Ofra Bengio
INSS Insight No. 1735, June 6, 2023
“The approach and modus operandi of the main Kurdish organization, the underground PKK, founded in the 1970s, are in effect a mirror image of those of Erdogan’s.”
Erdogan’s Strategy
In his approach toward the Kurdish issue, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has demonstrated initiative and versatility, displaying openness on the one hand and an iron fist on the other. Since he regards the Kurdish region as a borderless sphere, his actions extend beyond Turkey’s borders. In his view, there is a synergy between all parts, which function as “communicating vessels,” and should be treated accordingly. This approach has produced three integrated strategies that vary according to threat perception or emerging opportunities:
- A peace process with the Kurds in Turkey, that became an all-out war in 2016.
- Soft power in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has evolved over time into a strategic bond, with mutual trade reaching an annual average of $14 billion.
- Military involvement in Syrian Kurdistan, which began in 2016 and has continued since.
During the first thirteen years of his rule, Erdogan pursued a conciliatory policy toward the Kurds in Turkey (who constitute about 20 percent of the population), which included the launch of a peace process with the Kurdish leadership, including with the PKK guerilla movement. What prompted this initial policy, and what led him to change course and subsequently strike the Kurds with an iron fist? Erdogan’s initial conciliatory policy had five primary motives. The first, and the most important, was his desire to distance the military from the political scene: in order to weaken the military, he had to quiet the Kurdish issue, pulling the rug out from under the army’s feet.
A second important motive was the attempt to facilitate Turkey’s admission into the European Union, by exhibiting a facade of a liberal and democratic regime that grants civil rights to ethnic minorities. The third motive was his hope to gain the support of Kurdish voters in various election campaigns. Fourth was the desire to strengthen the economy in light of the heavy expenditures associated with maintaining the military and fighting the PKK. Fifth was Erdogan’s desire to promote Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish region of Iraq, which has become part of the Turkish sphere of influence since the occupation of Iraq in 2003. In doing so, Erdogan used the Iraqi Kurdish leadership as a means of promoting electoral interests among the Kurds in Turkey.
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