Ran Baratz
Mosaic Magazine, Jan. 6, 2025
“If the cold war had a deleterious effect on military thinking, the effect of the post-cold-war era was even worse.”
The October 7 attack from Gaza was not supposed to have been possible. Israelis were continuously assured by the security establishment and political leaders that Hamas was “deterred,” that Israel has an ample, sophisticated defense mechanism, and that its intelligence capabilities were second to none. And so, Israelis had to endure two shocks on that Simchat Torah morning: the large-scale surprise attack itself, which the IDF failed to avert, and the barbaric atrocities committed by Hamas terrorists and Gazan civilians.
Then came a third shock, which might surprise those who rely on English-language news from Israel’s advocates abroad, its political leaders, or the IDF’s own spokespeople: the Israeli high command required weeks to formulate plans and prepare for an operation in Gaza. Even worse, within weeks of the ground operation’s commencement, it became evident that the initial strategy was flawed, poorly planned, and exposed a staggering number of failures in preparation, training, force buildup, equipment, munitions, and execution. Although Israeli society has sprung into action to help deal with logistical problems, it became clear that the IDF was in a dire condition. To this day, a year and three months after the attack, despite numerous tactical successes and an enormous national investment in the war, both Hamas and Hizballah have managed to avoid total defeat, and despite the accomplishments of Israel’s soldiers the IDF has failed to secure total victory.
It goes without saying that Israel has an exceptional national army. Its soldiers’ fighting spirit is second to none, their bravery and commitment are likely unparalleled in the West today. But tactics and bravery alone are not enough. The strategic capabilities of the high command are essential to give shape and direction to successful military campaigns. Therefore, my aim in this essay is to examine what I believe to be the most critical aspect of the reality revealed on and after October 7: the military doctrines and national-security mindset that have led to the decades-long deterioration of the IDF’s capabilities. …SOURCE