Egyptian Mediation In Gaza Is A Strategic Asset By Its Own Right: Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman, Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, Apr. 18, 2019 — A temporary and fragile calm was established during the run-up to the Israeli elections on 9 April 2019, vis-à-vis Hamas and other “Resistance Groups” in the Gaza Strip.
The U.S. Is Losing Influence in The World’s Biggest Oil Region: Gregory R. Copley, Oil Price.com, Apr 15, 2019 — Egyptian President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi’s visit to the White House on April 9, 2019, resulted in one of the worst setbacks for U.S. Middle Eastern policy under the Donald Trump Administration.
In First, Arab Countries Admit Israel Into a Regional Alliance. But There Is a Price: Ora Coren,Haaretz, Jan 20, 2019 — The announcement this week that many of the countries of the East Mediterranean, including Israel, agreed to set up a forum to create a regional gas market is a landmark development for Israel.
Sisi Restores Jewish Heritage in Egypt: Haisam Hassanein, The Washington Institute, Dec. 14, 2018 — On December 10, Egyptian antiquities minister Khaled al-Anani announced that President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi had ordered the government to devote 1.3 billion pounds (or around $72 million) to restoring Jewish heritage in the country. During a meeting with the parliament’s Committee on Media, Culture, and Antiquities, Anani stated, “I would not wait for someone to give me money to service it. It is a priority for me like Pharaonic, Roman, Islamic, and Coptic heritage.”
ON TOPIC LINKS:
Egypt Constitutional Changes Could Mean Sisi Rule Until 2030: BBC, Apr. 16, 2019 — Mr Sisi is due to stand down in 2022, when his second four-year term ends. But the amendments, which must be put to a referendum within 30 days, would lengthen his current term to six years and allow him to stand for one more.
Egypt and Israel: From Peace between Leaders and Armies to Peace between Peoples: Ofir Winter, Udi Dekel, INSS Insight No. 1153, March 27, 2019 — An assessment of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt from the perspective of forty years since it was signed paints a positive picture, notwithstanding some elements that require review, improvement, and updating.
Egypt Hosts Arab War Games, In Possible Nod To Growing Anti-Iran Alliance: Times of Israel, Nov. 7, 2018 — Ground, air and naval units from five Arab nations are arriving in Egypt to join their Egyptian counterparts for war games, Egypt’s military said, in the first sign that a military alliance proposed by Washington and dubbed the “Arab NATO” for its Middle East partners may be gaining traction.
‘Arab Leaders Pressuring Palestinians to Accept Trump Plan’: David Rosenberg, Arutz Sheva, Apr. 22, 2019 — Arab leaders are pressuring the Palestinian Authority to accept the peace plan drawn up by the Trump administration, which is expected to be released this June, a source within the Palestinian Authority claims.
EGYPTIAN MEDIATION IN GAZA IS A STRATEGIC ASSET
BY ITS OWN RIGHT
Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, Apr. 18, 2019
A temporary and fragile calm was established during the run-up to the Israeli elections on 9 April 2019, vis-à-vis Hamas and other “Resistance Groups” in the Gaza Strip. This came in response to significant economic gestures by Israel. It is by no means a solution to the basic problems posed by the dangerous and complex military and political reality in this part of the world. The lingering frustration of the residents of the border areas (the Gaza “envelope,” in Israeli parlance) and that of many other Israelis with Hamas provocations is understandable and justified.
Still, there are no magic solutions hidden up anyone’s sleeve. A systemic and persistent engagement in managing the conflict, without a “decisive outcome” as traditionally understood in Israeli security doctrine, is probably the pattern best suited for Israeli needs in the foreseeable future. The alternatives are costlier and more difficult, and their chances of success are doubtful.
In this context, a unique role is played by Egypt – or to be more precise, by the Egyptian intelligence services, which can be used with “plausible deniability” and without granting diplomatic recognition to the de facto Hamas regime in Gaza. This is of broad strategic importance, both for Israel and for others in the region, including the Egyptian leadership, who share Israel’s sense of threat and order of priorities.
Much in the same way as Israel uses Russian good offices in Syria, Egypt’s contribution makes it possible to deliver unambiguous messages to the Hamas leadership. These messages, in turn, rest upon Israel’s proven ability to exact a heavy price from Hamas by military means. This establishes a triangular diplomatic maneuver which is aimed, from Israel’s perspective, to bring about a restored calm for as long a period as possible, but without falling into the trap of a direct dialogue with forces committed to Israel’s destruction.
On the economic side of the equation, Qatar (closely supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, and hence also Hamas) plays the role of funder for the Gaza Strip – a role which Egypt, for obvious reasons, cannot possibly play. The use of cash-filled suitcases, reminiscent of old Hollywood crime films, is due to the staunch refusal of the PA leadership in Ramallah to provide any proper banking and financial services to the “rebel held” area. But even if Qatar does serve as the CFO (Chief Financial Officer) of this situation, it is the Egyptian leadership that retains the role of CEO (Chief Executive Officer) in full control of the operation as a whole. For obvious geo-political reasons, Hamas has no choice but to oblige the Egyptians.
This offers Israel several benefits by their own right (beyond the impact on achieving calm with Hamas). Israel’s clear and overt preference for an Egyptian role was indeed manifest throughout the rounds of fighting in 2008-2009 (“Cast Lead”), 2012 (“Pillar of Defense”) and 2014 (“Protective Edge”), and several smaller conflagrations since. Paradoxically, it was easier to enlist Muhammad Morsi’s regime in the effort in 2012 to curb Hamas. Israel put him in a situation in which, if he did not act to end the fighting, Israel will opt for an extensive ground maneuver, and he may then face the stark choice between acting as a responsible Egyptian leader (to sustain peace with Israel) and doing his duty as a Muslim Brother (to help and protect Hamas). Morsi indeed committed himself to the effort to restore calm and won accolades from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for his role. Things were far murkier in 2014, due to the deeply-held mutual hatred between Hamas and Sisi’s regime – yet at the end it was again Egyptian mediation which played a key role. Today, the Egyptian regime has developed a sophisticated and effective approach combining rewards for the Hamas Leadership with significant leverages… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
THE U.S. IS LOSING INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD’S
BIGGEST OIL REGION
Gregory R. Copley
Oil Price.com, Apr 15, 2019
Egyptian President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi’s visit to the White House on April 9, 2019, resulted in one of the worst setbacks for U.S. Middle Eastern policy under the Donald Trump Administration. What was supposed to be a fence-mending exercise between the two countries essentially ended many of the meaningful strategic aspects of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, despite the fact that the public appearances between the two presidents appeared to be cordial. There have been significant areas of difference and frustration between Egypt and the US, even since the Trump Administration came to office, but there was at least a concerted effort on both sides to work harmoniously.
There has also been good personal chemistry between the two presidents since Trump ended what the Egyptians had regarded as a disastrous period under Barack Obama. President Sisi had essentially broken off strategic relations with the U.S. during the Obama Administration tenure in order to resist Obama’s insistence that the Muslim Brotherhood play a larger role in Egyptian politics. The question now is who in the Washington bureaucracy will take the blame for pushing Trump to insist on actions by al-Sisi which any fundamental analysis of the situation points to being infeasible and against Egypt’s view of its own strategic interests. That is not to say that Egypt wishes to end cordiality and cooperation between Washington and Cairo; it does not. But certain battle lines have been drawn in the greater Middle East, and Cairo and the U.S. are not altogether on the same side. Both sides will need to undertake significant, careful action to put relations back on a positive path before the break becomes calcified.
The failure on this occasion lay at the door of the U.S. for failing to realize that Washington now needs Egypt more than Egypt needs the U.S.
Trump, had, during his White House meeting with Pres. al-Sisi, insisted that Cairo break off or downplay its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Russian Federation (RF), which Cairo feels it cannot do. The PRC and RF are already firmly entrenched in the Red Sea/Eastern Mediterranean in ways which offer Cairo some benefits without appearing to force Egypt into taking sides in regional disputes.
Trump also hoped the Sisi meeting would re-invigorate his idea of an “Arab NATO”, the proposed Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), raised at the beginning of his Presidency. MESA would, U.S. planners believed, align the Gulf Arab states — particularly Saudi Arabia — with Jordan and Egypt to strategically balance and oppose Iran. Cairo cannot realistically support such a position in black and white terms (neither can Qatar or Jordan, at this stage). Cairo is actually open to improved relations with Iran, particularly because the Egyptian Government feels less than secure that the current Saudi regime is stable and reliable.
Trump, during the White House meeting, strenuously attempted to support Saudi Arabia and MbS, but received strong pushback from al-Sisi on that account. The measure of Egypt’s rejection of the U.S. pressure was indicated when al-Sisi, immediately upon returning to Cairo on April 10, 2019, formally withdrew Egypt from MESA. Egypt had very deliberately not sent a delegation to the MESA summit in Riyadh on April 8, 2019. This was as direct a response as could be delivered to the U.S. by Egypt.
Despite the realities that Qatar and Jordan have (for different reasons) felt that they must align with the new Middle East Entente (Turkey, Iran, and Qatar), that April 8, 2019, MESA summit included Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Jordan. Significantly, it did not include Iraq or Syria. Qatar’s participation was particularly notable, given the fact that Qatar has been the subject of massive efforts by Saudi Arabia to ostracize it from the region, and because (partly as a result of that Saudi-led effort) Qatar had recently teamed up with Turkey and Iran to form a new “Middle Eastern Entente”.
At the White House meeting, Trump urged Cairo to abandon its support for Khalifa Haftar in Libya, whose Libyan National Army (LNA) forces were, at that time, poised outside the Libyan capital, Tripoli, to take the city, and with it control of the central bank and the Libyan National Oil Company. President al-Sisi steadfastly refused to entertain the abandonment of Haftar as his approach to oppose not only the jihadist Sunni factions in Libya aligned with al-Qaida or DI’ISH, but also to oppose Turkish/Muslim Brotherhood attempts to dominate a future Libyan Government aligned with the approach of al-Sisi.
It is not insignificant that France, the United Arab Emirates, and more recently Saudi Arabia, also support General Haftar. And France and the UAE have been major pillars of financial and military support for Egypt since the Egyptian break with the U.S. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia — President Trump’s most significant ally in the Arab world — has not also been important as a supporter of Egypt; it has. In fact, it may have been Saudi Arabia which was, as a major buyer of French defense goods, responsible for financing the French role in the reconstruction of the Ethiopian Navy… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
IN FIRST, ARAB COUNTRIES ADMIT ISRAEL
INTO A REGIONAL ALLIANCE. BUT THERE IS A PRICE
Ora Coren
Haaretz, Jan 20, 2019
The announcement this week that many of the countries of the East Mediterranean, including Israel, agreed to set up a forum to create a regional gas market is a landmark development for Israel. It not only creates a framework for developing the region’s energy, but it marks the first time Israel has been admitted to a regional grouping that will give it official status in the Arab world. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, announced on Monday after a meeting in Cairo, aims to “create a regional gas market that serves the interests of its members by ensuring supply and demand, optimizing resource development, rationalizing the cost of infrastructure, offering competitive prices and improving trade relations, among other goals,” Egypt’s Petroleum Ministry announced. Besides Israel, the group includes Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. The statement said that other Eastern Mediterranean countries may join the forum later, a hint that Lebanon may become a member.
The forum is part of efforts to transform the region into a major energy hub. But from Israel’s point of view it also marks a major geopolitical win in its efforts to become an accepted member of the Middle East, where it has been all but isolated for the past 70 years. Yuval Steinitz, the first Israeli energy minister to visit Egypt since the 2011 uprising that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, said as much in an interview with Reuters on the meeting’s sidelines. “Israel exporting natural gas to the Arab world and also to Europe — this is something that sounded like a dream or a fantasy just 10 or 15 years ago,” he boasted.
In fact, Israel has already begun integrating itself into the regional gas market. In September, Israel and Egypt bought a 39 percent stake in the EMG pipeline, paving the way for a landmark $15 billion natural gas export deal to begin this year. It is also exporting gas to Jordan and to the PA. As well, the forum’s terms will offer Israel some protection from unilateral moves by member states that hurt its energy interests, such as Egypt’s 2012 decision to end a contract to supply Israel with natural gas. That protection is important to Israel as its gas exports to Jordan and the PA are not politically popular in the Jordanian and Palestinian streets.
However, membership in the forum also entails a number of disadvantages for Israel. For one, it could be used as a way of pressuring Israel politically, although it would be done indirectly and quietly since the forum’s mandate is limited to energy issues. In particular, the PA could exploit its membership in the organization to undermine Israel’s growing political and security cooperation with Egypt. The forum and its members’ committee on ensuring supply could pressure Israel into allowing development of the Gaza Marine offshore gas field, which lies outside Hamas-ruled Gaza.
In a controversial move at the time, Ehud Barak, when he was Israeli prime minister, ceded rights to the gas. However, after British Gas discovered 30 billion cubic meters of reserves there in 2000, Israel blocked development out of concern that profits from the gas could flow to terrorist organizations.
Another problem is the forum’s potential to tie Israel’s hand vis-a-vis future gas development. Egypt is angling to be the hub of the emerging regional market, which would make it the most powerful member of the group… [To read the full article, click the following LINK – Ed.]
SISI RESTORES JEWISH HERITAGE IN EGYPT
Haisam Hassanein
The Washington Institute, Dec. 14, 2018
On December 10, Egyptian antiquities minister Khaled al-Anani announced that President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi had ordered the government to devote 1.3 billion pounds (or around $72 million) to restoring Jewish heritage in the country. During a meeting with the parliament’s Committee on Media, Culture, and Antiquities, Anani stated, “I would not wait for someone to give me money to service it. It is a priority for me like Pharaonic, Roman, Islamic, and Coptic heritage.”
Some local political pundits have responded by saying the initiative should not come at the expense of impoverished Egyptians, arguing that foreign Jews should pay for it instead. Yet the announcement followed a string of favorable statements from prominent quarters regarding Egyptian Jewish heritage.
On December 6, editor-in-chief Khaled Salah of al-Youm al-Sabaa—a news outlet with close ties to Egypt’s security services—tweeted praise for Hanukkah, calling it a victory for monotheism against “paganism” and advising his audience to read about the Jewish festival’s central historical figure, Judas Maccabeus. This coincided with the first public Hanukkah celebration in decades at the Shaar Hashamayim Synagogue in Cairo, attended by members of Egypt’s tiny Jewish community alongside an American delegation.
On November 4, during the World Youth Forum in Sharm al-Sheikh, Sisi stated that Egypt is willing to “build houses of worship” for Jews just as it does for other religions. He also declared that “it is the right of the citizen to worship as he wishes.”
Three motivations best explain the government’s positive discourse toward Jews since Sisi came to power in 2013:
1. Improving Cairo’s standing in Washington. The government sees American Jewish citizens and organizations as a gateway to U.S. policymakers, whom they perceive as overtly sympathetic to Jewish causes.
2. Boosting tourism. Since the 2013 coup, the government has been actively trying to bring lost tourism revenue back to the country. Officials seem to believe that investing more money in restoring Jewish heritage will help market the country as a destination for global Jewish tourism.
3. Putting on a moderate face. According to Egyptian media rumors, the government plans to amend the constitution very soon in a manner that allows Sisi to stay in power past the normal limits. To ease the outcry likely to erupt from this and other upcoming decisions, the president’s advisors may be trying to burnish his image as a tolerant leader beforehand. In addition to enhancing relations with American Jewish organizations, this approach could also win him favor with the evangelical Christian community and its associated political organs.
Yet taking a friendly approach toward Jews and Israel also raises several challenges for Sisi. Historically, Islam has regarded Jews as a protected and tolerated religious minority with some civil and religious rights, but without political status. Hence, most traditional Muslims in Egypt have trouble comprehending or accepting the idea of a Jewish state, Jewish army, or Jewish political community. Moreover, a central tenet of the fundamentalist Islam practiced widely across Egypt is that Israel and the wider West are huge threats to Islamic territory and culture—a view that is periodically reinforced via negative images of Jews in certain Islamic traditions.
Even those Egyptians who agree with Sisi’s attitude toward Jews would still have trouble accepting the idea of a neighboring Zionist state. The concept of Zionism has been vehemently rejected in national discourse for decades, to the point that the very word is almost impossible to mention in public due to its negative emotional connotations. Thus, while some Egyptians may be able to digest the idea of Israel as a territorial state with a government, ambassadors, and army, accepting Israel’s ideological foundations as a Jewish state is beyond everything they have been brought up to believe.
As for Egypt’s Nasserists and leftists, they will seemingly never accept Israel. Nasserists tend to view the country as an outpost of Western imperialism, while many leftists (especially those with a strong pro-Russian orientation) see it as an intolerable tool of American hegemony in the Middle East.
Washington should continue encouraging Cairo to press Egyptian religious institutions on moderating their discourse. It should also insist that the government open the door for Egyptian liberals and moderate clerics who espouse peaceful notions and tolerance toward religious minorities. And in cases where public figures or the Nasserist/leftist media open popular debates on controversial subjects, Cairo should stay neutral and refrain from punishing those who speak out.
At the same time, Sisi’s latest measures should not give Washington any illusions that he has become a universally tolerant ruler. U.S. officials still need to prod him regarding his problematic policies on NGOs, human rights, and discrimination against Copts.
