EGYPT, ROCKED BY ATTACKS FROM SINAI ISLAMISTS, BOLSTERS SECURITY & COOPERATES WITH ISRAEL

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Contents:

 

 

Sinai Crisis Binds Egypt and Israel: Oren Kessler, Weekly Standard, Nov. 7, 2014 — Last week, Sinai-based extremists targeted the North Sinai security headquarters with a massive blast, causing damage, but no injuries.

Egypt’s Disengagement: Jerusalem Post, Nov. 5, 2014 — Imagine the following: Israel declares its intention to create a buffer zone between itself and the Gaza Strip.

The Jihadi Connection Between Sinai, Gaza and Islamic State: Jonathan Spyer, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1, 2014— What kind of relations do the jihadists of northern Sinai and Gaza have with Islamic State, and with Hamas?

Time for a New U.S. Approach to Egypt: Brian Katulis, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 29, 2014— The terrorist violence that killed at least 33 Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula last week was the latest in a string of attacks aimed at destabilizing the country.

 

On Topic Links

 

Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS: David D. Kirkpatrick, New York Times, Nov. 10, 2014

Militants Kill 5 Members of Egypt Security Forces in Sinai: Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 2014

Hunger Growls in Egypt: Daniel Pipes, Washington Times, Oct. 3, 2014

Israel and Egypt Keep Gaza Strip Borders Shut: Khaled Abu Toameh, Ben Hartman & Ariel Ben Solomon, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 2, 2014

Sinai: Terrorist Presence Becomes Full-Fledged Insurgency: Abdallah Schleifer, Al-Arabiya, Oct. 31, 2014

 

 

                             

SINAI CRISIS BINDS EGYPT AND ISRAEL                                                           

Oren Kessler                                                                                                                 

Weekly Standard, Nov. 7, 2014

 

Last week, Sinai-based extremists targeted the North Sinai security headquarters with a massive blast, causing damage, but no injuries. Thankfully it wasn’t a replay of the attack last month that killed 33 security personnel in some of Egypt’s worst violence since the overthrow of former president, and Muslim Brotherhood member, Mohamed Morsi last summer. That combined car-bomb and shooting attack capped a week that also saw seven troops killed by a roadside bomb and two Israeli soldiers wounded in a cross-border shooting. Even though the latest attacks give the lie to Cairo’s assurances that it was bringing jihad in Sinai to heel, they presage closer security cooperation with Israel, are already close.

 

The first embers of the Sinai insurgency were lit by the general security breakdown that accompanied the fall of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. The uprising’s current, blood-drenched phase, however, was sparked by the army’s July 2013 overthrow of Morsi. Since that coup, hundreds of soldiers and security force officers have been killed in retribution attacks, both in Sinai and – since last year – on the Egyptian mainland. In response, Egypt has waged a military campaign including air strikes and ground operations, as well as the destruction of 95% of smuggling tunnels (some 1,600 in all) to the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. Immediately following last month’s attacks, Sisi declared a three-month state of emergency and his forces began destroying or evacuating hundreds of homes in the half-kilometer area abutting the territory.

 

Through it all, Israel has been an indispensable partner. Even during the height of this summer’s Gaza conflict, the Egyptian-Israeli blockade of Gaza enforced since Hamas forcibly took it over in 2007 remained intact. All throughout that war – during which Cairo and Jerusalem worked together to draft ceasefire proposals with little input from Washington – Israeli officials communicated daily with their Egyptian colleagues to take Cairo’s “temperature.” At least 2,127 Palestinians were ultimately killed in the fighting – at least half of them civilians – and both partners knew high death tolls would eventually turn Egyptian public opinion toward a ceasefire. Throughout, Egypt continued operations against the tunnels, and kept its lone crossing to Gaza mostly closed to people and aid. Israel has come under shooting or rocket attack at least 20 times since Mubarak’s departure, but has been reluctant to conduct operations on Egyptian territory lest it jeopardize the 1979 Camp David Accords. One of the few exceptions came last summer, when an Israeli drone appears to have struck Sinai militants with Egypt’s permission—and conceivably at its behest.

 

The 1979 treaty strictly restricts the scope and type of Egypt’s military installations in the Sinai. Still, on more than two dozen occasions since 2011, Israel has acceded to Egyptian requests to exceed the treaty’s limits, including the deployment of U.S.-supplied Apache helicopters to attack militants like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, the Islamic State-affiliated group that has carried out the bulk of attacks in Sinai. On a handful of such occasions, Egypt has done so without Israeli permission – including deploying tanks in violation of Camp David – prompting the Israeli foreign minister to warn of the “slippery slope” of toying with the treaty. In response, Sisi (then Egypt’s defense minister) reportedly contacted his Israeli counterparts to assuage any fears.

 

The upsurge in violence has also shaken Israel out of its decades-long complacency over its Egyptian border. During the Mubarak era, the land defenses on that frontier – Israel’s longest – consisted almost entirely of towed artillery (most contemporary artillery is self-propelled) that the country had developed in the 1970s for the Shah’s Iran. Since 2011, however, the Israelis have installed advanced surveillance technology and created a new Shin Bet (internal security) unit tasked solely with monitoring Sinai. That process has been given new impetus by last month’s attacks—Israel has already dispatched additional forces to the site where its soldiers were ambushed. Last year, moreover, Israel completed a fortified fence along its Egyptian border in a bid to control the flow of asylum seekers and economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. Happily for the Israelis, the fence has also tamped down the threat of Sinai terrorism. While the years 2011 and 2012 saw a number of major Sinai-based assaults on Israel, this year and last have brought no major cross-border attacks from the peninsula – until last month. Israeli security officials explain that security cooperation with Egypt is already closer than at any time in memory, and the latest attacks in Sinai will only tighten that intimacy. Rather than a potential crisis point between Cairo and Jerusalem, they represent the basis for further efforts to stabilize the unruly peninsula that not only divides them, but more than ever unites them as well.

                                                                       

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EGYPT’S DISENGAGEMENT                                                                                   

Jerusalem Post, Nov. 5, 2014

 

Imagine the following: Israel declares its intention to create a buffer zone between itself and the Gaza Strip. The rationale is trenchant. After the discovery of numerous attack tunnels leading from Gaza into Israeli communities – to say nothing of ambushes, attempted abductions, and mortar fire – Israel resolved to clear a swathe of territory from any habitation. This would deny the terrorists cover for their tunnel-digging, ambushes, etc. It’s no stretch to suppose that, immediately upon Israel’s announcement of its intentions, the entire international community would explode into a deafening recriminatory uproar. Condemnations and threats would flow in from around the globe. The UN would censure, the US would threaten, and the EU would preach. If Israel were to proceed with its plans despite the pandemonium, a horrific spate of terrorism would erupt, rockets would rain on Israeli civilians, Israel would be ostracized even further than it is already, sanctions would ensue, and a maelstrom of malevolence would engulf the Jewish state. Footage of hapless families evicted with all their worldly belongings and of their homes being blown sky-high would seal Israel’s fate as the pariah of the civilized world. Gaza’s sins would go unmentioned.

Not all of the above scenario is make-believe. A buffer is being created, families are evicted with all their worldly belongings, their homes are being blown sky-high and the rubble is bulldozed. A deep canal is mooted along the demarcation line, as is a tall concrete separation wall. The only thing that keeps this from outraging world opinion is the identity of the side provoked into this action. It is Egypt and not Israel. The border is between Gaza and Egypt rather than the Gaza-Israel border. These distinctions alone suffice to make it all not much of a big deal. Apparently, if Israeli culprits can’t be fingered it’s apparently of no consequence to the world or the media. That said, Egypt deserves no worldwide rebuke. It knows, as do foreign governments and the media, that Gaza is both a terrorist nerve center against Israel and its fanatic reach extends elsewhere. The gangs of jihadists who roam through Sinai often infiltrate via Gaza or are manipulated from there. The same goes for the military-grade weaponry which these Islamist extremists openly deploy.

Gaza’s hub of sedition and insurrection not only affects Israel. The many Egyptian casualties, the bombed oil pipelines, the rampant sabotage, the kidnapping of tourists, and much more have led Cairo to recognize that no modus vivendi with the current Gazan powers-that-be is feasible. Gaza’s Hamas warlords had enjoyed a honeymoon phase while the Muslim Brotherhood (of which Hamas is an offshoot) ruled Egypt. But Cairo’s patience has ended with the recent slaying of more than 30 of its troops. The Egyptian public appears to be giving its government wide latitude, the expelled residents of Rafah know not to tangle with Arab forces (which are hardly as soft-hearted as Israelis), journalists have been barred from the scenes of destruction, and the Arab world hasn’t yet resorted to the shrill hysteria that would doubtless be unleashed against Israel for far less. But it would be naïve to suppose that Israel would escape with no flak. In popular Arab commentary – even inside Egypt – Israel is described as somehow being behind the Egyptian operation, as having advised and even directed the Egyptians regarding the measures they should adopt. Israeli experts, according to the prevalent spin, have instructed Egypt on the minutiae of anti-terrorist tactics.

There’s no denying Egypt’s current offensive does benefit Israel. The Sinai could have been a dangerous new front that Israel cannot afford. It’s further a relief to Israel that gunrunning and bankrolling funnels via Sinai might be minimized. Surely Egypt is doing what cannot be avoided. This is Gaza’s comeuppance. Nonetheless, none of this is undertaken for the love of Israel. Egypt has its own very compelling case against Gazan provocations and aggression. In a way, this can be viewed as Egypt’s disengagement from Gaza. Ironically, however, in its own 2005 disengagement Israel harmed no Gazan interests and expelled its own population. This has since been repaid with violent ingratitude.

 

                                                                       

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THE JIHADI CONNECTION BETWEEN SINAI,

GAZA AND ISLAMIC STATE                                                      

Jonathan Spyer   

Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1, 2014

 

What kind of relations do the jihadists of northern Sinai and Gaza have with Islamic State, and with Hamas? Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared a three-month national emergency this week, following the killing of over 31 Egyptian soldiers in a suicide car bombing carried out by jihadists in northern Sinai. No organization has issued an authoritative claim of responsibility for the bombing, but it comes amid a state of open insurgency in northern Sinai, as Egyptian security forces battle a number of jihadist organizations. Most prominent among these groups are Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen; the attack on the Sinai military base came a few days after an Egyptian court sentenced seven members of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis to death for carrying out previous attacks on the army. In subsequent days, Egyptian officials pointed an accusing finger at the Hamas rulers of Gaza, asserting there is “no doubt that elements belonging to Palestinian factions were directly involved in the attack.” Cairo is now set to build a new barrier separating the Strip from northern Sinai. In a number of Arabic media outlets, unnamed Egyptian government sources openly accused Hamas members of aiding the assault, assisting with planning, funding and weapons supply.

 

Are the Egyptian claims credible? Are there links between Hamas or smaller jihadist movements in the Gaza Strip and the insurgents in northern Sinai? And no less importantly, is the armed campaign in northern Sinai linked to Islamic State? First, it is important to understand that jihadist activity in northern Sinai is not a new development. Long before the military coup of July 3, 2013, and indeed before the downfall of president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, this area had become a lawless zone in which jihadists and Beduin smugglers of people and goods carried out their activities. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis emerged from this already existing jihadist milieu in the period following Mubarak’s ouster. At this time, Egyptian security measures in the area sharply declined. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has not confined its activities to the Sinai area; rather, it has directly engaged in attacks on Israeli targets. Recently, the group beheaded four Sinai locals who it accused of being “spies for the Mossad,” also carrying out two rocket attacks on Eilat this past January.

 

The claim of links between Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has been raised in the past. In September, Egyptian security forces claimed to have found uniforms and weaponry identifiable as belonging to Hamas’s Izzadin Kassam brigades. It is worth remembering that the current Egyptian government has, since its inception, sought to link salafi jihadist terrorism with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as part of its strategy of marginalizing and criminalizing the Brotherhood. The current statements seeking to link Hamas directly to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis may form part of this larger strategy.

 

For its part, Hamas indignantly denies any link to this week’s bombing. But what can be said with greater confidence is there is, without doubt, a burgeoning and violent salafi jihadist subculture which encompasses northern Sinai and southern Gaza – with various organizations possessing members and infrastructure on both sides of the border. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis itself and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen both have members in Sinai and Gaza. Working tunnels smuggling goods and weapons exist between Gaza and northern Sinai, despite Egyptian attempts to destroy them. It is also a fact that Hamas is aware of these tunnels and makes no attempt to act against them, benefiting economically from their presence. From this standpoint, Hamas authorities in Gaza are guilty by omission of failing to act against the infrastructure supplying and supporting salafi guerrillas in northern Sinai, whether or not the less verifiable claims of direct Hamas links with them have a basis.

 

Given this reality, it is also not hard to understand the Egyptian determination to build an effective physical barrier between the Strip and Egyptian territory. What of the issue of support for Islamic State? Should these jihadist groups be seen as a southern manifestation of the Sunni jihadist wave now sweeping across Iraq, Syria and increasingly, Lebanon? From an ideological point of view, certainly yes. From an organizational point of view, the situation is more complex. According to Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, an expert on jihadist groups currently based at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and the Middle East Forum, neither Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis nor Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen have formally pledged their allegiance to the caliphate established by Islamic State in parts of Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, Tamimi confirmed, both organizations have expressed “support” for Islamic State and its objectives, while not subordinating themselves to it through a pledge of allegiance. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is known to maintain contacts with Islamic State, which has advised it on the mechanics of carrying out operations. Islamic State, meanwhile, has publicly declared its support for the jihadists in northern Sinai, without singling out any specific group for public support. Tamimi further notes the existence of two smaller and more obscure groups in Gaza with more direct links to Islamic State. These are Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis (The Group of Helpers/ Supporters of the Islamic State in Bayt al-Maqdis), which carries out propaganda activities from Gaza and helps funnel volunteers to Syria and Iraq, and the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Battalion, a Gazan contingent fighting with Islamic State in these countries.

 

So, a number of conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, Hamas, in its tolerance of and engagement with smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Sinai, at least indirectly permits the jihadists networks operating these tunnels to wage their insurgency against Egypt – even if the claims of a direct Hamas link to violent activities in Sinai have not yet been conclusively proven. Secondly, the most important organizations engaged in this insurgency support Islamic State, and are supported by them, though the former have not yet pledged allegiance and become directly subordinate to the latter. Islamic State is not yet in northern Sinai, but its close allies are. Their activities are tolerated by the Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip – as long as they are directed outward, against Egypt and Israel.

 

                                                                       

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TIME FOR A NEW U.S. APPROACH TO EGYPT                                                   

Brian Katulis        

Wall Street Journal, Oct. 29, 2014

 

The terrorist violence that killed at least 33 Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula last week was the latest in a string of attacks aimed at destabilizing the country. Egypt is too big to fail. If it experienced the sort of collapse other countries in the region have witnessed, the consequences for global security would be devastating. There are no easy answers to how Egypt can succeed amid its enormous security, political, economic, and social pressures. But it must remain high on the U.S. policy agenda.

 

For decades the U.S.-Egypt relationship centered on ensuring the endurance of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. But with Egypt’s leaders touting their close ties to Israel, it’s time for a broader strategy.

Helping Egypt address its many challenges–particularly when Washington is dealing with threats from Islamic State (ISIS) and nuclear talks with Iran–requires greater dexterity than the U.S. has demonstrated since the start of the Arab uprisings. It also requires Washington and Cairo to have a more honest conversation. A bilateral strategic dialogue likely to take place before year’s end offers a chance to set a different course–but the U.S. and Egypt would have to question at least three old assumptions about their relationship.

 

The first such assumption is whether fully restoring the bilateral security assistance program is sufficient to deal with Egypt’s security challenges. The Obama administration is holding back delivery of certain weapons systems, including F-16 fighter jets and M1A1 tanks, that are a portion of the security assistance suspended in the wake of former President Mohammed Morsi’s overthrow. From candid discussions I’ve had with several Egyptian security officials this week, it is clear that Egypt needs a lot of help to deal with multiple threats–not just those that have festered in the Sinai Peninsula for years but also stopping the spread of instability from neighboring Libya.

 

Even if the U.S. sent the weapons it has held back this past year, it is not clear how much they would help on their own. Sophisticated military hardware suited for conventional warfare is unlikely to fully address the asymmetrical threats posed by terrorist networks. As important is a more effective police and justice system that protects law and order while safeguarding basic rights. Egypt needs a comprehensive, integrated political and economic empowerment strategy that dries up the pool of potential recruits for terrorist groups.

 

The second assumption that needs to be questioned is whether the old ways of trying to boost Egypt’s economic growth can still work. President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi‘s efforts to reform Egypt’s costly energy subsidies are encouraging. But it’s unclear whether his government is empowered to follow through on next steps. There is also confusion within Egypt’s government about a donor and investment conference scheduled for next year; several Egyptian officials outlined different visions to me about this planned conference. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew’s visit to Cairo is a signal that the U.S. is making economic statecraft a key part of reengagement, and a major business delegation planned for next month may make possible a broader foundation for bilateral relations. But this economic engagement needs greater organization to have a meaningful impact; serious growth that produces enough jobs to address youth unemployment requires a major overhaul of Egypt’s political economy. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have made large investments in Egypt in the past year. A more coordinated multilateral strategy working with Gulf countries and potentially others to encourage serious economic reform would help.

 

The third assumption that needs to be questioned is whether the old style of restricted politics and limits on basic freedoms would stabilize Egypt. Many Americans’ deep reservations about Egypt stem from its jailing of journalists and civil society activists. Nearly all of these figures have no association with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists at the center of Egypt’s polarized debate over power. Interestingly, Americans’ reservations are shared among some Egyptian political leaders who voice strong support for President Sisi. Some of these people, many of whom plan to run in upcoming parliamentary elections and who say they are glad the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in power, indicate concerns about the Sisi government’s attempts to close off space for political debate. As a practical matter, Washington is less likely to fully reengage amid widespread abuses of basic rights in Egypt; members of Congress from both parties are showing hesitation.

 

The past three and a half years in U.S.-Egypt relations have been rocky, but last month’s meeting between President Barack Obama and President Sisi could be a starting point for turning the page. For the U.S., today’s Egypt requires not a return to business as usual but a new way of thinking. Yet a new foundation won’t be politically viable if Egypt continues to suffer from negative perceptions in the U.S. Much depends on how Egypt’s president handles this moment–and whether both countries are willing to move past assumptions that guided the relationship for decades.

 

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On Topic

Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS: David D. Kirkpatrick, New York Times, Nov. 10, 2014 —They have slaughtered hundreds of Egyptian soldiers and police officers, recruited experienced fighters and staged increasingly sophisticated raids from the Western desert to the Sinai Peninsula.

Militants Kill 5 Members of Egypt Security Forces in Sinai: Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 2014 —Islamic militants set up roadblocks and killed five policemen and soldiers early on Thursday in Egypt’s restive northern Sinai Peninsula, where authorities have declared a state of emergency following a major attack that killed 31 troops last month, officials said.

Hunger Growls in Egypt: Daniel Pipes, Washington Times, Oct. 3, 2014—Egypt, famed for millennia as the “breadbasket of the Mediterranean,” now faces alarming food shortages. A startlingly candid report in Cairo’s Al-Ahram newspaper by Gihan Shahine, entitled “Food for Stability” makes clear the extent of the crisis.

Israel and Egypt Keep Gaza Strip Borders Shut: Khaled Abu Toameh, Ben Hartman & Ariel Ben Solomon, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 2, 2014—The Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings to Gaza will remain closed until the security situation allows their reopening, a Defense Ministry spokeswoman said on Sunday.

Sinai: Terrorist Presence Becomes Full-Fledged Insurgency: Abdallah Schleifer, Al-Arabiya, Oct. 31, 2014—A week later, Egypt is still reeling from the coordinated attack in the Sinai that cost 31 soldiers their lives.

 

 

 

               

 

 

 

                      

                

 

 

Rob Coles, Publications Chairman, Canadian Institute for Jewish Research/ L’institut Canadien de recherches sur le Judaïsme, www.isranet.org

Tel: (514) 486-5544 – Fax:(514) 486-8284 ; ber@isranet.wpsitie.com