Ben Fishman, Hanin Ghaddar, Assaf Orion and Dennis Ross
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Aug 27, 2024
“In its [Hezbollah’s] view, the current conflict has shifted the “buffer zone” between the two parties southward, posing enough of a threat to compel mass evacuations in northern Israel.”
On August 25, Israel carried out large-scale preemptive strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, reportedly acting on intelligence that the group was preparing an imminent attack in retaliation for last month’s killing of senior operative Fuad Shukr in the heart of Beirut. In the hours that followed, Hezbollah fired hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel, aiming mainly at military targets and causing little damage.
Although the exchange represented another peak in the past year’s worth of fighting between the two sides and stirred competing narratives about their intentions, they quickly returned to their “fighting routine” on the ground and appeared inclined to remain in that mode. Whatever happens in the coming days, the incident reveals much about their deterrence calculations, their willingness to dance on the sword’s edge of war for ten months and counting, and the role that their respective allies in Iran and Washington can and should play.
Hezbollah’s Calculus
Hezbollah’s decision to delay its retaliation for nearly a month after Shukr’s July 30 death has had negative military consequences for the group and reflects the vulnerabilities of its current strategic situation. On August 1, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah pledged to respond; soon afterward, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) escalated their military operations deep inside Lebanon, killing more commanders and hitting warehouses in the Beqa Valley while conducting nearly nonstop drone and jet flights across the border. Moreover, Israel publicly signaled its readiness to launch a full-scale war if needed, and the United States drove that point home by redeploying substantial forces to the area. … [To read the full article, click here]
