Frederick Krantz
Col. (Res.) Gur Laisch’s “The Long War Phenomenon” (BESA Center) is an important piece, offering a window into the strategic thinking of at least one component of Israel’s military intelligence sector. It explains one rationale for recurrent and seemingly defeatist media references of some Israeli military figures who note that Hamas “cannot be defeated” and that Israel’s response to Oct.7 was wrong from the beginning (i.e., it should have retained sufficient force to have struck Hezbollah in the north immediately as well), etc.
Tactically, some of the articles’ observations make sense—“trimming the lawn” hasn’t worked, and permanent war for a small and isolated state like Israel is problematic. What’s missing here, however, is a recognition that removing or severely wounding Teheran would transform the recurring conflict with Iran’s proxies, changing not only the tactical but the strategic equation.
Also, an obvious, but here unmentioned, elephant in the room is the U.S. in two respects: 1) The Biden Administration’s appeasement policy towards Iran, the obverse side of which is imposing restraints (political, materiel, calling for “ceasefire”) on Israel, and 2) The implications of a Trump electoral victory in November, which would mean reinforcement of Israel’s military position (in Gaza and Lebanon [Hezbollah] and, most importantly, regarding Iran).
Here, time is indeed a key factor, again in two respects: First, Iran must not be allowed to achieve a nuclear weapon, as this would radically change the strategic picture. Here we are, according to the best intel, talking about a matter of months, if not weeks (factoring in the development of a warhead triggering mechanism and of ballistic delivery may add some time, but not much, given Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, and North Korean technical aid, etc.); Second, the Trump Administration entry into the region (assuming he wins the election) would also be decisive, but remains a dangerous five months away.
A massive blow against Hezbollah either now, while Israel is mopping up Hamas/Sinwar in Gaza, or as part of a final reckoning with Iran, which would await the Trump Administration’s military-materiel support after Jan.20, might be in the offing. Tehran has no doubt been notified that any new direct aggression on their part will be met with significant devastation. This may account for the recent failed terrorist bombing in Tel Aviv, which Hamas and others have claimed as part of a new intifada, and which may be Iran’s “limited” riposte to the Haniyeh assassination in Tehran.
(NB: Israel is quite capable of destroying Iranian refineries and missile launch-sites, but their buried nuclear establishment would require—short of tactical nuclear weapons—extremely heavy bunker-busting ordinance and the means of delivering it, which Biden has been holding back. Incontrovertible proof of a successful Iranian nuclear bomb would require an immediate, major Israeli response: American support lacking, Israel might well be able to overcome the evident difficulties in constructing and delivering the ordinance required. Indeed, such a direct existential threat could certainly involve considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons.)
Regarding Hezbollah, Israel cannot allow the current situation, in which ca.80,000 of its citizens cannot return to their homes along the Lebanon border, to continue, let alone worsen.
Hence, there is a need to fight a two-front war (eased now by the near-completion of the Gaza campaign). Hamas may well not be completely destructible—as al-Qaeda and Islamic State demonstrate, terrorist groups live on beyond decisive military defeat as long as there are sufficient Islamist recruits. But a key realization is that their major cadres and state-like control of contiguous territory can be destroyed (and Sinwar may yet get away to Yemen or Turkey or wherever— Israel will find him wherever he hides, but Gaza will never again be a terrorist safe-haven along Israel’s southern border [nor will the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border with Gaza ever again be lost to Israeli control]).
And much the same fate awaits Hezbollah. Here, its leader, Nasrallah—who seems to be the last man standing, as Israel has eliminated his primary leadership cohorts–may think twice, especially if Teheran pulls back under Israeli pressure and the prospect of Trump’s return. Beyond this, if push does come to shove and Israel is forced to act against Iran before Jan.20, U.S interests in the region (e.g., Iraq, the Red Sea/Suez Canal, north-east Syria, let alone Israel per se) might, however grudgingly, finally dictate Biden-Harris anti-Iranian action.
To conclude: What seems missing from the Gur Laish “Long War” analysis is a) A sense of the strategic issues involved, which includes the U.S. as well, of course, as Israel.
I omit reference here for the moment to China and Russia, obviously not unimportant elements in the larger-scale picture but which deserve separate, extended analysis.; b) Sufficient weighting of Israel’s real strengths as a regional Great [nuclear] Power; and c) A sense that the current situation presents an opportunity to transform the strategic picture through the decisive defeat of Iran, the octopus without the support of which its proxy tentacles cannot function.
Knocking Iran out of the equation (and perhaps triggering a successful popular uprising) would be precisely the game-changing move radically transforming Israel’s strategic and tactical situation: It would resolve the limiting parameters around which the Gur Laish analysis and much Israeli pre-October 7th policy has turned. One must, of course, surely assume this is now an option well-known to Israel’s government and high command and to the Iranian mullahs.
Prof. Frederick Krantz, a historian, is the founder and Executive Director (Emeritus) of the CIJR.
