IS IRAQ LOST? A RENASCENT AL-QAEDA, FUELED BY OBAMA’S WITHDRAWAL, SHI’ITE MISSTEPS, PLUNGES IRAQ INTO SECTARIAN STRUGGLE

As We Go To Press: IRAQ MOVES UP TANKS, GUNS FOR LOOMING FALLUJA ASSAULT (Baghdad) —The Iraqi army deployed tanks and artillery around Falluja on Tuesday, security officials said, as local leaders in the besieged city urged al Qaeda-linked militants to leave in order to avert an impending military assault. Security officials and tribal leaders have said that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki agreed to hold off an offensive to give people in Falluja time to push the militants out. But it is not clear how long they have before troops storm the town, close to Baghdad, where U.S. forces fought notable battles a decade ago. (Reuters, Jan. 7, 2013)

CIVILIAN DEATH TOLL IN IRAQ HIGHEST IN YEARS, FUELING CONCERN OF AL QAEDA 'RESURGENCE' (Baghdad) —Violence in Iraq soared in 2013 to levels not seen in years, U.N. officials reported this week, stoking concerns that the country is descending into the kind of sectarian bloodshed that gripped the country before the U.S. troop surge. The United Nations said 7,818 civilians were killed in 2013, a return to 2008 levels. The startling figure follows warnings from lawmakers and analysts that the violence threatens to undo hard-fought gains by the United States. (Fox News, Jan. 2, 2013)

Contents:

In Iraq, a Sunni Revolt Raises Specter of New War: Liz Sly, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2014 — An eruption of violence in Iraq is threatening to undo much of what U.S. troops appeared to have accomplished before they withdrew, putting the country’s stability on the line and raising the specter of a new civil war in a region already buckling under the strain of the conflict in Syria.

How Al Qaeda Terrorized Its Way Back in Iraq: Max Boot, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 2013 — The climactic battles of the American War in Iraq were fought in Anbar Province, with U.S. forces at great cost retaking the city of Fallujah at the end of 2004 and Ramadi, the provincial capital, in 2006-07.

What’s Really Happening in Iraq?: Michael Rubin, Commentary, Jan. 7, 2013 —  The situation in Iraq’s restive Western province of al-Anbar continues to deteriorate as al-Qaeda-affiliated radicals have now seized Fallujah and threaten to take more cities.

Fallujah, Al-Qaeda, and American Sacrifice: Tom Rogan, National Review, Jan. 7, 2013— Amid chaos across the Middle East, the heir to al-Qaeda in Iraq has raised its flag over Fallujah.

On Topic Links

Iraq's Lessons on Political Will: Patrick Knapp, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2014

U.S. Won’t Ship Iraq the Weapons it Needs to Fight Al Qaeda: Yochi Dreazen & John Hudson, Foreign Policy, Jan. 6, 2014

The Intertwined Conflicts in Syria & Iraq: Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2014

Suicide Bombers Disguised as Pilgrims Infiltrate Iraq: Adnan Abu Zeed, Al-Monitor, Jan. 2, 2013

IN IRAQ, A SUNNI REVOLT RAISES SPECTER OF NEW WAR                

Liz Sly

Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2013

An eruption of violence in Iraq is threatening to undo much of what U.S. troops appeared to have accomplished before they withdrew, putting the country’s stability on the line and raising the specter of a new civil war in a region already buckling under the strain of the conflict in Syria. In the western Iraqi province of Anbar, Sunnis are in open revolt against the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Militants affiliated with al-Qaeda have taken advantage of the turmoil to raise their flag over areas from which they had been driven out by American troops, including the powerfully symbolic city of Fallujah, where U.S. forces fought their bloodiest battle since the Vietnam War. The Iraqi army, trained and equipped at great expense by the U.S. military before it pulled out of the country in 2011, is struggling to hold its own against what is at once a populist revolt and a militant insurgency.

On Monday, Maliki urged the people of Fallujah to expel al-Qaeda-­affiliated militants to avert a full-on attack, echoing calls made by U.S. forces a decade ago when they warned residents to leave the city or suffer the consequences. “The prime minister appeals to the tribes and people of Fallujah to expel the terrorists from the city in order to spare themselves the risk of armed clashes,” Maliki said in a statement read on state television as convoys of military personnel, tanks and heavy equipment headed toward the city to reinforce troops who were surrounding it. Instead, most residents were trying to leave, packing their possessions into cars and fleeing in any direction they could, just as they did ahead of the U.S. assault on the city in November 2004.

The Obama administration has responded to the crisis by promising to accelerate weapons deliveries to the Iraqi government, including Hellfire missiles and surveillance drones. White House spokesman Jay Carney said U.S. officials are working with the Iraqi government “to develop a holistic strategy to isolate the al-Qaeda-affiliated groups.” But most analysts and Iraqis say the problem is rooted, above all, in the Maliki administration’s failure to reach out to Sunnis and include them in the decision-making processes of the coalition government, thereby enhancing a sense of Sunni alienation from the authorities in Baghdad that began when U.S. troops invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, in 2003. “Extra weapons and drones are not going to solve this problem. In fact, they will make it worse, because it will encourage Maliki to believe there is a military solution to this problem, and that is what perpetuates civil wars,” said Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution in Washington.

The latest violence erupted after Maliki dispatched troops last week to break up a year-old protest camp in Anbar’s capital, Ramadi, where Sunnis had gathered to air grievances against the government. The upheaval that followed has evolved into a complicated three-way conflict in which almost all Sunnis have turned against the central government, though some have aligned themselves with militants from the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and others have not. In Ramadi, local tribesmen have been fighting the militants and have ousted them from most of the areas they had seized.

But Monday, the advances stalled, and al-Qaeda fighters remained dug in in three neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city, residents said. The Iraqi army, demoralized and running short of supplies, has proved unable to dislodge the militants, and the ad hoc tribal militias confronting them lack weapons and ammunition, said retired Brig. Gen. Hassan Dulaimi, a former deputy police chief in Ramadi who is working with the tribal forces battling the al-Qaeda fighters. “The Iraqi army is not up to standard,” he said. “Their morale is low, and they are not capable of street fighting, while the tribes are willing to die to keep the Iraqi army out of their towns.”…

[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link –ed.]

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HOW AL QAEDA TERRORIZED ITS WAY BACK IN IRAQ        

Max Boot                                

Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 2013

The climactic battles of the American War in Iraq were fought in Anbar Province, with U.S. forces at great cost retaking the city of Fallujah at the end of 2004 and Ramadi, the provincial capital, in 2006-07. The latter success was sparked by an unlikely alliance with tribal fighters that turned around what had been a losing war effort and made possible the success of what became known as "the surge." By 2009, violence had fallen more than 90%, creating an unexpected opportunity to build a stable, democratic and prosperous country in the heart of the Middle East.

It is now obvious that this opportunity has been squandered, with tragic consequences for the entire region. In recent days the Iraqi army appears to have been pushed, at least temporarily, out of Fallujah and Ramadi by al Qaeda in Iraq militants. A battle is raging for control of Anbar Province with some tribal fighters supporting the government and others AQI. Mosul, the major city of northern Iraq and a longtime hotbed of AQI activity, could be next to fall. If it does, AQI would gain effective control of the Sunni Triangle, an area north and west of Baghdad the size of New England. AQI's control would stretch beyond the Sunni Triangle because its offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, dominates a significant portion of Syrian territory across the border. This creates the potential for a new nightmare: an al Qaeda state incorporating northern Syria and western Iraq.

Even if this worst-case scenario does not come to pass—even if Mosul holds and even if the Iraqi army succeeds in regaining control of Ramadi and Fallujah—the odds of Iraq becoming embroiled, like Syria, in a full-blown civil war are growing by the day. Iraq is almost there already: The United Nations reports that last year 8,868 Iraqis were killed, the highest death toll since the dark days of 2008. Car bombings have become such a regular occurrence that they barely make the news. What happened? How did Iraq go from relatively good to god-awful in the last two years? The chief culprit is al Qaeda, which has shown a disturbing but nevertheless impressive ability to bounce back from near-defeat. But it would never have been able to do so if it did not enjoy significant support among the Sunni population of Anbar, Ninewah, Diyala and other provinces. When the group lost that support in 2007, AQI's operatives were quickly rolled up. Today it enjoys freedom to maneuver because it has the backing of many Sunnis who now see it as a defender against a predatory, sectarian Shiite government.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has no one but himself to blame. If he had embraced the Sunni Awakening movement, Iraq likely would have remained relatively peaceful. Instead, the moment that U.S. troops left Iraq, he immediately began victimizing prominent Sunnis. In December 2011 Mr. Maliki sent his security forces to arrest Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, who escaped but was sentenced to death in absentia based on the testimony of his bodyguards, allegedly extracted under torture. In December 2012, security forces arrested the bodyguards of Raffi al-Essawi, a former finance minister, and other leading Sunni politicians. Mr. Essawi narrowly missed winding up in prison. Another prominent Sunni parliamentarian, Ahmed al-Awlani, was arrested just a few days ago, on Dec. 28, after a gunfight between his bodyguards and Iraqi security forces that left his brother dead.

Mr. Awlani's arrest set off the events that culminated in al Qaeda fighters, dressed in black, parading through the streets of Fallujah and Ramadi. Mr. Maliki reacted to protests over Mr. Awlani's detention by sending his security forces to close down a protest camp in Ramadi. This sparked major fighting, with many Sunni leaders in Anbar urging their followers to resist government troops under the orders of a Shiite regime. Sheikh Abdul Malek al Saadi's message, translated by the Institute for the Study of War, was typical: "Oh heroes of Fallujah and other towns. Cut the road and prevent Maliki's troops from reaching your brothers in the heart of Anbar. Maliki wants to wipe out every one of the people he dislikes, using the antiterrorism pretext again."

Not all is necessarily lost. While some Anbar sheiks have cast their lot with AQI, others continue to side with the government and cooperate with local police, if not with the Iraqi army. Most prominent has been Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Sunni Awakening leaders. On Jan. 1 he called on his followers to fight against AQI's attempts "to commit their crimes, to cut off the heads, blow up houses, kill scholars and disrupt life." Iraq may once again stumble back from the brink of all-out civil war. But it is unlikely to recover the promise of 2009-11—in retrospect, a mini-golden age—because Mr. Maliki is unlikely to mend his ways. What Iraq needs now is what it saw in 2007 when Gen. David Petraeus orchestrated a full-blown counterinsurgency strategy. Such a strategy has many facets, but one of the most important is a political "line of operations," which in this case means fostering reconciliation between the prime minister and tribal leaders of Anbar…

[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link –ed.]

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WHAT’S REALLY HAPPENING IN IRAQ?                                                 

Michael Rubin

Commentary, Jan. 7, 2013

The situation in Iraq’s restive Western province of al-Anbar continues to deteriorate as al-Qaeda-affiliated radicals have now seized Fallujah and threaten to take more cities. Some analysts have been tempted to blame everyone from Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad to President Obama in the White House—and certainly there is blame to go around—but ultimately that political blame should not cover the fact that sometimes the solution to terrorism rooted in ideology is not counterinsurgency strategy or winning hearts and minds, but rather killing those who embrace terror.

It would be wrong simply to blame Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for the breakdown of security in Al-Anbar or Iraq more broadly. Prime Minister Maliki does not set off car bombs in Baghdad, and to blame the prime minister for the reaction of terrorism effectively legitimizes such terrorism. It is true that the Iraqi government, perhaps on the orders of Prime Minister Maliki or some of those around him, has moved against prominent Sunni politicians in the past, men like former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi and former finance minister Rafi al-Issawi. Many Americans condemned such moves and said that they would fan sectarian tension. The most important question, however, is too often ignored: Were Hashemi and Issawi guilty? In both cases, the answer seems to be yes. After all, why would Issawi pay blood money to the family of those his body guards allegedly murdered if those murders did not occur? That any politician is Sunni should not be a reason for immunity in Iraq. (That the initial complaints against these men often came from Sunnis as well is an inconvenient fact too often ignored.)

Perhaps Maliki should not have timed the raid on the Ramadi protest camp in the manner he did, and it is unfortunate that the timing appears to have been colored by partisan politics: With the elections forthcoming in April, the theory that Maliki ordered the raid to prove his “Shi’ite” credentials is believable among a wide segment of Iraqi society… According to residents of al-Anbar, most residents of the protest camp were unemployed youth who joined the camp both for the free food and the camaraderie. Residents do acknowledge supporters of al-Qaeda were present—and, indeed, their presence is undeniable and caught on YouTube videos—but locals dismiss the al-Qaeda presence as few and far between (somewhat akin to the way “International ANSWER” or “Code Pink” show up at random protests to try to hijack the press attention). Perhaps, however, the al-Qaeda presence was underestimated: After all, al-Qaeda didn’t spontaneously organize to the point that they could seize Fallujah in just a week. The al-Qaeda presence was not created in the mind of the prime minister, as it is too easy to imagine from the safety of Washington or New York.

It is fashionable to blame Baghdad for the alleged discrimination which fuels the unrest in Al-Anbar but, once again, the situation is more complicated. There are huge differences in the proportion of allocated budgets actually spent from province to province. The way the Iraqi system works, some governors explain to me, is that the province has a budget, but only when a certain amount of money is spent will they receive the next infusion of cash. Kirkuk spends almost all of its budget, and has the results to show for it. In Ninewah and al-Anbar, the proportion spent is miniscule. What is unclear is whether the reason for that is a capacity issue in Mosul and Ramadi, or whether there is some bureaucratic blockage in Baghdad. Either way, if the protestors simply buy into the sectarian rhetoric, they will be no further to solving the very real problems which impact predominantly Sunni areas…

Within the United States, the surge colors analysis. The surge was a very successful military strategy in the short-term, but it created and exacerbated very real long-term political problems. General David Petraeus sometimes promised what he did not have the power to implement, and throughout his career seems to have prioritized short-term stability and security over the long-term viability of his strategies. If the situation went to heck after his departure, too often his successors would be blamed even if the seeds had been sown under his command. The unfortunate fact is that the surge rewarded violence and convinced some elements of Iraqi society that if they simply hold out longer or threaten (or even engage in violence), that they can win concessions through violence that they will never win through the ballot box. Proponents of the surge may not like to see the long-term consequence tarnish their legacy, but to pin the blame on the prime minister would be dishonest: the problem isn’t Maliki, but rather the absolutist vein which continues to course through Al-Anbar’s body politic.

So what can be done? A civil war in Iraq would be tragic, but offering concessions in the face of terrorism would simply pour fuel on the fire. If terrorism is motivated by ideology and, indeed, when facing al-Qaeda, both Iraq and the West are facing a corrosive ideology, then the only solution can be to kill the terrorists. Secretary of State John Kerry might be right when he says the United States no longer should be involved in the fight inside Iraq, but let us hope then that the United States will not get squeamish when Iraqi security forces do what must be done.             

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FALLUJAH, AL-QAEDA, AND AMERICAN SACRIFICE                             Tom Rogan                                                                                   

National Review, Jan. 7, 2013

Amid chaos across the Middle East, the heir to al-Qaeda in Iraq has raised its flag over Fallujah. At Business Insider, Paul Szoldra, a Marine, has written a powerful piece about the friend he lost during Operation Phantom Fury, the 2004 operation to clear insurgents from Fallujah. Szoldra argues that the current strife proves that his friends died only for one another, not for some greater cause. ‘‘I’ll never know why they died,” he writes. “It sure wasn’t for freedom, democracy, apple pie, or mom and dad back home.’’

I would never claim to know Szoldra’s pain. As much as I’ve informed myself about the human toll that Iraq has taken on thousands of American families (David Finkel is a must-read), I haven’t lost friends in the fighting there. But I do know this: Regardless of what Iraq becomes — whether a model of democracy for the region, or a flawed but semi-functioning democracy, or a failed state — those Americans who died in Iraq died for more than one another. Ultimately, only the historians will be able to answer the question of whether Iraq was worth it. Nevertheless, we must pay heed to what Americans like Lance Corporal Franklin Sweger achieved with their sacrifices.

Prior to the Marines’ arrival, Fallujah provided the heart for the most brutal element of the insurgency. Put more simply, Fallujah was al-Zarqawi’s factory of death. It was the place from which car bombs were exported to rip apart markets, schools, and neighborhoods. It was the place to which kidnapped civilians were imported for torture and beheading. These days the casual consensus is that Phantom Fury was an unconstrained attack on a city full of civilians. Far too often, critics entertain the myth that murderers who worked for Zarqawi were “resistance fighters” defending Iraq from an imperial aggressor. Of course, the opposite is true. Consider Bing West’s reporting in No True Glory on the Fallujah that existed under “resistance” authority. This was the place where a police officer who dared to stand up for his city was whipped, boiled, and decapitated. This was the place where normality meant a nameless woman “dumped on a street, arms and legs cut off, entrails eviscerated.” The place where a house in which Zarqawi’s henchmen cut off people’s legs stood next to an amusement park. One story sums it all up. West describes the beheading studio where Nicholas Berg lost his life. He begins by noting the array of video recorders, tapes, and computers arrayed for a basic purpose: to extract fear from agony. West then describes how the recording schedule “included what time a prisoner was to be brought out and washed up, when his confession had to be taped, when the execution should be done, how long it would take to digitize the video and make copies, and when to leave Fallujah in order to deliver the tape to the Al Jazeera studio in Baghdad to be shown on prime time.”

But the Marines and others who fought in Fallujah didn’t just save lives by ending the carnage that Zarqawi’s Fallujah produced. They helped save a nation. Had Zarqawi retained his fortified base of operations, the sectarian bloodletting of 2006 would almost certainly have arrived much sooner, before the U.S. military had the ability to grapple with that challenge. Herein is the defining truth: Along with the hundreds of thousands of other Americans who served in Iraq, the Marines of Fallujah helped win extraordinary reductions in violence. In doing so, they brought hope where despair had reigned, giving Iraqis a chance to forge a future of their own making, rather than one shaped by tyrants and terrorists. In 2004, Iraq’s government was utterly dysfunctional. Today, albeit deeply flawed, the Iraqi government is showing the military capacity and the hints of flexibility that it will need to survive. Again, this doesn’t mean that the costs of Iraq were worth it. But it does mean that our public discourse on Iraq requires a little more honesty. Just as it was wrong to write off Iraq in late 2006, so too we should not deny the possibility that Iraq’s democracy will yet prosper. Regardless, the legacies of men and women such as Franklin Sweger are proved every day. Not only by the friends for whom they gave lives, but by the countless Iraqis who live because of them, and live with the chance of a better life.

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Iraq's Lessons on Political Will: Patrick Knapp, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2014 —After eight years of U.S.-led state-building efforts, thousands of coalition force fatalities, and nearly one trillion dollars spent, Iraq is drifting toward authoritarianism under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party while al-Qaeda-stoked violence is running at levels not seen in years.

U.S. Won’t Ship Iraq the Weapons it Needs to Fight Al Qaeda: Yochi Dreazen & John Hudson, Foreign Policy, Jan. 6, 2014 — The stunning conquest of Fallujah and Ramadi by al Qaeda fighters has reignited the debate about whether the White House should have left combat troops in Iraq.

The Intertwined Conflicts in Syria & Iraq: Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2014

Suicide Bombers Disguised as Pilgrims Infiltrate Iraq: Adnan Abu Zeed, Al-Monitor, Jan. 2, 2013 — A suicide bomber walks into a crowd of pilgrims going to the city of Karbala, which Iraq’s Shiites consider holy, then blows himself up among the crowd by pressing the detonation button on his explosives belt while shouting “Allahu Akbar” [God is the greatest].

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