Yoav Limor
Israel Hayom, Oct. 12, 2023
“This is an extremely dangerous game: Both sides are on the highest state of alert with already taut nerves stretched to the limit, and any localized incident may boil over in no time at all into a much broader conflagration.”
The main task that the emergency cabinet had to address this week was to define the achievement that the IDF is expected to make in the current war in southern Israel. Although in the last few days, we have heard a whole range of declarations from various individuals, beyond vague threats, no clear bottom line has been defined from which the IDF may derive an operational plan.
This is no mere question of semantics. In past military operations in the Gaza Strip, the IDF was charged with the task of inflicting considerable damage on Hamas military capabilities, without taking over the entire Strip and while refraining from a lengthy period of stay there. This time, Israel must decide whether it is going to take a few steps further to the total uprooting of the Hamas military wing, and even to the extent of removing the organization’s governmental control of the Gaza Strip, while clearly understanding the inherent challenges involved in this – from the numerous Israeli casualties to the loss of international legitimacy and the concern over becoming bogged down in the Gaza quagmire for an extended period. Even if such a move does succeed, Israel must decide what it wants to do on the day after all of this, who will be in control of the Gaza Strip and what form of relationship does it desire to have with that entity.
These decisions need to be made now for two main reasons. Firstly – the IDF has completed taking over control of the border fence area and is currently rapidly and successfully contending with any attempt to cross it (even if this involves a heavy price on occasions). Secondly – the IDF has completed the accumulation of a considerably large number of forces in the south to enable an extensive operation. In addition, the understanding that the window of opportunity afforded by both public opinion and the leadership of the international community to act will gradually grow smaller and eventually close requires a rapid shift to a ground offensive, the intensity and scope of which will be derived from the definition of the operation’s objectives.
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