Can Israel Defeat Hamas Without Toppling It?:
Yaacov Lappin, Algemeiner, Feb. 25, 2019 —
Despite its radical Islamist ideology and long-term commitment to Israel’s destruction, Hamas in the Gaza Strip is — for now — avoiding high intensity armed conflict.
IDF Warns Hamas Likely to Spark War in Gaza in Bid for International Support: Judah Ari Gross, The Times of Israel, Feb. 14, 2019 — The Hamas terror group may seek to spark a war with Israel in the near future in an attempt to elicit international sympathy and an influx of international aid money to the Gaza Strip, which it controls, according to an Israeli Military Intelligence assessment released Wednesday.
Looking at the Gaza Strip: From Short Term to Long Term: Kim Lavi and Udi Dekel, INSS Insight, Nov. 20, 2018 — The most recent escalation between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip (November 11-12, 2018) erupted as progress was underway in the ongoing efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement between the parties.
Uniting Iran, Lebanon and Gaza Against Israel: Dr Adnan Abu Amer, Middle East Monitor, Jan. 28, 2019 — While I was writing this article, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced that any operation launched by Israel against Lebanon will be dealt with as a declaration of war. If Israel makes any mistakes, he claimed, the entire “axis resistance” is ready to retaliate.
On Topic Links
Hamas’s Popularity: A Reality Check: Prof. Hillel Frisch, BESA, Feb. 20, 2019
Hamas and Salafi Jihadi Groups: Aymenn Jawad Al- Tamimi, Quilliam, Jan. 28, 2019
Palestinian Terror Advances In Gaza, Held In Check In West Bank – Report: Yonah Jeremy Bob, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 3, 2019
Russian Mediation: The Critical Messages of the Hamas-Fatah Talks in Moscow: Ramzy Baroud, Counterpunch, Feb. 22, 2019
CAN ISRAEL DEFEAT HAMAS WITHOUT TOPPLING IT?
Yaacov Lappin Algemeiner, Feb. 25, 2019
Despite its radical Islamist ideology and long-term commitment to Israel’s destruction, Hamas in the Gaza Strip is — for now — avoiding high intensity armed conflict. Hamas’ leader, Yahya Sinwar, has expressed an awareness of the futility of a new war with Israel at this time. Instead, he is focused on other goals: ending the organization’s regional isolation, strengthening its iron grip on Gaza, and avoiding an economic meltdown in the Strip, which could endanger his regime.
Hamas is relying on low intensity pressure tactics, such as weekly border rioting, to promote these goals. It is also actively trying to set up terrorism cells throughout the West Bank and plot mass casualty attacks, which the Shin Bet intelligence agency prevents to a very large degree. Hamas’ object is to weaken its arch West Bank rival, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and promote the cause of jihadist violence against Israel — and do all this without leading a trail of fire back to Gaza.
The Gaza-Israel border violence that Hamas has fomented for nearly a year represents a calculated high-risk approach. It is designed to apply pressure on Jerusalem and Cairo to ease security restrictions on Gaza, without allowing the situation to deteriorate into a new war. Hamas’ attempts to reconcile with the PA in Ramallah, which holds the key to budget allocations for Gaza, have failed, and the group is now engaging with Israel and Egypt to rescue Gaza’s economy.
A shared Israeli-Hamas interest in preventing an economic collapse of Gaza has led to regular injections of Qatari cash, a development that has politically damaged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It has also led to some criticism of Hamas by Gazans, who ask whether the border violence and the casualties it causes are all just for the sake of Qatari money.
At the same time, Hamas, together with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the second-largest armed faction in Gaza, has embarked on an ambitious military build-up program involving the domestic production of some 20,000 surface-to-surface rockets, the digging of a network of combat tunnels crisscrossing Gaza, and intensive war training for armed Gazan battalions.
The result is an inherently unstable Gaza arena that could rapidly shift from low-level confrontation to high-intensity armed conflict, sparked by any number of localized tactical incidents. Therefore, now is the crucial time for Israel to consider the end objective of any future armed conflict in Gaza, despite the lack of any will on Jerusalem’s part to enter into one.
In recent years, the IDF Southern Command, which is responsible for much of the war planning for Gaza, has identified a long-term truce as the best of the bad options for Israel. This is based on the understanding that an Israeli invasion of Gaza and subsequent destruction of the Hamas regime would leave Israel in the unenviable position of being directly in charge of some two million mostly hostile Gazans. This could lead to an open-ended and draining military occupation. It would be extremely difficult to find alternative rulers for Gaza, with the PA likely unwilling or unable to “ride into Gaza on Israeli tanks” and assume a governing role. The PA would risk its legitimacy and be exposed to even harsher criticism from its Islamist rivals, who are always keen to depict it as a collaborator with Israel. … [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
IDF WARNS HAMAS LIKELY TO SPARK WAR IN GAZA
IN BID FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
Judah Ari Gross
The Times of Israel, Feb. 14, 2019
The Hamas terror group may seek to spark a war with Israel in the near future in an attempt to elicit international sympathy and an influx of international aid money to the Gaza Strip, which it controls, according to an Israeli Military Intelligence assessment released Wednesday.
The Israel Defense Forces believes Hamas or the Iran-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the second largest terror group in Gaza, could attempt to draw Israel into a war by conducting an attack along the border — another anti-tank missile strike on a bus, an ambush from an as-yet-undiscovered tunnel or a similar low-level but significant attack. According to the intelligence assessment, parts of which were distributed to reporters on Wednesday, while the Israeli military sees the northern arena — Lebanon and the Iranian entrenchment in Syria — as the larger challenges facing the Jewish state, the more immediate threats come from the Gaza Strip.
In light of this view, IDF chief Lt. Gen. Aviv Kohavi, whose tenure began last month, called for the military to update operational plans for fighting in the Gaza Strip. “Gaza, as it is noted in the annual intelligence assessment, is the most volatile region, and there is a risk of terror group’s initiating action [against Israel]. The chief of staff identified an improvement of readiness in that region as a top priority,” the military said. “The identification of targets will be increased — both for retaliatory strikes and to assist in ground forces maneuvering within the Strip,” the army said.
Kohavi also called for the military to purchase two more Iron Dome missile defense systems. Currently, the Israeli Air Force possesses eight batteries — six that are operated by conscripts and two by reservists. “By the end of 2019, 10 batteries are intended to be deployed across the country — eight staffed by conscripts and two by reservists,” the army said.
The IDF believes the terror group is not interested in entering a long conflict with Israel but envisions a short period of intense fighting after which it would be able to negotiate a ceasefire agreement that would improve its overall economic and political standing.
Adding to the potential for war in Gaza, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in recent months has proven itself to be increasingly willing to clash with Israeli troops, despite Hamas’s opposition. Earlier this month, a sniper from the Iran-backed terror group opened fire at an IDF officer, hitting him in the helmet, causing light injuries.
This in part seems to come from the fact that Israel officially holds Hamas responsible for all violence coming from the Gaza Strip and thus directs its retaliatory strikes against Hamas targets and bases, meaning PIJ can carry out attacks without immediate consequences.
This represents a change from the IDF’s assessments in recent months, which had held that while Hamas wanted to maintain pressure on Israel with border violence, it was not interested in all-out conflict.
Hamas, which has ruled Gaza since it overthrew the Palestinian Authority in a bloody coup in 2007, has faced increasing domestic pressure as the Strip’s economy has deteriorated during the interim 12 years in the face of a naval blockade by Israel and Egypt, which the countries say is necessary to prevent the terror group from importing large amounts of weaponry and war materiel into the coastal enclave.
International aid groups have warned in recent months that the Gaza Strip, which already has sweeping unemployment and limited access to electricity and water, is heading for a full humanitarian crisis… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
LOOKING AT THE GAZA STRIP: FROM SHORT TERM TO LONG TERM
Kim Levi and Udi Dekel
INSS Insight, Nov. 20, 2018
The most recent escalation between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip (November 11-12, 2018) erupted as progress was underway in the ongoing efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement between the parties. The behavior of Israel and Hamas during this episode attests to a mutual desire to reach understandings (both parties reject the notion of a “settlement,” as it would be interpreted as mutual recognition) that include a ceasefire and a significant easing of the closure of the Gaza Strip. The current sense is that both Israel and Hamas are not interested in paying the price of a war that will ultimately return them to square one.
The clash between Hamas and an IDF force operating in Khan Yunis was exploited effectively by Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in the Gaza Strip, in an effort to prove to his critics that he has not abandoned the path of armed resistance. He likewise was eager to demonstrate to Israel that Hamas will not exercise restraint in response to IDF operations in the Gaza Strip conducted under the cover of ceasefire understandings. Hamas’s decision to fire a massive barrage of some 500 rockets at Israel over two days reflected Hamas’s assessment that what was required was a painful blow to Israel but limited in rocket range so as to retain the ability to return to the ceasefire understandings. In turn, Israel’s response was strong yet measured, reflected in the relatively low number of people killed in the Gaza Strip as a result of the IDF attacks (and the “roof knocking” practice to provide advance warning of attacks in residential areas).
For a number of months, Egypt, in conjunction with UN emissary Nickolay Mladenov, has tried to promote a settlement in the Gaza Strip through mediation between Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority (PA). A settlement between Israel and Hamas will undermine the status of the PA as the sole representative of the Palestinians and will perpetuate Hamas’s rule in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, an internal Palestinian reconciliation agreement between the PA and Hamas would harm Israel’s ability to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank. Therefore, and despite Israel’s and Hamas’s refusal to engage in mutual recognition, negotiations – albeit indirect – are underway between these parties, without the involvement of the PA. Since the onset on March 30 of the mass demonstrations along the border fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel (the “Marches of Return”), Hamas has tried to achieve a settlement with the aim of providing “calm in exchange for lifting the blockade” on the Strip and beginning significant reconstruction in the area.
For its part, Israel has presented a clear equation of “calm in exchange for calm” and has conditioned progress on the return of the missing individuals and the bodies of the soldiers held by Hamas. It is also unwilling to allow Hamas to score successes that would strengthen it in the domestic arena and validate the violence it exercised along the border. At the same time, the PA has refused to help promote a settlement that will give Hamas legitimacy and strengthen its rule in the Strip and has made all progress toward a settlement conditional upon internal Palestinian reconciliation and restoration of all of its authorities, including security powers, to administer the Strip… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
UNITING IRAN, LEBANON AND GAZA AGAINST ISRAEL
Dr. Adman Abu Amer
Middle East Monitor, Jan. 28, 2019
While I was writing this article, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced that any operation launched by Israel against Lebanon will be dealt with as a declaration of war. If Israel makes any mistakes, he claimed, the entire “axis resistance” is ready to retaliate.
Nasrallah made his statement after a silence of several months. It coincided with the annual strategic assessment issued by Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies. “Tension also exists between very strong basic deterrence, which prevents Israel’s adversaries from initiating wide scale military action, and the military and security challenges that lie below the threshold of war,” said the Institute. “These tensions contribute to potential volatility on all of Israel’s main fronts: Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. In spite of the ‘mutual deterrence’ that exists, these fronts are also characterised by the potential for deterioration into large scale confrontation and outright war, which might occur on more than one front at a time.”
Israel believes that if this scenario of a comprehensive military confrontation comes into being, then it could find itself facing an “all party war” against Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah in the north and the Palestinian resistance movements in Gaza in the south. It needs to be prepared for them all.
The statements by archenemies Israel and Hezbollah prompt a number of questions. Will, for example, Israel launch an attack on these fronts collectively or individually, or will these fronts launch a collective attack on Israel? What is the Palestinians’ position on joining Iran and Hezbollah? What will Iran and Hezbollah’s position be in the event that Gaza is attacked by Israel?
These developments have been preceded by the Israelis ending “Operation Northern Shield”, the campaign to expose Hezbollah’s tunnels. The Israeli, Palestinian and Lebanese positions indicate the potential for engaging in a multi-front confrontation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commented on this by saying that, “Israel is operating divisively and responsibly on all fronts simultaneously.” It was as if he was suggesting the possibility of the opening of other fronts in Gaza or Syria if a war between Hezbollah and Israel erupts.
Hezbollah is apparently monitoring Israel’s moves on all fronts: “We are an integrated chain, and we cannot separate Gaza from Lebanon. Our enemy is one regardless of the number of fronts involved. We will not let one front face Israel alone.” This indicates the position of the axis, led by Iran, on the potential to engage in fighting on multiple fronts and opens the door to discussions about such a scenario. Are Hamas and the Palestinian factions prepared for this?… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
On Topic Links
Hamas’s Popularity: A Reality Check: Prof. Hillel Frisch, BESA, Feb. 20, 2019 — Hamas did its best to create the impression that enormous, enthusiastic crowds attended its recent 31st anniversary commemoration in Katiba Square in Gaza.: Aymenn Jawad Al- Tamimi, Quilliam, Jan. 28, 2019 —
What has been the nature of relations between Hamas and Salafi jihadi groups? The question is worth examining because Hamas is sometimes equated with the latter ideologically while on other occasions a strict dichotomy of enmity and opposition is painted between Hamas and the Salafi jihadi groups.
Palestinian Terror Advances In Gaza, Held In Check In West Bank – Report: Yonah Jeremy Bob, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 3, 2019 —
While the Shin Bet has kept Hamas in check in the West Bank, the terror group has maintained a destabilizing conflict with Israel via Gaza, a new intelligence center report said.
Russian Mediation: The Critical Messages of the Hamas-Fatah Talks in Moscow: Ramzy Baroud, Counterpunch, Feb. 22, 2019 — The Russian-sponsored Palestinian unity talks in Moscow on February 11 were neither a success nor failure. Uniting Palestinian factions was not the main objective of the Moscow conference, in the first place.
