WITH CONFLICTS HEATING UP ON THREE BORDERS, HOW PREPARED IS THE IDF TO RESPOND?
Is the IDF Ready for War?: Shmuel Even and Sason Hadad: INSS Insight No. 1152, March 25, 2019 — The public debate about the readiness of the ground forces for war intensified following the report issued in September 2018 by Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick before concluding his term as IDF ombudsman in January 2019. This classified report followed the ombudsman’s report issued in mid-2018.
Why Israel Fears Iran’s Presence in Syria: David Kenner: The Atlantic, Jul. 22, 2018 — In some ways, Israel has never been more powerful. It boasts a close relationship with the Trump administration, a powerful and nuclear-armed military, and an air force capable of striking enemies hundreds of miles away.
The IDF’s Anti-Tunnel Operation Is Not About Tunnels: Yonah Jeremy Bob, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 4, 2019 — Of course, the soldiers in Operation Northern Shield are investing nearly all of their time eliminating Hezbollah’s cross-border attack tunnels.
Technology and Conventional Warfare Merge Under Israeli Eyes: Seth J. Frantzman, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 22, 2018 –Last week the Iron Dome faced off against the largest number of rockets ever fired by Hamas in a single 24-hour period.
On Topic Links
Hamas’s “New Campaign” in Gaza, One Year Later: Michael Milstein, INSS Insight No. 1145, Mar. 8, 2019 — The current campaign along the Gaza border, which began nearly one year ago, differs fundamentally from other struggles Israel has faced in this arena over the last decades.
Inside the Hezbollah Tunnel that Israel Never Found: Richard Hall Meleeta, The Independent, Dec. 5, 2018 — The entrance to the tunnel is hidden by a canopy of oak trees that cover the mountainside. Inside, dim lamps lead the way down a narrow passageway into a warren of small rooms where the air is cool and damp.
5 Weapons That Make It Clear Israel Dominates the Sky: Zachary Keck, The National Interest, Apr. 14, 2019 — Time and again during its short existence, Israel has demonstrated that it has the most powerful military in the Middle East.
Israel Military Strength: GFP (Global Fire Power) 2019 – For 2019, Israel ranked 16 (of 137) out of the countries currently considered for the GFP review. It holds a Pwrindex rating of 0.2964 (o.oooo being perfect.)
IS THE IDF READY FOR WAR?
Shmuel Even and Sason Hadad
INSS Insight No. 1152, March 25, 2019
The public debate about the readiness of the ground forces for war intensified following the report issued in September 2018 by Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick before concluding his term as IDF ombudsman in January 2019. This classified report followed the ombudsman’s report issued in mid-2018. Brick argued that the ground forces were not ready for war, and in a radio interview on January 11, 2019, strongly criticized the IDF organizational culture. He warned that airpower, intelligence, and cyber capabilities would not suffice to stop missile fire against the home front in the next war, and that ground maneuver deep within enemy territory, perhaps on several fronts simultaneously, would be necessary. Brick made clear that within the framework of his job, rather than only looking into soldiers’ complaints, he had personally investigated the root causes, drawing on his rich combat experience in the ground forces.
In the wake of this criticism, then-Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot appointed a committee to investigate the readiness of the ground forces for war (henceforth “the committee”), headed by IDF Comptroller Brig. Gen. Ilan Harari. In summarizing the committee’s findings, Harari said that the ground forces had been significantly improved in recent years and stated: “We declare the ground forces ready and prepared for war.” However, the committee also pointed out significant lapses in certain aspects of the readiness of these forces. Findings included: lags in integrating the Command and Control System in reservist regiments; shortfalls in logistical transport, namely a major shortage of trucks for conveying ordnance and other supplies and the transportation of armored fighting vehicles; slow procurement of advanced tanks and APCs; a need to increase weapons stockpiles in certain areas; shortfalls in appointing personnel to available posts in combat support roles, both in the regular military and the reserves; lags in reserves mobilization; training environments that in some cases do not simulate combat scenarios; and insufficient dialogue between commanders and the junior officer corps. Maj. Gen. (res.) Avi Mizrahi, who headed the steering committee of Harari’s committee, argued that the successes of Iron Dome had given rise to a mistaken perception among decision makers that wars could be won without ground maneuvers; Mizrahi contended that no war in Lebanon could be won without ground maneuver. Given the shortfalls uncovered by the review, and the need for further buildup, the committee recommended a large budgetary supplement for bolstering the ground forces (some $2 billion annually over five years), in addition to the budget in the Gideon Plan.
Brick’s criticism was also discussed in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee’s Sub-Committee for Readiness and Maintaining National Security, headed by MK Omer Bar-Lev. In December 2018, the Bar-Lev committee rejected Brick’s argument that the IDF was not ready for war, with the counter-argument that the problems cited were familiar and were appropriately addressed by the Chief of Staff, guided by a reasonable order of priorities. It issued its own report on IDF readiness, drawing on its reviews over recent years. Among its findings were that six division commanders who were interviewed gave their units a score of 8 out of maximum of 10 points for readiness, while eight reserve regiment commanders gave a score of 9. As part of its recommendations, the Bar-Lev committee placed a top priority on raising salaries of senior non-commissioned officers and suggested that the deputy Chief of Staff be made responsible for ensuring that the shortfalls found by the various committees be followed up and rectified. The panel further demanded that operational plans – specifically, the timetables for combat mobilization – are coordinated with estimates that implementation could well occur while under massive fire targeting traffic routes, induction centers, and emergency supply depots… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
WHY ISRAEL FEARS IRAN’S PRESENCE IN SYRIA
David Kenner
The Atlantic, Jul. 22, 2018
In some ways, Israel has never been more powerful. It boasts a close relationship with the Trump administration, a powerful and nuclear-armed military, and an air force capable of striking enemies hundreds of miles away. At the same time, it is a small country with limited infrastructure: It has one international airport, a handful of major power stations, and an electrical grid that Israeli experts have already warned is vulnerable to attack.
Iran and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, have obtained advanced missiles that are designed to exploit those weaknesses. For Israeli security officials, the nightmare scenario is that these weapons may become accurate enough to hit Israel’s civilian and military infrastructure, paralyzing daily life in the country. The threat they pose has already drawn Israel deeper into the Syrian conflict and promises to fundamentally alter the next war with Hezbollah—a war that could come sooner than expected.
Since the beginning of the Syrian war, Israeli warplanes have struck Hezbollah arms convoys more than 100 times. A Syrian government offensive is sweeping through the southwest of the country, threatening to spark a further escalation. Syrian regime forces are approaching Israel, which has sent reinforcements to its side of the border to contain any spillover violence. Recently, Israel shot down two Syrian military drones that crossed into Israeli territory. While Iranian-backed fighters have played a low-profile role in the offensive, officials in Jerusalem remain worried that they could quietly move in once the Syrian government regains control.
The United States, Russia, and Israel are reportedly negotiating a diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict that would establish a buffer zone free of Iran-backed forces near the Israeli border. Yet the threat from Hezbollah’s long-range missiles will remain. “Our concern is not Iran by the border. Our concern is Iran in Syria,” Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States and current deputy minister, told me. “Pulling Iranian forces away from the border doesn’t help you very much when [they] have a missile that can travel 200 kilometers.” Underscoring that point, on May 10, Iran and its allies fired 32 rockets at Israel from the Golan Heights; most landed short of the border or in unpopulated areas, and the rest were intercepted by Israel’s missile-defense system. The Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the attacks marked a “new phase” in the conflict with Israel.
Since Hezbollah’s last war with Israel in 2006, it has expanded its rocket and missile stockpile. With Iran’s help, its arsenal is also now far more technologically advanced. Israel’s missile-defense systems can counter some threats but would likely be overwhelmed by the sheer number of rockets and missiles that Hezbollah can now fire. “In the event of a war, the Israeli population will absorb blows that it has not experienced in decades,” Ofer Zalzberg, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Israel and Palestine, told me.
In Lebanon, I met with Hajj Mohammed, a short, stocky veteran Hezbollah fighter. During the 2006 war, he fired constant barrages of short-range Katyusha rockets from south Lebanon into northern Israel. With Israeli jets prowling the skies, it was dangerous work. But Hezbollah was prepared: The Lebanese militia had concealed its launchers under concrete bunkers, rigging them to rise up using a hydraulic system, fire, and then disappear in the ground again. This system allowed Hezbollah to fire a steady stream of rockets for the duration of the war, forcing hundreds of thousands of Israelis to flee their homes.
While Hajj Mohammed was only too happy to relive the glories of 2006, his focus is fixed on the future. “Since 2006 until today, the game has changed entirely,” he said. “This time we have already chosen the targets, and we’ll make it rain missiles with pinpoint accuracy.”
Foreign-intelligence assessments appear to lend credence to Hajj Mohammed’s bravado. A senior U.S. counterterrorism official told me that Hezbollah’s arsenal includes at least 100,000 rockets and missiles, 10 times the number the group had in 2006. These weapons likely include the Iranian-made Fateh-110 missile, scud missiles, guided surface-to-air missiles that could target Israeli warplanes, and an increasingly sophisticated drone program, the official said. Israeli military officials, meanwhile, have warned that Hezbollah could fire 1,200 rockets a day in a future conflict—up from the roughly 100 rockets a day 12 years ago… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
THE IDF’S ANTI-TUNNEL OPERATION IS NOT ABOUT TUNNELS
Yonah Jeremy Bob
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 4, 2019
Of course, the soldiers in Operation Northern Shield are investing nearly all of their time eliminating Hezbollah’s cross-border attack tunnels.
But this week we learned loud and clear from IDF intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Tamir Heyman that the real primary goal of the month-old IDF operation is deterrence. Not only that, but we learned that the next main goal of the operation is setting the stage for any future conflict with Hezbollah.
Israel hopes to grab the moral high ground and, by unearthing Hezbollah’s duplicity in building cross-border attack tunnels, establish legitimacy for the massive destruction that the IDF may need to bring down on Lebanon in a potential future war.
Eliminating Hezbollah tunnels themselves does end aspects of the threat the powerful force could pose in a future conflict, but as Heyman said, Israel may not be capable of eliminating all of the attack tunnels at this time. “I want to emphasize that we are not talking about an operation whose goal is to destroy the attack tunnel capability of Hezbollah, but rather… to thwart Hezbollah’s primary attack plan,” he said in Tel Aviv.
Heyman said that Hezbollah’s plan had been to invade villages on the northern border to take the fighting into Israel. His message was that by severely blunting Hezbollah’s attack-tunnel abilities, even if some abilities remained, it would be heavily discouraged from even a limited invasion. How many more cross-border attack tunnels does Hezbollah have, and what is the point of eliminating only some of the tunnels?
While defense sources have told The Jerusalem Post that Hezbollah’s attack tunnels were always single digits, which would mean at most only a few have not yet been uncovered, there is reason to be skeptical. First of all, during the 2014 Gaza war, initial IDF estimates regarding how many attack tunnels Hamas had and how long it would take to clear them were gross underestimates. A small number of tunnels, which the IDF initially said could be cleared in a matter of days, eventually ballooned to 31 attack tunnels, which took around 50 days to eliminate.
Daphné Richemond-Barak, author of the book Underground Warfare and a professor at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, told the Post: “There could definitely be more tunnels. It is very likely. The fact that we found five – five is a lot and very few. It’s a lot because it’s a significant security threat, but its very few because, given what we know about the threat and given Hezbollah’s, Hamas’s and Israel’s history underground,” the number seems low.
She also said that “going out on a major operation and making lots of media noise” – maybe “five tunnels justifies it, but the noise created expectations of an even graver threat… and even more tunnels.”
Richemond-Barak said she would feel safer with the tunnel situation if the IDF was crossing into Lebanon in a targeted fashion to get rid of tunnels also near the border, which possibly connect to cross-border tunnels or may be hooked up to them in the future… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
TECHNOLOGY AND CONVENTIONAL WARFARE MERGE UNDER ISRAELI EYES
Seth J. Frantzman
Jerusalem Post, Nov. 22, 2018
Last week the Iron Dome faced off against the largest number of rockets ever fired by Hamas in a single 24-hour period. It performed impressively, stopping more than 100 of the 460 fired, targeting those headed for populated areas and letting others fall harmlessly.
I had a front-row seat next to Kfar Aza. Years ago, due to the threat of Qassam rockets and mortars, we wouldn’t have felt so secure, so close to Gaza and danger. But instead, a theater of war played out around us at night, with dozens of little yellow dots, the rockets from Gaza, reaching skyward, and the white light of the Iron Dome Tamir interceptors searching them out.
Israel is a pioneer in these kinds of systems, especially those that are increasingly filling gaps and niches between the tactical level and larger level. Recently, I visited two companies that are pioneering technologies in this field.
One of them is called CONTROP Precision Technologies, a privately-owned company that specializes in what it calls “development and production of electro-optical and precision motion control systems and surveillance, defense and homeland security applications.” The other company, RADA Electronic Industries, specializes in design, development and production of defense electronics, especially tactical land radars.
It’s hard to visualize most of these systems or understand how they are applicable, because of the jargon and technical specifications involved in them. The best way to think of it is to recall all the movies you’ve seen about war recently. Whether it was Eye in the Sky about military personnel bickering about a drone target, or episodes of Homeland, there’s always a scene with people sitting in a room with computers watching some target somewhere. What all of this technology is doing is making it possible to locate targets more easily or defend borders from threats.
In most of history, war was primarily a contest between people with handmade weapons. If they were lucky, they had access to animals, such as war elephants or horses. When societies were organized, they mass-produced weapons and had complex military formations. By the time of the First World War, technology had made killing more deadly, and machines such as tanks were being produced… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.}
