Yonah Jeremy Bob
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 6, 2025
“If the IDF could bring 120 Special Forces for three hours into Syria to destroy a sensitive Iranian facility, in the best-defended part of Syria from both air and on the ground after Damascus, why couldn’t Israel carry out an adapted version of such an operation at Fordow?”
How Israel could attack and destroy Iran’s nuclear program has transformed in the last nine months, even more so in the last few.
Before April 19, an attack on Iran’s nuclear program was theoretically possible via an aerial attack using Israel’s stealth capabilities to eliminate Iran’s advanced S-300 anti-aircraft radar systems, followed by waves of strikes on key nuclear program sites.
Another goal would have been to disable Iran’s underground facility at Fordow by dropping a series of 5,000-pound or smaller weapons, one after another, on the same spot.
How Barack Obama’s peaceful ideology led to failed foreign policy
Over the past few months, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took credit for the Israel Air Force destroying Iran’s S-300 anti-aircraft radar systems on April 19, and the rest on October 26.
This means that at any moment, Israel could launch an airstrike on the nuclear program, which is essentially undefended in any real way from such strikes – for now.
Put differently, what a year ago would have been seen as a risky mission, is now something, from a military point of view, that has already been partially done, with the rest remaining very doable.
Tehran had three main indirect ways to scare Israel off from attacking its nuclear program. If Jerusalem dared to carry out such a strike, it was promised a hellfire of missiles from Hamas and Hezbollah – and powerful, unusually dangerous ballistic missiles from Iran itself. …SOURCE