ON TISHA BE’AV WE REMEMBER THE MIRACLE, DESPITE SUFFERING, OF ISRAEL’S SURVIVAL, & SUCCESS

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Contents:

Tisha Be’av: Jerusalem Post, July 31, 2014— Throughout the long centuries of exile, the message of Tisha Be’av – which marks the destruction of the First and Second Temples – was largely about suffering.        

Netanyahu’s ‘Long War’ Doctrine: Jonathan Spyer, PJ Media, Aug. 5, 2014: As a number of former senior Israeli officials pointed out in the course of Operation Protective Edge, Jerusalem had only two possible strategic options to choose from as it entered this fight.

No Economic Aid to Hamas-Ruled Gaza: Prof. Efraim Inbar, Besa, Jul. 29, 2014 — The developing international consensus to offer Gaza an economic package in order to convince Hamas to agree to a ceasefire is immoral and a strategic folly. It is also unlikely to be effective.

A Stronger Israel?: Victor Davis Hanson, National Review, Aug. 5, 2013— In postmodern wars, we are told, there is no victory, no defeat, no aggressors, no defenders, just a tragedy of conflicting agendas.

On Topic Links

Spontaneous Pro-Israel Rally Erupts in Response to Protestors (Video): Youtube, Aug. 3, 2014

Down the UN’s Anti-Israel Rabbit Hole: Irwin Cotler, National Post, Aug. 2, 2014  

Stories From The Battlefield: Hamas Tunnels Used To Target Israel’s Kindergartens: Mordechai Ben-Menachem, Daily Caller, Jul. 27, 2014

Why We Want to be Here – a Tisha Be’av Message For the Jewish People from Battalion 969: Ari Abramowitz, Jerusalem Post, Aug. 4, 2014

TISHA BE’AV                                                                                                        

Jerusalem Post, Aug. 4, 2014

Throughout the long centuries of exile, the message of Tisha Be’av – which marks the destruction of the First and Second Temples – was largely about suffering. Exiled from their land for their sins, the Jewish people were doomed to remain a wandering nation until the advent of the messianic era. Tisha Be’av fit into a larger religious narrative of persecutions and martyrdom that helped preserve and give cohesion to the communities of the Diaspora. Zionism, a largely secular political movement, sought to, and ultimately succeeded in, changing the course of Jewish history. Even though the state was established in the shadow of the Holocaust, the narrative was no longer principally about suffering and exile but about taking control of Jewish destiny and overcoming adversity. For many Zionists, Tisha Be’av’s message appeared to be anachronistic. What relevance could the story of destruction and exile have for a nation engaged in homecoming and rebuilding? Indeed, the descriptions in the prayer book of Jerusalem as a desolate, ruined city seem incongruous with reality. Never before has Jerusalem been so built up and populated as today.

However, the story of Tisha Be’av is based on the premise that the Jewish people’s success and continuity as a nation depend on its own actions. Destruction and exile are the consequences of internecine fighting, disunity and baseless hatred. Jewish sovereignty of the Land of Israel is conditional upon the nation’s moral conduct. For religious Jews, God’s covenant with the Jewish people is central to this conditionality. Mysteriously, a God who intervenes in history chose the Jewish people and brought them to the Land of Israel, but made their continued existence here conditional upon their behavior. The Jewish people were expected to espouse justice in interpersonal relations. If they failed to, they would be exiled. But one does not need to be religiously observant to understand that the health and strength of a society depend upon its ethical behavior. Corruption, totalitarianism and repression often result in a breakdown of society. It is no coincidence that liberal democracies, which provide their citizens with human rights and freedoms, have succeeded, while the evil empires of the 20th century – Fascism, Nazism and Communism – ultimately collapsed.

Because Tisha Be’av marks historical events involving the Jewish people’s previous periods of sovereignty, it has unique resonance and pertinence for Israel today. Our sages teach that the Second Temple was destroyed due to “baseless hatred” among Jews. At the time, the Jewish people were acrimoniously divided rather than harmoniously united. The lesson is clear: “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” There may not be direct parallels between contemporary Israel and the infighting among the Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes and Zealots that preceded the destruction of the Temple. But we may draw some general conclusions: Religious extremism is destructive; an inability to unite against an enemy can lead to defeat; and a sober recognition of a nation’s limitations is essential for its survival. Israelis, religious or not, understand that the strength of our society is determined not only on the battlefield. More important is the extent to which we safeguard freedoms, uphold justice, maintain morality and encourage an atmosphere that permits self-criticism that makes our society strong. Soldiers fighting for a free and open society have an advantage over the totalitarian regimes that often provoke wars. These soldiers know that justice is on their side.

During Operation Protective Edge, when soldiers were ordered into Gaza to protect all Israeli civilians, regardless of their race or religion, from Hamas rockets and terrorist tunnels, they were emboldened for the same reasons. They are fighting a just war against barbaric terrorism. It should be stressed that we – unlike some of our enemies – do not rejoice at the devastation caused by the hostilities, especially the loss of lives. The IDF may be the most moral army in the world, but that does not mean tragic mistakes are not made, particularly when Hamas insists on using its civilians as human shields. When we contemplate the tragedies that have befallen the Jewish people and the State of Israel, we should find a place in our hearts to feel the pain caused by the current conflict – not only for the heartbreaking deaths of 64 soldiers and three civilians, but for the hundreds of Palestinian civilians in Gaza – men, women and children – who have been killed by IDF fire in an effort to stop Hamas’s deadly attacks on Israeli communities. While the destruction of the Temple reminds us of our own people’s vulnerability, it does not mean we cannot feel empathy for the suffering of another people, even if its own leaders are the primary cause of that suffering. In the shadow of Operation Protective Edge, Tisha Be’av’s message is more relevant than ever.

Contents                                                                                                                 

NETANYAHU’S ‘LONG WAR’ DOCTRINE                                                   

Jonathan Spyer                                                                                                      

PJ Media, Aug. 5, 2014

As a number of former senior Israeli officials pointed out in the course of Operation Protective Edge, Jerusalem had only two possible strategic options to choose from as it entered this fight. The first involved seeking to inflict serious damage on Hamas’s military capabilities in an operation limited in scope. The goal of such a course of action would be to achieve deterrence against Hamas. Implicit in this option is that, at its conclusion, the Hamas authority in Gaza would still be in existence — chastened, but alive.

The second, more ambitious option would have been to have pushed on into the Gaza Strip, and to have destroyed the Hamas authority there. This would have resembled Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. Israeli forces would have needed to remain in Gaza for months, or years, in order to suppress and destroy the continued guerrilla resistance which Hamas and other Palestinian groups would no doubt have undertaken. This second option would also have required Israel to re-establish the civil administration in Gaza, taking responsibility for the lives of the 1.8 million residents of the Strip. This is because it would be politically impossible for the Ramallah Palestinian Authority to receive the Gaza Strip on a silver platter, as it were, from the Golani Brigade and its sister units of the Israel Defense Forces. It is also likely that the insurgency which would have followed the destruction of Hamas rule would have proven a magnet for the jihadi forces which are currently proliferating in the neighborhood. ISIS and similar organizations are already in the Gaza Strip in small numbers. But the “global jihad” would like nothing more than to find a platform from which to begin war against the Jews.

Given all this, it is not surprising that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have chosen the first option. Netanyahu, in stark contrast to his image in Europe and to a lesser extent in North America, is deeply cautious when it comes to the use of military force. Indeed, the record shows that Israel elected to begin a ground campaign on July 18th only when it became clear from its actions and its statements that Hamas was not interested in a return to the status quo ante. This caution does not come from a temperamental inability to manage military action. Indeed, the Israeli prime minister’s performance in recent weeks may go some way to dispelling the image which his opponents have sought to disseminate in Israel in recent years. That is, Netanyahu is a man who buckles under pressure and is easily swayed from his course. This is the first time that one of Israel’s longest-serving prime ministers has led the country in a military confrontation. The general sense in Israel is that his performance as a leader has been relatively effective — setting clear and limited goals and pursuing them with vigor.

Netanyahu’s caution derives, rather, from his perception that what Israel calls “wars” or “operations” are really only episodes in a long war in which the country is engaged against those who seek its destruction. In the present phase, these forces are gathered largely under the banner of radical Islam, though this was not always so. In such a conflict, what matters is not a quick and crushing perception of victory. Indeed, the search for a knockout, a final decision in this or that operation , given the underlying realities, is likely to end in overstretch, error and non-achievement. What matters is the ability to endure, conserve one’s forces — military and societal — and to work away on wearing down the enemy’s will. Military achievement, as well as economic and societal success, are all weapons in this war. This view notes the essentially implacable nature of the core Arab and Muslim hostility to Israel. So it includes an inbuilt skepticism toward the possibility of historic reconciliation and final-status peace accords. At the same time, this view does not rule out alliances of convenience with regional powers. As Netanyahu’s recent speeches have indicated, the Israeli prime minister is deeply aware that the immediate interests of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are largely coterminous with those of Israel. All three countries are hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood and to the ambitions of Iran and its allies. All three are deeply dismayed at the current U.S. administration’s softness toward and accommodation of these forces. It is an alliance of the coldest, most pragmatic and most hard-headed type. Precisely for this reason, it works. Egyptian President Sisi is locked in a war of death against the Muslim Brotherhood at home and sees the Hamas enclave in Gaza as an extension of his domestic opponents. The speech given by Saudi King Abdullah this week also held Hamas responsible for the current situation.

So for now, Israel is redeploying its forces outside Gaza, with the option and possibility of strikes back inside if a renewed ceasefire continues to prove elusive. The IDF will continue to maintain the pressure on Hamas, even as the rulers of Gaza participate in ceasefire negotiations managed by Sisi in Cairo. There are reports of Israel establishing a de facto buffer zone inside the Gaza Strip, to reduce the ability of Hamas to fire short-range rockets at southern Israeli communities. All this forms part of an effort to undertake the containment and incremental weakening of the Islamist entity in Gaza, in cooperation with whoever, for his own reasons, is willing to cooperate. Netanyahu’s vision is a chilly one, though it is not ultimately pessimistic. It aims to provide firm, durable walls for the house that the Jews of Israel have constructed. Within those walls the energies of Israeli Jews will ensure success — provided that the walls can be kept secure, thus believes the Israeli prime minister. It is from the point of view of this broader strategic picture that the current actions of Israel need to be understood. Operation Protective Edge — like Cast Lead and Orchard and Lebanon 2006 and the others — is intended as a single action in a long and unfinished war.

Contents

NO ECONOMIC AID TO HAMAS-RULED GAZA                              

Prof. Efraim Inbar       

Besa, July 29, 2014

The developing international consensus to offer Gaza an economic package in order to convince Hamas to agree to a ceasefire is immoral and a strategic folly. It is also unlikely to be effective. One of the main reasons for Hamas harassing several million Israelis by launching thousands of rockets and sending terrorists into Israel by tunnels, apart from the desire to kill Jews, is to rock the boat in order to get out of its dire economic conditions. Getting paid for stopping to shoot at Israeli civilians looks like the “protection money” collected by the Mafia.

The morality of pouring money into Gaza so that their civilians can live better remains questionable for as long as Hamas does not stop its terrorism against Israel. Unfortunately, establishing a clear connection between economic aid and political compliance is not on the agenda of the “peacemakers”. It is true that Gazans are suffering. Nevertheless, it is wrong to argue that the Gazans should not suffer the consequences of Hamas’ criminal actions. Unfortunately, Hamas was popular among the Gazans and continues to be so. Moreover, all polls show that Gazans support violence against Israel. What moral justification exists for helping people that support an organization intent on destroying the Jewish state and is actively engaged in killing innocent Israeli citizens? Furthermore, we should not forget that the essence of war is a competition of inflicting pain in order to change patterns of behavior. Actually, pain may have a positive value in affecting the learning curve of the warring sides. Israel has tried to influence the learning curve of the Palestinians that aggression against Israel does not pay and that support for Hamas could be costly.

Exacting a high cost from Hamas and the Gazans may lead them to more peaceful behavior. It is true that it is difficult to influence the learning process of large collectives, but this has occurred before. For example, it took a lot of suffering in World War I and World War II to transform German society into becoming less militaristic and less belligerent. While not politically correct, such treatment might be the recipe for turning the Palestinians into peaceful neighbors in the long run.

Moreover, economic aid to Gaza, as long as Hamas stays in control, strengthens its power and its grip over the poor Gazans. Allowing the continued rule of Hamas, as the US plans, also undermines the rule of the more moderate Palestinian Authority (PA) leader, Mahmoud Abbas. Indeed the PA also criticized the Kerry cease fire proposal that favored Hamas. However, this clear strategic rationale seems to be taken over by sentimentalist responses to Hamas media manipulation. Instead of using the depressing pictures coming out of Gaza to tell Gazans: “We told you all along that Hamas leadership would only make things worse” (just as it has in other places where radical Islamists gain power), Western leaders seem to have foolishly decided that Gaza should speedily be rebuilt! The US efforts to bribe Hamas into behaving (while suspending aid to Egypt), are probably against American laws dealing with terrorist organizations. Promises of aid send the wrong signal. It tells Palestinians that their leadership can make grave, deadly mistakes, and nevertheless gullible Westerners and others will bail them out. It also signals to Hamas that it can continue seeking the destruction of Israel and shooting at the Jewish State; for if Israel repeats its military action, merciful donor states will repair the damage yet again.

Diplomats are looking for formulas that will enable channeling aid to the Gaza Strip bypassing Hamas. Realistically, there is no way to reconstruct Gaza without strengthening the Hamas. The reconstruction of Hamastan in Gaza — an Iranian base that threatens Israel and many moderate Arab regimes — makes no strategic sense. More importantly, Hamas has used aid to enhance its military capabilities. It built an infrastructure to produce missiles and a network of tunnels. The home-made missiles are relatively cheap, but according to IDF estimates, the cost of each attack tunnel is approximately $3 million. All this adds up to millions of dollars. America helped reconstruct Western Europe and Japan after World War II to make sure they would be ruled by friendly democratic regimes. Hamas is authoritarian and anti-Western. Moreover, its rule will doom the Gazans to continuous poverty and ignorance. It is simply senseless to facilitate the continuation of Hamas rule. History of humanitarian aid in the last century shows that outside economic aid is only as good as the ability of a recipient’s economy and government to use it prudently and productively. Like many Third World countries, Gaza lacks the legal and institutional infrastructure needed for the effective dispersal of economic aid. Billions of euros transferred to the PA since the Oslo Accords have been squandered and misused by corruption and ineptitude. Very little aid has filtered down to the people. Therefore, it is not at all clear that sending more money to the dysfunctional Gaza will do any good.

From what we know of the fortunes of the humanitarian aid transferred to the Gazans in recent years, it is clear that external aid will be siphoned off to the corrupt Hamas leadership. Khaled Mashaal, and Musa Abu Marzook are evaluated to be billionaires, while Ismail Haniyeh, is only a millionaire. Some will be directed to Hamas activists; and only what is left will go to the destitute. Those with arms always get the first and best cut from international aid sent to the suffering. This is what is happening everywhere international aid is dispensed. Gaza is not different. Humanitarian aid should be dispensed judiciously, while making sure that it does not preserve poverty and dependence. Even the friends of the Palestinian national movement should realize that it is time for tough love for Gaza.

Contents

A STRONGER ISRAEL?                                                                                              

Victor Davis Hanson                              

 National Review, Aug. 5, 2014

In postmodern wars, we are told, there is no victory, no defeat, no aggressors, no defenders, just a tragedy of conflicting agendas. But in such a mindless and amoral landscape, Israel in fact is on its way to emerging in a far better position after the Gaza war than before. Analysts of the current fighting in Gaza have assured us that even if Israel weakens Hamas, such a short-term victory will hardly lead to long-term strategic success — but they don’t define “long-term.” In this line of thinking, supposedly in a few weeks Israel will only find itself more isolated than ever. It will grow even more unpopular in Europe and will perhaps, for the first time, lose its patron, America — while gaining an enraged host of Arab and Islamic enemies. Meanwhile, Hamas will gain stature, rebuild, and slowly wear Israel down. But if we compare the Gaza war with Israel’s past wars, that pessimistic scenario hardly rings true. Unlike in the existential wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, Israel faces no coalition of powerful conventional enemies. Syria’s military is wrecked. Iraq is devouring itself. Egypt is bankrupt and in no mood for war. Its military government is more worried about Hamas than about Israel. Jordan has no wish to attack Israel. The Gulf States are likewise more afraid of the axis of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood than of Israel — a change of mentality that has no historical precedent. In short, never since the birth of the Jewish state have the traditional enemies surrounding Israel been in such military and political disarray. Never have powerful Arab states quietly hoped that Israel would destroy an Islamist terrorist organization that they fear more than they fear the Jewish state.

But is not asymmetrical warfare the true threat to Israel? The West, after all, has had little success in achieving long-term victories over terrorist groups and insurgents — remember Afghanistan and Iraq. How can tiny Israel find security against enemies who seem to gain political clout and legitimacy as they incur ever greater losses, especially when there is only a set number of casualties that an affluent, Western Israel can afford, before public support for the war collapses? How can the Israelis fight a war that the world media portray as genocide against the innocents? In fact, most of these suppositions are simplistic. The U.S., for example, defeated assorted Islamic insurgents in what was largely an optional war in Iraq; a small token peacekeeping force might have kept Nouri al-Maliki from hounding Sunni politicians, and otherwise kept the peace. Israel’s recent counterinsurgency wars have rendered both the Palestinians on the West Bank and pro-Iranian Hezbollah militants in Lebanon less, not more, dangerous. Hamas, not Israel, would not wish to repeat the last three weeks. Oddly, Hezbollah, an erstwhile ally of Hamas, has been largely quiet during the Gaza war. Why, when the use of its vast missile arsenal, in conjunction with Hamas’s rocketry, might in theory have overwhelmed Israel’s missile defenses? The answer is probably the huge amount of damage suffered by Hezbollah in the 2006 war in Lebanon, and its inability to protect its remaining assets from yet another overwhelming Israeli air response. Had Hamas’s rockets hit their targets, perhaps Hezbollah would have joined in. But for now, 2014 looks to them a lot like 2006.

In the current asymmetrical war, Israel has found a method of inflicting as much damage on Hamas as it finds politically and strategically useful without suffering intolerable losses. And because the war is seen as existential — aiming rockets at a civilian population will do that — Israeli public opinion will largely support the effort to retaliate. As long as Israel does not seek to reoccupy Gaza, it can inflict enough damage on the Hamas leadership, and on both the tunnels and the missile stockpiles, to win four or five years of quiet. In the Middle East, that sort of calm qualifies as victory. And the more the world sees of the elaborate tunnels and vast missile arsenals that an impoverished Hamas had built with other people’s money, and the more these military assets proved entirely futile in actual war, the more Hamas appears not just foolish but incompetent, if not ridiculous, as well. After all the acrimony dies down, Gazans will understand that there was a correlation between blown-up houses, on the one hand, and, on the other, tunnel entrances, weapon depots, and the habitat of the Hamas leadership. Even the Hamas totalitarians will not be able to keep that fact hidden. As the rubble is cleared away, too many Gazans will ask of their Hamas leaders whether the supposedly brilliant strategy of asymmetrical warfare was worth it. Hamas’s intended war — blanketing Israel with thousands of rockets that would send video clips around the world of hundreds of thousands of Jews trembling in fear in shelters — failed in its first hours. The air campaign was about as successful as the tunnel war, which was supposed to allow hit teams to enter Israel to kidnap and kill, with gruesome videos posted all over the Internet. Both strategies largely failed almost upon implementation.

[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]

On Topic

Spontaneous Pro-Israel Rally Erupts in Response to Protestors (Video): Youtube, Aug. 3, 2014

Down the UN’s Anti-Israel Rabbit Hole: Irwin Cotler, National Post, Aug. 2, 2014  —No one should be surprised that the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) voted to launch an inquiry into alleged Israeli war crimes in “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” as close to 40% of all UN Special Sessions have ended with a condemnation of Israel.

Stories From The Battlefield: Hamas Tunnels Used To Target Israel’s Kindergartens: Mordechai Ben-Menachem, Daily Caller, Jul. 27, 2014 —Multiple media outlets report that Hamas’s offensive tunnel network – now known to have been composed of over forty attack tunnels dug underneath Israel’s border with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip – was set to be activated during the Jewish High Holidays (September 24^th) as a mass terror attack.

Why We Want to be Here – a Tisha Be’av Message For the Jewish People from Battalion 969: Ari Abramowitz, Jerusalem Post, Aug. 4, 2014 —Upon learning that we would be released next week – a month after our emergency call-up to fight this war – my reserve unit drafted a petition expressing our willingness and desire to continue in this war effort and defeat those who have been murdering and terrorizing our nation.

Rob Coles, Publications Chairman, Canadian Institute for Jewish Research/ L'institut Canadien de recherches sur le Judaïsme, www.isranet.org

Tel: (514) 486-5544 – Fax:(514) 486-8284 ; ber@isranet.wpsitie.com