignty. Looking ahead, and based on previous clashes (as in the case of the flotilla to Gaza in 2010), it is important that Israel remain mindful of this in the event of a potential confrontation with a Turkish flotilla or aircraft that may approach Israel’s borders in the future…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
CANADA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA GOES AGAINST THE FLOW Kelly McParland
National Post, Dec. 4, 2015
One of the criticisms of the U.S. coalition against ISIL was that it wasn’t much of a coalition. The membership was vague, most of the heavy lifting was done by the U.S., and a number of the coalition members were hardly known as military powerhouses. That has changed significantly since the terrorist attacks in Paris two weeks ago. Following votes in London and Berlin this week, both countries have announced plans to join anti-ISIL activities in Syria.
France has been bombing ISIL targets in Iraq for more than a year. It began striking targets in Syria in September, even before the November attack on Paris, and has stepped up its efforts in the aftermath. On Friday President Francois Hollande visited the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, which has been stationed off Syria with 38 warplanes to facilitate the French mission. It was also revealed that French aircraft have been carrying out reconnaissance and surveillance missions over the Libyan town of Sirte, which has come under the control of the self-declared Islamic State and is viewed as a potential alternative headquarters for ISIL leaders as Syrian targets face growing pressure.
On Wednesday British Prime Minister David Cameron won approval in Parliament for the RAF to join in bombing missions over Syria. The first strikes came within hours from bases in Cyprus, which Cameron had also offered to make available to French planes. Cameron lost a similar vote in 2013, but argued that the Paris attacks, the destruction of a Russian plane over Egypt and bombings in Turkey and Lebanon demonstrated that the threat represented by the brutal Islamist regime could not be contained to the Middle East and represented a tangible threat to British security.
On Friday Germany’s Bundestag also voted to join the campaign in Syria, by a vote of 445 to 146. The Germans will six Tornado reconnaissance jets, a frigate to help protect the Charles de Gaulle, refuelling aircraft and up to 1,200 military personnel, though it will not carry out any air strikes. Although Germany has been historically wary of expanding its armed forces, there is a growing argument that the leading role in plays in European affairs, and the responsibilities that entails, require a bigger military as well. Friday’s vote also followed an appeal from France for assistance in fighting back against ISIL. “The goal… is to fight and contain IS, and destroy their safe havens and their ability to lead worldwide terror operations,” Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen said before Friday’s vote.
Critics still argue that aerial bombing will never succeed in defeating the Islamist threat, and that stepped up ground forces are essential, as is a determined effort to get at the extremist ideology that is at the heart of its spread. But growing demonstrations of its appeal beyond the Middle East has raised public backing for military efforts as a demonstration of the West’s determination to fight back. While those countries closest to the war zone are moving in one direction, Canada is moving in the other by pulling its planes out of direct action against ISIL forces in Syria.
Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham
BESA, Dec. 13, 2015
Since its emergence, ISIS has sought chemical weapons and has used them against its opponents, namely the Syrian opposition groups, Kurds, Iraqi and Syrian government forces. In September 2014, around 40 Iraqi soldiers and Shia militiamen showed symptoms of chlorine poisoning and many were hospitalized, consequent to the use in battle of bombs with chlorine-filled cylinders. Around the same time, ISIS insurgents surrounded hundreds of Iraqi soldiers in the Saqlawiyah district of northern Fallujah, and used chlorine gas to suffocate them before detonating a car bomb. This resulted in the death of 300 Iraqi soldiers.
In January 2015, weaponized chlorine gas was likely employed by ISIS in a suicide bombing in northern Iraq against Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. Iraqi officials showed the BBC videos in March 2015 that they say confirm Islamic State use of chlorine gas in crude home-made bombs. Three months later, ISIS shelled several security checkpoints and residential areas in Ramadi with chlorine gas-imbued bombs. This past August, ISIS launched 45 120mm-mortar shells tipped with mustard warheads against the Kurds in Makhmour, Iraq, and the effects included burns, blisters, severe damage to the eyes, respiratory system, and internal organs.
Since July of last year, ISIS has repeatedly attacked Kurds with chemical weapons in the strategic Syrian city of Kobane. At first, the ISIS used chlorine in Kobane and later, by this August, mortar shells filled with mustard gas. During an attack in Hasakah in August 2015, the same mustard weapons were used. The same weapon was used shortly thereafter by the group while fighting in the town of Mare near Alleppo.
In contrast to chlorine, which ISIS succeeded in weaponizing, mustard agent in a powdery form is regularly used too, which is a sophisticated albeit old weapon that probably originated in the Iraqi army. This may be the outcome of the June 2014 capture by ISIS of the huge Muthanna State Establishment, the main Iraqi chemical weapons facility dating back to the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Although the facility was heavily bombarded in 2003, it still contains two bunkers containing chemical weapons.
Iraqi Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim, in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in July 2014, said: "The Government of Iraq requests the States Members of the United Nations to understand the current inability of Iraq, owing to the deterioration of the security situation, to fulfill its obligations to destroy chemical weapons."
Around the same time, ISIS captured approximately 40kg of uranium compounds at Mosul University. The uranium – a weak radioactive material – was not enriched. Remarkably, ISIS had already set up – possibly in Mosul University – a branch dedicated to research and experiments of chemical weapons. ISIS had also mobilized Iraqi and Syrian scientists who are currently assisting the development of chemical weapons, particularly nerve and mustard gas. Foreign experts came from Chechnya and Southeast Asia as well. Recently, ISIS reportedly moved its labs, experts, and materials from Iraq to "secured locations" inside Syria. It is highly likely that ISIS seeks chemical, biological, and radiological materials for both military and civilian targets, such as subways, food, and water supplies.
ISIS is an even more brutal and radical group than al-Qaida, which has also pursued WMD. Given the technological limitations that ISIS faces, their procuring of a nuclear device is highly unlikely. However, the probability that the group will acquire further chemical agents, and seek to obtain biological and radiological agents for the first time – not necessarily weaponized – is high. ISIS could seek these weapons in order to compensate for its military inferiority as well as for retaliating against what ISIS regards as foreign interventions. An attack could occur anywhere across the globe. ISIS does not display any degree of morality whatsoever and does not fear the consequences of its deeds…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
CIJR Wishes All Our Friends & Supporters: Chag Sameach, Happy Hanukkah Holiday!
The Isis Papers: Leaked Documents Show How Isis is Building its State: Shiv Malik, The Guardian, Dec. 7, 2015—A leaked internal Islamic State manual shows how the terrorist group has set about building a state in Iraq and Syria complete with government departments, a treasury and an economic programme for self-sufficiency, the Guardian can reveal.
Syrian War as Testing Ground for Russia’s Latest Sea and Air Weapons: Debka, Dec. 13, 2015—Like other manufacturers of advanced military weaponry, Russia has sought – and found in the Syrian conflict – a live battleground for testing and exhibiting its latest and most advanced tools of war. The two most sophisticated Russian armaments on full operational display in recent weeks are the Kalibr NK cruise missile and the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback fighter-bomber.
The Evil That Cannot Be Left Unanswered: Roger Cohen, New York Times, Dec. 10, 2015—Just outside Diyarbakir in southeastern Turkey, there is a refugee camp where more than 2,700 Yazidis languish in makeshift tents more than a year after being driven out of northern Iraq by Islamic State fanatics.
Obama’s Cynical Game on Syria: Jonah Goldberg, National Review, Nov. 18, 2015—Not even President Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq has been as destructive for Europe or as damaging to the Transatlantic alliance as President Obama’s hard-hearted and short-sighted Syria policy.
