TURKEY, THE KURDS, & SYRIA: INTERNAL ISLAMISM & EXTERNAL PROXYISM

Is Turkey Supporting Al-Qaeda in Syria?: Michael Rubin, Commentary. Nov. 11, 2013—  Perhaps the most dangerous group in Syria is Jabhat al-Nusra, the Nusra Front. The group does not hide its sympathy for al-Qaeda and targets more moderate Syrian opposition groups alongside the Syrian regime. While Syrians comprise most Syrian opposition groups, the Nusra Front counts Libyans, Saudis, Mauritanians, Chechens, Uighurs, Germans, and Turks among its fighters.

Turkey’s Fix for the “Kurdish Problem”: Robert Hatem & Mark Dohrmann, Middle East Forum, Fall, 2013— From the beginnings of modern Turkey, the Kurds have been considered outsiders, often not even allowed to speak their own language without the threat of punishment.

Kurds Declare Independence in Syria: Daniel Greenfield, Front Page Magazine, Nov. 13, 2013— This is an interesting development. Assad is in no shape to do anything about it right now and is hoping that the various Sunni Jihadist groups begin pressing down harder on the Kurds to give him some breathing room.

Erdogan’s “Morality Police” Assume Duty: Orhan Kemal Cengiz, Al-Monitor, Nov. 6, 2013— It all started with the leak of remarks made by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a closed meeting over the weekend.

On Topic Links

Turkish Columnists Eulogize Democracy: Michael Rubin, Commentary, Nov. 12, 2013

Iraq’s Kurdish Region Pursues Ties With Turkey – For Energy Revenue and Independence: Ben Van Heuvelen, Washington Post, Nov. 9, 2013

Curing the Hiccups in Israeli-Turkish Negotiations: Gabriel Mitchell, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 5, 2013

Syrian Kurdish Leader: Turkey May End Proxy War: Amberin Zaman, Al-Monitor, Nov. 7, 2013

IS TURKEY SUPPORTING AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA?

Michael Rubin

                                     Commentary, Nov. 11, 2013

Perhaps the most dangerous group in Syria is Jabhat al-Nusra, the Nusra Front. The group does not hide its sympathy for al-Qaeda and targets more moderate Syrian opposition groups alongside the Syrian regime. While Syrians comprise most Syrian opposition groups, the Nusra Front counts Libyans, Saudis, Mauritanians, Chechens, Uighurs, Germans, and Turks among its fighters. Around Syria, it is an open secret that Turkey supports—or at least has supported—the Nusra Front.

Not only has Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denied that the Nusra Front are terrorists—more like honorable jihadists, he suggested in the face of questions from an opposition leader—but Turkish forces have also apparently used al-Nusra as a proxy against the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Kurdish party linked to Turkey’s own Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which remains overwhelmingly popular among Syria’s Kurdish population. If it comes to a choice between an al-Qaeda affiliate and a secular Kurdish party controlling territory, Erdoğan sides with al-Qaeda.

When I asked Iraqi counterterrorism officials who monitor the transit of al-Qaeda last summer about the Turkish relationship with the Nusra Front, they were careful. “Let’s just say that whenever the Nusra Front wants to have a meeting, they know they can do so inside Turkey and won’t be bothered,” one official told me. While diplomatic tension between Iraq and Turkey remains strong, the official was able to give very specific examples that suggest he was not simply trying to tar Turkey.

Erdoğan, himself, however has bristled at any suggestion Turkey provides safe haven or even free passage to the Nusra Front. Now, however, there is video evidence. CNN International has an excellent video report on the transit of jihadis through the Hatay airport in Turkey and into Syria. Perhaps it is time for officials to question the judgment of President Obama for his friendship with and personal endorsement of Erdoğan, who appears not only to sympathize with the most radical elements in Syria’s civil war, but also to be a liar.                                                                          

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TURKEY’S FIX FOR THE “KURDISH PROBLEM”

Robert Hatem & Mark Dohrmann

                                    Middle East Forum, Fall 2013

From the beginnings of modern Turkey, the Kurds have been considered outsiders, often not even allowed to speak their own language without the threat of punishment. With Mustafa Kemal Atatürk modeling the nascent republic on the somewhat ethnically homogeneous European nation-states of the time, and the constitution declaring that "the Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity," there was little room for permitting, and certainly not encouraging, the open expression of disparate ethnic or national identities within Turkey's borders. Instead, Ankara's answer to the "Kurdish question" has been, more often than not, to deny the existence of the Kurds altogether and simultaneously to attempt to pacify the region militarily, crushing all dissent while forcibly assimilating its "mountain Turk," that is Kurdish, population.

In more recent times, the Turkish government has sought to exploit a massive infrastructure undertaking, the Southeast Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP), as a means of resolving the Kurdish dilemma. How this project came about and how it came to be seen as a solution to a largely self-created problem is a tale unto itself with roots in the nineteenth century and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Defining what is meant by a Kurd can be a difficult task. The Kurdish people presently live in large numbers in four major states—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—speak numerous languages alongside Kurdish, which itself has several different dialects, and profess several different religions besides the predominant one, Sunni Islam. Kurdish world population is estimated at thirty million, the largest ethnic group without its own state. The Kurdish population in Turkey is estimated to be between ten and twenty million; such a wide range reflects the difficulty of obtaining population statistics for a people that has been for a long period of time denied existence by the state. Whatever the precise numbers, the Kurds are clearly the second largest ethnic group within the Turkish state behind the Turks themselves. Kurds can be found in all of Turkey's geographical regions but are concentrated in the eastern and southeastern sections of the country…

Since 2011, Ankara has been forced to deal with the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] within the context of responding to turmoil and changes with two of its own neighbors. Turkey's response to the ongoing conflict in Syria and the uprising seeking to oust President Bashar al-Assad has effectively ended its "zero problems with neighbors" policy. As of July 12, 2013, there were 381,462 Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations in Turkey with over 400,000 estimated to be in the country. These numbers pose a problem for the Turkish government as they remain in the southeastern, largely Kurdish portion of the country. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's call for the removal of Assad triggered a counter-response by the Syrian government that has allowed the PKK to fill a power vacuum in the territories near the Turkish border. The Party of Unity and Democracy, the PKK's Syrian offshoot, has so far held its grip on power in the region, forcing Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to declare that Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria would be acceptable in a post-Assad environment.

Coinciding with this public acceptance of Kurdish autonomy in a bordering state, Turkey has supported the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq as the KRG has assisted in efforts to contain the PKK on its soil. Meanwhile, Ankara's own relations with the government in Baghdad have soured: A proposed Turkish-KRG oil pipeline would bypass the Baghdad government and would provide the Kurdish government in northern Iraq with a source of independent funding. The quid pro quo in this relationship relies on the KRG's ability to assist in containing the PKK. Iraqi Kurdistan president Masoud Barzani's call for the PKK to "lay down its arms" or else "bear the consequences" has demonstrated that the KRG is seeking better relations with Turkey to provide support against the government in Baghdad.

While Turkey has shown its support for Kurdish autonomy in Syria and Iraq, within its own borders, Kurdish autonomy is still viewed as a threat, despite the PKK and other Kurdish groups' official statements that they no longer seek an independent Kurdistan but rather equal rights within the state. Erdoğan responded characteristically that Kurdish calls for a federal structure were "[d]aring to abuse the democratization efforts in order to subvert national unity … a political assassination directed against the nation's will." For the foreseeable future, the Kurds will remain a marginalized and excluded group within the Turkish state…

The issue of how to manage the Turkish Kurds—specifically dealing with the reasons behind and solutions to the violence that recurs in predominantly Kurdish areas—is framed in one of three ways by the Turkish state. These frames offer differing views on why the Kurds are a problem, why they fail to assimilate into the Turkish state, and why the Kurds continue to support PKK activities. Underlying these views is the belief that the Kurdish problem is essentially one of terrorism. As a result of this premise, one viewpoint posits that the problem is primarily due to domestic Kurdish support for terrorism, necessitating population control and monitoring. This framing underlies Turkish attempts to introduce the village guard system that would secure areas for the Turkish military and create a population loyal to Turkey.

Another standpoint views the Kurdish situation as a function of international terrorism. Thus Turkey's Kurdish problem is due to support received from Syria and Iraq, both from the central governments themselves and from their local, indigenous Kurdish communities; without such international support, Kurds would voluntarily join and integrate into the Turkish state. This framing blames international actors for keeping a Kurdish identity alive in order to destabilize Turkey. From this perspective, border control and pressure on foreign governments will solve the Kurdish issue. This point of view is most responsible for bilateral Iraqi-Turkish agreements that allowed Turkey to conduct several cross-border raids into Iraq in the late 1980s in pursuit of PKK terrorists. Both viewpoints are widespread within Turkey and have the support of both nationalistic political parties and the military.

The final frame of reference examines the Kurdish problem from a civilizational approach, concluding that the poor socioeconomic status of the region has resulted in violence. The solution to the problem is then perceived as one of economic and social development. In practice, initiatives in this direction have resulted in forced assimilation and the social and cultural destruction of Kurdish identity. The displacement and assimilation policies of the Turkish state, dating back to 1927 and 1934 laws, were intended to weaken traditional social bonds, encourage urbanization and educational assimilation. None of these approaches to the Kurdish issue include the possibility of a rejection of the ethnic Turkic identity of the nation-state, which leaves no room for minority expression. Although, since the late 1980s, there have been moves on the part of the government to allow at least some form of Kurdish cultural or political expression, these efforts were relatively limited and often failed to translate into practice. While not mutually exclusive, each of the frames of reference outlined above leads to differing conclusions about how to proceed toward a solution to the problem.

However, the project which offers solutions to all three frames simultaneously is the Southeast Anatolian Project or GAP…The project provides a catchall solution to the three main ways in which the Kurdish problem is framed by the Turkish majority. GAP can solve the problem of domestic terrorism by limiting internal travel and concentrating populations, making the Kurds easier to control. GAP can solve the problem of international terrorism by providing the Turkish government with a tool with which to threaten foreign nations and by making cross-border incursions more difficult. Finally, GAP can solve socioeconomic problems by encouraging economic growth in the region while forcibly assimilating the society. Initially an electrical generation project, GAP was sold as a way to improve the economic performance of Turkey and to build up the backward, underdeveloped southeastern region within the country. This integration approach was also intended to allay many European human rights concerns about Turkey and to expedite the process of Turkish inclusion in the European Economic Community and later the European Union.

Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case. GAP has, in actuality, served as an alternative method of assimilation and government control over an area that is notorious throughout Turkish history for being difficult to dominate. Supported by other government policies, it encourages permanent displacement of Kurdish populations and the destruction of Kurdish culture. Even the regional socioeconomic improvements are implemented in a way that seeks to force the assimilation of the Kurdish population. Despite limited openings within Turkish politics and society for the Kurdish population, GAP continues to provide policy expression to the Kemalist idea of a nation-state based on the single ethnic identity of Turk. Far from developing and integrating the Kurdish populations, GAP furthers the solution of Turkey's Kurdish problem by erasing the Kurds themselves.

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KURDS DECLARE INDEPENDENCE IN SYRIA

Daniel Greenfield

Frontpage, Nov. 13, 2013

This is an interesting development. Assad is in no shape to do anything about it right now and is hoping that the various Sunni Jihadist groups begin pressing down harder on the Kurds to give him some breathing room. Considering that Turkey is terrified of Kurdish autonomy and is backing the Sunni forces, that is inevitable. But Iraq, Assad’s Shiite ally, also has a serious Kurdish autonomy problem. But then again it also has a serious Sunni Jihadist problem too. If Assad makes a full comeback, no Kurdish autonomous state is likely to survive for long. It might be different with American backing, but that won’t come. Not under Obama.

Following a series of military gains, Syrian Kurds in the northeast of the country announced on Tuesday the formation of a transitional autonomous government. The latest declaration comes amid a general strengthening of Kurdish rights in neighboring Turkey, and increasing moves towards independence by Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region. Long oppressed under Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his father before him, Kurds view the civil war as an opportunity to gain the kind of autonomy enjoyed by their ethnic kin in neighboring Iraq.

The announcement was made after talks in the mostly-Kurdish town of Qamishli, and comes after Kurdish leaders announced plans to create the temporary government in July. Kurdish regions of northern Syria have been administered by local Kurdish councils since forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad withdrew in the middle of 2012. The redeployment was seen as a tactical move by the regime, one which freed up forces to battle rebels elsewhere, and encouraged the Kurds to avoid allying with the opposition.

A Kurdish state across parts of what used to be Iraq, Syria and Turkey is still probably a fantasy, but Kurds have been one of the biggest beneficiaries of American foreign policy; though unintentionally. The Iraq War and the extended violence afterward, backed by Syria, gave Iraqi Kurds the breathing room to become a success. Now the Arab Spring has likewise made it possible for the Kurds to carve up a piece of Syria. And if Erdogan manages to tear apart Turkey, the Kurds might just be 3 for 3.

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ERDOGAN’S “MORALITY POLICE” ASSUME DUTY

Orhan Kemal Cengiz

Al-Monitor, Nov. 6, 2013

It all started with the leak of remarks made by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a closed meeting over the weekend. According to media reports, Erdogan said university students — boys and girls — were sharing flats in the western province of Denizli due to a shortage of dorms, and that this was unacceptable. “Students, boys and girls, are living together in the same homes because the dorms are insufficient. This is incompatible with our conservative democrat nature. I’ve seen this in Denizli. I’ve instructed the governor. Whatever is necessary will be done,” Erdogan was quoted as saying. Government spokesmen, however, were quick to deny the alleged remarks. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc and Erdogan’s chief adviser Yalcin Akdogan both dismissed the reports as fabrications and said that Erdogan had actually referred to dorms and “apart” accommodations housing students.

The controversy was beginning to fade when Erdogan appeared before the media and confirmed he did make the remarks. He asserted he stood behind his statement: “I’m not a person to deny what I have said. We have failed to meet the demand for dorms in some places, which has led to problems concerning accommodation in [private] homes. Our security forces are receiving intelligence about those places, our governors are taking action. Why is this a reason to be annoyed? Those flats are being reported by neighbors in the same buildings. It is unknown what is going on there. All kinds of messy things are happening. Parents are crying out, ‘Where is the state?’ We have to show where the state is.” Erdogan did not stop there and indicated explicitly what action the state could take: “The governors already have authority, and we want them to be more active on the issue. If need be, we could also pass a legislative arrangement.”

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has been making a special effort recently to separate the dorms for male and female university students. The Youth and Sports Ministry has launched a drive to make sure that male and female dorms are not located on the same campus. Erdogan’s remarks, however, indicate that the government intends to also prevent male and female students from sharing homes. Yet the “legislative” arrangements he mentioned appear quite problematic in the context of the Turkish legal system. Article 20 of the Turkish constitution states: “Everyone has the right to demand respect for his/her private and family life. Privacy of private or family life shall not be violated.” Under current Turkish law, police cannot enter a home without a judicial order unless a crime punishable with a heavy sentence is being perpetrated inside the property at that very moment.

Erdogan’s remarks about legislative measures brought to mind the controversy in 2004, when he insisted that adultery would be criminalized, but then backed down. Erdogan said at the time that the government was working on new penal code provisions that would make it a crime for spouses to have extramarital sexual relations. The draft, however, was shelved following public outcry and harsh European Union criticism. Even if the government criminalizes adultery or introduces legal provisions facilitating the police’s entry to residential spaces, none of those arrangements are likely to have any validity vis-à-vis the international conventions that Turkey has signed.

Besides its constitutional guarantee for private life, Turkey is a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, Article 90 of the Turkish constitution stipulates that in the case of a conflict between international agreements and domestic laws on issues related to fundamental rights and freedoms, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail. This means that legislating provisions like the one Erdogan mentioned seems impossible unless drastic steps are taken to retract Turkey’s signature from the said international conventions or amend the constitution. Yet, that legal provisions are impossible or at least hard to legislate does not mean that the government cannot intervene in people’s private lives on the ground.

Shortly after Erdogan spoke, the governor of Adana, Turkey’s fourth largest province, declared that the prime minister’s words amounted to an order for him and that he would take the necessary steps for the protection of the youth. In Isparta, meanwhile, a high school was reported to have introduced an arrangement segregating boys and girls during lunch. No doubt Erdogan’s words will greatly increase social pressure on people with secular lifestyles. It is not hard to foresee that the self-styled morality guardians of neighborhoods and apartment buildings will now feel emboldened to harass unmarried couples or men and women sharing homes.

Some building managers appear to be already taking action and assuming the role of “morality police.” A message, pasted on the entrance of a building in Istanbul’s Uskudar district right after Erdogan’s speech, illustrates clearly what pressures men and women sharing a home will face. “Some people in this building are staying together, boys and girls. This is inappropriate for the building and the apartment block. When you see such people, report them to the police,” the message read. In fact, all this demonstrates that Erdogan and his government have failed to learn any lesson from the mass demonstrations that simmered across Turkey in June. “Hands off my private life!” was one of the most popular slogans of the protests. Yet Erdogan is still encouraging governors, public administrators, building managers and neighborhood folk to act as “morality police” and meddle in people’s private lives. And the “morality police” appear to have enthusiastically assumed their duty.

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Turkish Columnists Eulogize Democracy: Michael Rubin, Commentary, Nov. 12, 2013— I and many others have written for quite some time about the erosion of democracy, liberalism, tolerance, and constitutionalism inside Turkey.

Iraq’s Kurdish Region Pursues Ties With Turkey – For Energy Revenue and Independence: Ben Van Heuvelen, Washington Post, Nov. 9, 2013— As the rest of Iraq descends into a crisis of deepening violence, the autonomous enclave of Kurdistan is enlisting the help of an unlikely ally, Turkey, to reach for a long-delayed dream of independence.

Curing the Hiccups in Israeli-Turkish Negotiations: Gabriel Mitchell, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 5, 2013— From tales of Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan revealing the names of 10 Mossad assets to Iranian authorities, to El Al being locked out of the Turkish market, it is hard to find a silver lining amid the darkening clouds of Israeli-Turkish relations.

Syrian Kurdish Leader: Turkey May End Proxy War: Amberin Zaman, Al-Monitor, Nov. 7, 2013—  Saleh Muslim, the co-chairman of Syria’s most powerful Kurdish party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), has been holding talks in Geneva with Russian and Western officials in preparation for the planned Geneva II peace conference between the Syrian government and opposition groups.

On Topic Links

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